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1 An interconnected whole 
October 2016 feels like a long time ago. Back then, just about to start my PhD in 
Barcelona, I had little idea of what my dissertation was going to be about. Unlike many 
of my colleagues, I had no overarching hypothesis over which to dwell for the three or 
four years to come. It surprised me that many of them not only already knew what they 
wanted to do research on but could delineate their main conjectures with enviable 
precision.  
 My move from Brazil to Barcelona around that time was made possible by being 
one of the 14 fortunate recipients of an incredible scholarship, part of the bigger-than-
life Diaphora project1, spearheaded by Sven Rosenkranz and countless other philosophy 
luminaries across Europe; the bigger the prize, the greater the responsibilities – still, I 
couldn’t but stutter when people, surely trying to be nice to the newcomer, asked “what’s 
your thesis about?”. 
 In retrospect, all I had back in October 2016 was a vague impression: there is 
little consensus on what —if anything— is for two persons, or for the same person at 
different times, to think the same thoughts or to entertain the same concepts. These two 
interrelated issues are sometimes called, respectively, the problem of thought publicity 
and of cognitive dynamics. The second issue was to finally lose protagonism in my 
dissertation, being progressively relegated to the background; thought’s publicity, on the 
other hand, consistently appeared as a central aspect of the papers I read, and, 
unsurprisingly, in the papers I wrote. It is thus no surprise that the dissertation is called 
what it is. 
 I confess I was slightly relieved when, just very recently, I looked back on the 
papers I had written during my doctorate years and discovered that, indeed, they do form 
a – sort of – interconnected whole. I now explain why this is so. I’ll do this in two steps. 
First (section 2), I attempt to briefly outline the methodological stance which informs 
most of the chapters that follow. I do this by discussing some fundamental recurring 
themes, as well as fending off a few preliminary criticisms that would make my project 
 
1 The Marie Skłodowska-Curie European Training Network DIAPHORA served as a European research 
and training platform for collaborative research on the nature of philosophical problems, their resilience 
and the sources of persistent divergence of expert opinion about them, and their relation to conflicts in the 
practical sphere. It received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation 
programme under Grant Agreement no. 675415. For more: http://www.ub.edu/diaphora/ 
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seem unfairly unattractive. The starting point is that thoughts and concepts are functional 
entities, and thus definable by their constitutive theoretical roles. Which roles these are, 
of course, is one of the most pressing issues examined, but the focus is on a particular 
one: thought’s role in explaining several intersubjective relationships such as 
communication, understanding, and genuine disagreement. Secondly (section 3), I tell 
you a little bit about each chapter and explain how they swirl around these topics, 
regardless of the occasional terminological discrepancy or divergent focus. In any case, 
don’t worry: I will avoid detailing everything that the papers talk about and mainly focus 
on their mutual interactions. 
 
2 Recurring Themes 
As any old theoretical entities, thoughts (the whole thing) and concepts (its parts) are 
supposed to earn their keep by means of the jobs they can do – where ‘doing’, in this 
case, consists in being able to adequately explain or at least illuminate phenomena which 
can itself be described independently of them. Which phenomena are thoughts and 
concepts supposed to explain? Crucial to this dissertation is Publicity – thought’s role in 
an account of several intersubjective relationships between thinkers, especially 
successful communication, understanding and genuine agreement. 
 Four of the five papers compiled therein have Publicity at their forefront, while 
the exception (chapter 4) discusses issues very much in its vicinity. But Publicity is a 
tough role to accommodate. On each of these four chapters, I pair Publicity with another 
important thesis - either a distinct role that thoughts are equally expected to play, or a 
more precise view about concepts – and the ensuing result is inevitably the same: 
inconsistency. Thus, in Chapter 1, we see that Publicity clashes with Explanation, the 
theoretical role according to which sameness of thought allow us to predict sameness of 
behavior. Chapter 2 is about Publicity’s conflict with Frege’s Constraint, the principle 
that thoughts must track cognitive or informational import. Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 put 
Publicity face to face with, respectively, internalist and relationist view of concepts. 
Unsurprisingly, the predicament is the same: either Publicity or the accompanying view 
must be rejected.  
 In summary, all but one of the papers compiled herein can be advertised as a 
conflict between Publicity and another contending claim. Given that each of those 
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contenders have independent plausibility behind them, the fact that all of them seem to 
clash with Publicity amounts to an astounding cumulative argument against it. It would 
be nice if it could be otherwise, but the way things have gone, we cannot but conclude: 
Publicity must go.  
 In the next couple of subsections (2.1, 2.2), I hope to explain why this conclusion 
is not to be taken too lightly. Publicity, I claim, is a highly desirable principle for more 
than one methodological reason. If it must really go, this is no reason to celebrate. 
Besides, rejecting it is much trickier than has been thought. In subsection 2.3, I fend off 
a few prima facie criticisms against it that sound intuitive at first look, but ultimately fail. 
This will help us set the stage for what I take to be the appropriate reasons for letting 
Publicity go, which will be spelled out in the following chapters. 
 
2.1 Thoughts and Publicity 
‘Thought’ is, at least in restricted analytic philosophy circles, a term that evokes the 
philosophical work of Frege. In On Sense and Reference, Frege explains what he means 
by ‘thought’ in a discreet footnote: “by a thought I understand not the subjective 
performance of thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the common 
property of several thinkers” (Frege, 1892, fn. 5).  
 This telling footnote has several aspects, but a clear thread underlies it: thoughts 
are not subjective (such as my current thinking about lunch right now, with all the 
contingent associative ideas that surround it), but objective, and thus shareable by distinct 
thinkers. Armed with an opportunity to explain what thoughts are, Frege thus basically 
sets out the basic ideas behind what me and other authors call ‘Publicity’.   
 Frege’s suggestion takes us far, but not far enough. It is ok to suggest that 
thoughts are introduced in order to explain objective, and not subjective, aspects of 
thinkers – but which aspects? Here we might start to deviate from Frege, but the 
cornerstone idea of this dissertation, put in the most general and pre-theoretical terms as 
possible, is that the notion of thought must help us explain when two thinkers think alike 
– in other words, when two thinkers are thinking the same. This, then, is the phenomenon 
we can describe prior to the introduction of thought qua theoretical notion: subjects 
sometimes think alike – e.g. when one takes the other at her word and believes what she 
says – and sometimes do not – e.g. when they’re unknowingly talking past each other. 
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The promising idea then is: by introducing thoughts to our theoretical framework, we can 
systematize that pre-theoretical phenomenon and illuminate its inner workings. 
 We can thus define Publicity as the claim that thoughts (or at least the relation of 
sameness of thought)2 must help us account, in a reasonably direct fashion, for several 
intersubjective relationships between distinct thinkers, such as successful 
communication and understanding. These intersubjective relationships are supposed to 
be a first-pass precisification of the admittedly vague idea that sometimes subjects think 
alike and sometimes not. The intuitive connection between the latter idea and the 
intersubjective relationships is then naturally hypothesized to work in the following 
manner: if two subjects successfully communicate and understand each other, then 
(modulo cases of insincere utterances or suspicious hearers, which I’m sorry to say I 
won’t be concerned with in this dissertation) they think alike.  
 Let me emphasize how helpful this precisification is supposed to be. Our 
commonsensical intuitions about when people think alike with respect to a certain subject 
matter are not always crystal clear; but they’re certainly sharper with regards to whether 
two subjects have successfully communicated or understood each other. Take, for 
example, a layperson who knows no more about megabytes than that they’re stuff you 
can measure “the size” of computer programs with, and a computer specialist who could 
give you an accurate description of how they function. Do these people think the same 
as each other if, for example, both assent to ‘floppy disks can store 1.44 megabytes’? 
Well, in a sense there is no principled way to answer that question – “think the same in 
which respect?”, one might wonder. When the layperson assents to that, she’s mainly 
focused on e.g. a computer game whose size is just a bit under 1.44mb, so she could carry 
it in one floppy. When the specialist assents to that, she might be focused on… I don’t 
even know, complicated stuff about bytes and bits, I guess.  
 On the other hand, if we rephrase the question as “would the layperson understand 
the computer specialist if the latter had uttered that sentence (or vice-versa)?” then our 
verdicts might point with a bit more strength towards a positive answer. It is easy to 
conceive of communicate scenarios in which one utters that sentence to the other, and 
both leave knowing more than they did before. Some could, of course, still raise their 
 
2 I will usually speak of thoughts as the key theoretical entities, but it might very well be that we just need 
an equivalence relation, sameness of thought, in order to do all we need to do. 
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eyebrows and wonder whether this instance of communication was really 100% 
successful, or whether understanding there was not only “partial”. I welcome that kind 
of hypothesis. However, I find it hard to deny that this question, unlike its analogue from 
the previous paragraph, has already taken us to the field of philosophical doubt. It is not 
the question the ordinary person in the street would ask, but one which is raised inside 
philosophy departments by people who wonder about the roles the concepts of successful 
communication and understanding should play. The distinction between the philosopher 
and the layperson is, I admit, not clear-cut. But limits need to be traced at some place in 
order for inquiry to get off the ground; this is where I’ve traced them.  
 Of course, intuitions about cases are important but not irrefutably dogmatic. As 
Austin nicely puts in a discussion about the use of ordinary language within philosophy: 
 
Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can 
everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only 
remember, it is the first word. (Austin 1979, p. 185, emphasis mine) 
 
 We can then summarize my most general methodological stance as an inference 
that starts with a yearn to provide an account of what it is for two subjects to think alike 
with respect to a certain subject matter, precisifies that notion as consisting in the 
intersubjective relationships previously mentioned, and ends with the introduction of 
thought (or sameness of thought) as the minimal notion that would be enough to fulfill 
that task in a suitably systematic fashion. The question we started this section with was: 
what are thoughts? I can now give you a minimal answer that mirrors some of what Frege 
said in that footnote: thoughts are the theoretical posits whose sharing by subjects explain 
why they’ve successfully communicated or understood each other. This general idea and 
understanding of what thoughts are I refer to as ‘Publicity’ in chapters 3 and 5, as 
‘Agreement’ in chapter 1, and as ‘the thought-transfer model of communication’ in 
chapter 2.3 These distinct names reflect the distinct commitments and objectives of each 
separate chapter, but their common core all point to the same direction. 
 Let me pause here and make a disclaimer. I’ve been implying that my conception 
of what thoughts are is broadly Fregean, and in sync with what this author says on his 
 
3 A related but not-quite-the-same principle is called ‘C2’ in chapter 4. 
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well-known 1892 paper. This is misleading. For one thing, I have thus far acted as if 
Frege’s quotation never included that bit about “thoughts being contents”. If thoughts are 
contents, then they are semantic notions and prone to have all sorts of properties that 
semantic entities usually have. At first sight, this doesn’t seem to have much to do with 
Publicity, which is itself neutral on whether thoughts strictly belong to semantics or not 
(it is not, after all, contradictory to think that whether communication is successful or not 
crucially depends on non-semantic issues).4 I might have also led you to believe that 
Frege took thoughts and intersubjective relationships to stand in a very close, almost 
indissociable relationship on that paper. But those who have read On Sense and 
Reference might notice that communicative scenarios do not play a very central role in 
that paper.5 Instead, Frege’s main aim there is to explain how some identities can be 
informative, and others not, regardless of being made true by the same object’s self-
identity. This, and not anything I talked about, is the theoretical role Frege mostly cared 
about back in 1892. 
 I never meant to do any accurate exegesis of Frege’s work, but some clarifications 
are in order. In providing them, I also intend to make it clearer how Publicity connects 
with the Fregean discussions about the informativity of identities and other themes. Let 
us then make a brief detour.  
 
2.2 Frege’s Constraint  
Frege’s main aim in his famous paper, solving the puzzle of informative identities and 
showing how propositional attitudes with the same truth-conditions can be cognitively 
distinct, also plays a central part in this dissertation. Indeed, this theoretical role of 
thoughts divides the spotlight with Publicity in chapter 2 of this dissertation, and appears 
in the background of all of the others. Throughout the chapters to come, it is variously 
called ‘Frege’s Constraint’ (chapters 2, and 3), CS-Role (for ‘cognitive significance’, in 
chapter 5), and referred to en passant as ‘the hyper-intensionality of singular thought’ in 
chapter 1. I take Frege’s Costraint (as we might choose to call it, following the likes of 
 
4 Indeed, I am, for the most part, neutral about whether thoughts and concepts are to be conceived as 
semantic entities or not. The only exceptions is chapter 3, where I’m explicitly examining semantic 
internalist views, where the semantic nature of thoughts and concepts follows as a corollary. In all of the 
other chapters, on the other hand, thoughts and concepts are whatever play a certain set of theoretical roles, 
and these roles will consistently be neutral on that respect.  
5 Although they of course do in his 1918 paper, The Thought. 
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Schiffer 1978 and Recanati 2012) so seriously that I almost never even conceive of 
rejecting it. Indeed, the only place where I discuss its rejection is within a brief discussion 
on section 6 of Chapter 2 – but I quickly dismiss that possibility given residual 
complications that would arise. 
 My dissatisfaction with Frege’s Constraint is not that I do not find it fundamental 
enough. It’s that, if this is the only role for thoughts we have to go on, then their 
theoretical usefulness will be limited to particular time-slices of single individuals. In 
other words, Frege’s Constraint only enables us to individuate the thoughts that a single 
subject has at one and the same time. I won’t go over the (boringly familiar) details about 
why this is so here; this will be clear enough in the chapters to follow. Suffice to notice 
that Frege’s Constraint is a principle about what a (single) rational thinker can believe 
simultaneously, and thus it is useless if we’re interested in intersubjective and/or 
diachronic scenarios.  
This then is another substantial reason in favor of the methodological stance I 
have outlined in the previous section: subscribing to Publicity, and thus ensuring that 
sameness of thought walks hand in hand with the intersubjective relationships, enables 
us to have faith that an intersubjective notion of thought, equally capable of 
characterizing single individuals’ cognitive states as of distinct ones, can be designed.  
I hope this is seductive enough to convince the reader that Publicity is a highly 
attractive principle. If not, I presume you will find my attempts to motivate, defend, and 
ultimately show the limitations of Publicity in the following chapters a bit similar to 
Quixote fighting windmills. I am however confident that my discussions will have 
something for everybody, even for those who are suspicious of the idea that 
communication and understanding require the transmission of a thing (or some kind of 
sharing), where this thing is also supposed to be what characterizes the cognitive value 
of our beliefs. Even if you sympathize with this suspicion, you might still appreciate to 
learn that some reasons to be skeptical of Publicity and my whole methodological stance 
are better than others. If all else fails, I might at least rest content with having separated 
the wheat from the chaff, that is, good reasons to be skeptical of Publicity from bad ones 





2.3 Much chaff for just a few grains of wheat 
Here’s a first criticism I’d like to pre-empt: “why should I care if thought can be made 
intersubjective or not? As long as I can distinguish between Lois Lane’s beliefs about 
Clark Kent from her beliefs about Superman, why would I need anything more? Aren’t 
you sweating for nothing?” 
 My first reaction to that criticism is that any conception of propositional attitudes 
according to which they’re not a common currency between distinct individuals would 
fail to give us one of the central constituents of folk-psychology, which is expected to be 
reflected on any serious cognitive psychology: generalizable intentional explanations. I 
do not need to go into details here, but the idea is old and familiar: if a subject 
intentionally acts some way because of the beliefs and desires she holds, then, if another 
subject also holds those same beliefs and desires, she will, all things being equal, act in 
the same way. Behavior can not only be explained on the basis of a subject’s attitudes, 
we can also predict that people who believe alike will behave alike. This fundamental 
principle, which is referred to as ‘Explanation’ in Chapter 1 (where it is presented as 
Publicity’s contender) and discussed under the rubric of ‘Intentional Explanation’ in 
Chapter 5, depends on the idea that distinct subjects can have the same propositional 
attitudes; from there, it is a quick step to the conclusion that Explanation depends, at least 
weakly, on the shareability of thoughts. 
 Leaving these issues to the side, another skeptic might put forward the following 
complaint: “explain to me again why we should want an intersubjective notion of thought 
which is as fine-grained as the intrapersonal one carved up by Frege’s Constraint? For 
one thing, Frege’s reasons for introducing thoughts in On Sense and Reference seems 
based on an intrapersonal puzzle that doesn’t obviously have an intersubjective analogue. 
Which intersubjective puzzle(s) would this conception of thought be supposed to 
explain?” 
This challenge is well received but, I think, can be met. For each of the 
intersubjective relationships we’ve discussed above, we can construct a puzzle which is 
analogous to Frege’s puzzle of informative identities in a crucial respect, namely, in 
showing that sameness of truth-conditions (or referential content) is not sufficient to 
account for some target notion. Frege’s puzzle of identities shows it is not sufficient to 
characterize the cognitive profile of our attitudes (since token attitudes with the same 
ix 
 
truth-conditions can be cognitively distinct). Analogous puzzles show it is not sufficient 
to characterize the success conditions of the intersubjective relationships. 
Communication, for example, can fail even if the hearer acquires, as a result of 
interpreting the speaker’s utterance, a belief which has the same truth-conditions as the 
speaker’s. I refer to these cases as ‘Loar-cases’, given their inspiration on a thought-
experiment found in Loar (1976). Loar-cases are the centerpiece of chapter 4 (indeed, 
this chapter contains no fewer than 3 variations of these cases), but they also pop up in a 
couple of other places throughout the dissertation. 
To be sure, Loar-cases only show that sameness of truth-conditions is not 
sufficient for successful communication or understanding, but nothing about them forces 
us to conclude what sameness of thought then should be. Taking sameness of thought as 
the key explanatory relation in these cases is to be seen as an inference to the best 
explanation, and not as deductive consequence of the data. Whether it really is the best 
explanation or not is – of course - one of the main questions I examine. There surely is a 
lot of good reason for skepticism, I admit. But I repeat: there are many bad reasons around 
being taken for good ones, and very few good ones that are being properly focused on.  
I thus insist on discussing a set of bad reasons to be skeptic about Publicity before 
proceeding to give you a summary of the papers and finishing this introduction. The first 
are related to indexicals, the second, to conceptual variability. 
 
2.3.1 Publicity and indexicals 
Back in 2017, during my first ever PhD talk at the University of Łódź, I received a 
question during the Q&A session that haunted me for quite some time. This episode 
centered around the following accusation: “why would anybody think that 
communication requires sameness of thought between speaker and hearer? Just look at 
any instance of communication involving indexical expressions – these are clear cases 
where successful understanding requires the hearer to entertain a thought which is 
radically distinct from the speaker’s, e.g. if you say ‘I’, then I must say ‘you’!” 
 On those days, I still hadn’t thought long about the subject, and the confident 
smile of my interlocutor did not help me get ahold of myself and construct a proper reply. 
I can do better now. I think this type of argument (“indexicals show communication often 
requires distinct thoughts”) is much harder to sustain than people usually presume. It 
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rests on an unspoken assumption which sounds natural but is actually dubious. The 
assumption is roughly: no belief expressible by an indexical i¹ is characterizable by the 
same thought as another belief expressible by an indexical i², where i¹ is different from 
i². Let us call this thesis ‘Distinctness’. For the sake of exposition, we might limit our 
discussion to the particular case of I/you. The restricted Distinctness then comes out as: 
no de te belief (expressible by the second person pronoun) is ever the same as 
(characterizable by the same thought as) a de se belief (expressible by the first person 
pronoun).  
 People often assume Distinctness implicitly, and then jump to the conclusion that 
Publicity is incompatible with indexical communication. But what are the arguments in 
its favor in the first place? This is not always easy to answer. I’ve come up with three 
different ones: (i) the argument from revised Frege’s Constraint, (ii) the argument from 
the Lewisian view of propositional attitudes, (iii) the argument from Explanation.6  
 Let me now explain why I think (i) fails and why (ii) is not convincing. I hope 
you’ll agree that these discussions are worth the ride. As for (iii), my final verdict is that 
it is plausible. However, this argument will not be discussed here but in Chapter 1. 
Indeed, a great part of Chapter 1 is devoted to developing that argument and shielding it 
from objections. Its plausibility is thus not straightforward, it must be earned. In any case, 
the argument is not a direct refutation of Publicity. It at most allows us to conclude that 
Publicity is in conflict with Explanation with regards to indexical scenarios. One could 
save Publicity by either rejecting Explanation or restricting it to non-indexical thoughts. 
In summary, I see only one promising argument in favor of the Distinctness and it is 
neither easy to motivate nor a direct refutation of Publicity. My interlocutor was surely 
taking too much for granted. 
 
2.3.1.1 Publicity and the revised Frege’s Constraint 
Frege’s Constraint, as we have seen, entails that, if an individual can simultaneously 
believe of the same object that it has and doesn’t have a certain property 
 
6 Another possible argument is “the argument from immunity to error through misidentification”. It would 
be based on the fact that de se beliefs are (sometimes?) IEM, de te ones, not. It is not common to employ 
IEM in the service of individuating thoughts, but this could be the basis for an interesting argument. In any 
case, I leave it unexplored for the time being. 
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(simultaneously), then his belief and disbelief should be characterized by distinct 
thoughts. Can Frege’s Constraint be used to argue for Distinctness?  
 One might try to do so by arguing that there is no pair of de se and de te thoughts 
such that it would be irrational to believe one while disbelieving the other simultaneously. 
Take, for example, the belief Newman expresses by ‘These pretzels are making me 
thirsty!’. It is plain to see that he can have that belief without believing what he’d 
normally express by the corresponding second-person utterance of ‘These pretzels are 
making you thirsty!’ – and that is true even if that utterance were directed at Newman 
himself (e.g. if he were looking at himself in the mirror without realizing it was his own 
reflection). From this, one might try to infer Distinctness, i.e. that every de se and de te 
beliefs are such that they need to be characterized by distinct thoughts.  
 This might be sound reasoning but it’s not enough to support Distinctness. The 
cases which are of interest to our present discussion are ones where the pair of de se and 
de te thoughts are not tokened by one and the same thinker, but by distinct participants 
in a conversation - a speaker and a hearer.7 We are, after all, trying to see if indexical 
communication is compatible with Publicity. This requires a scenario with two thoughts, 
where one is the result of interpreting an utterance which expresses the other. The two 
thoughts must be connected by means of an interpretation relation, so to say. More 
particularly, the kind of case we are interested is one where the speaker (e.g. Newman) 
makes a first-person utterance, and where the hearer (e.g. Elaine) forms, as a result of 
interpreting his utterance, a belief she’d express by means of a second-person utterance: 
 
 Newman: these pretzels are making me thirsty! 
 Elaine: these pretzels are making you [addressing Newman] thirsty!  
 
 At first sight, Frege’s Constraint is completely silent about interpersonal cases 
such as the one above. It only outputs predictions for thoughts that one and the same 
subject can hold at one and the same time.  Can we somehow expand it so that it helps 
us account for conversational contexts such as Newman & Elaine’s? One way we could 
try to do this is by asking ourselves whether it would be rational for someone to accept 
 
7 Strictly speaking, the speaker and the hearer can be the same person as long as she is interpreting her own 
utterance from the third-person.  
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Newman’s 1st-person utterance as expressing a true thought while taking Elaine’s 2nd-
person one to express a false one. But the answer to that question is clearly ‘yes’. If one 
mistakenly thinks that Elaine’s utterance is directed at a third participant of the 
conversation, say George, instead of Newman, one might think that Newman’s utterance 
says something true, but that Elaine’s doesn’t. Just to be clear, if one commits that 
mistake, one would end up with a bad interpretation of Elaine’s utterance, but that doesn’t 
mean this person would be irrational. In any case, it seems hasty to jump from that 
possibility to the conclusion that Newman and Elaine’s utterances express distinct 
thoughts. Instead, the possibility of taking contrasting attitudes to the thoughts expressed 
by these utterances seems best accounted by the fact that this mistaken thinker fails to 
understand who Elaine is talking to in the first place. The case here is similar to one 
where a subject mistakenly believes that ‘vixen’ and ‘female fox’ mean different things, 
and thus is able to rationally take contrasting attitudes to thoughts expressed by utterances 
which only differ in the substitution of one term for the other. 
 These comments suggest that we should focus only on thinkers who successfully 
understand who the speaker is talking about. Frege’s Constraint can then be revised in 
the form of the following test: two utterances express distinct thoughts if and only if a 
subject who understands who these utterances are directed at could rationally take 
contrasting attitudes to them (believing one while disbelieving the other).  
 Let us then conceive of a thinker who understands that Newman’s utterance 
expresses a de se thought about Newman and that Elaine’s utterance expresses a de te 
thought about Newman. Can she take contrasting attitudes towards them? It seems she 
cannot. If that thinker understands that the two utterances are directed at the same person, 
then there seems to be no rational basis for thinking they diverge in truth-value. She 
believes what one says if and only if she believes what the other does. Thus, if this version 
of Frege’s Constraint is to be taken as a serious indication of thought distinctness, it at 
least fails to entail that they’re different (if passing the test is taken as a necessary 
condition for thought distinctness) and possibly shows that they’re the same (if not 
passing the test is taken as a sufficient condition for thought identity). 
 
2.3.1.2 Publicity and the Lewisian view 
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Other arguments for Distinctness are less general and, instead, follow collaterally from 
theoretical choices made with other objectives in mind. Thus, for example, if one 
subscribes to the popular Lewisian view of propositional attitudes, according to which 
beliefs is modeled as the self-ascription of a property, then, as many authors have pointed 
out,  Distinctness follows as a collateral consequence and Publicity crumbles. While it is 
true that Lewis’ (1979) framework has Distinctness as a consequence, I think this is a 
“theoretical epiphenomenon” of his view, and not one of its essential aspects. Lewis’ 
objectives had very little to do with Distinctness, and thus tweaking his view so as to 
make it compatible with the former thesis should not affect its most important virtues. 
What follows are mere sketches of how this proposal could be developed, but hopefully 
they will be suggestive enough that the reader will see what I’m hinting at. 
 Lewis’ account of the de se in terms of the self-ascription of properties has one 
main objective: accounting for the cognitive value of de se beliefs. Lewis wants to 
explain how it is possible e.g. for Zeus to believe what he’d express by ‘Zeus throws 
down bolts of lightning’ without believing what he’d express by ‘I throw down bolts of 
lightning’.  
 Lewis’ way of accounting for his primary objective is making belief very fine-
grained: to believe is to self-ascribe a property. The self-ascription part has one 
immediate consequence: we do not literally have the same beliefs, since each of us is 
self-ascribing properties to themselves. But this is not an insurmountable problem, since 
we can at least have beliefs whose content is the same property. 
 Surprisingly, even if we attain ourselves to the properties self-ascribed according 
to Lewis’ view, Distinctness still follows. Say that a de se belief and a de te belief agree 
with each other when they’re witnesses to an instance of successful communication (e.g. 
my ‘I’ and your ‘you’ when we understand each other). The problem is that, while every 
de se belief will be modeled as the self-ascription of a property F, every corresponding 
de te belief in agreement with it will be modeled as the self-ascription of the property of 
inhabiting a world where one’s addressee is F. In Lewis’ view, no de se and de te belief 
ever self-ascribe the same property. Thus, Distinctness is true on that view. 
 But does it have to be so? Is the entailment of Distinctness one of the things that 
Lewis needed/strived to have? I don’t think so. Notice that Lewis’ objective has prima 
facie nothing to do with it. It is not one of his main worries, for example, whether Zeus’ 
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de se belief (‘I throw down bolts of lightning’) is identical to Thor’s de te belief which 
he’d express as ‘You [to Zeus] throw down bolts of lightning’. 
 With that in mind, here’s two ways in which one might modify Lewis’ framework 
so that (i) it still accounts for the cognitive value of de se thought and (ii) it does not 
entail Distinctness: 
 
1. Model belief as the group-ascription of a property. This has been done already (e.g. 
work on multicentered propositions). On this view, a de se and a de te belief could be 
said to group-ascribe the same property: the property of being members of a group where 
one of the members is F. But there’s a potential problem here. In views that employ 
multicentered propositions, much care is put into making sure that the members of the 
corresponding group be ordered. This needs to be done because often we are not simply 
ascribing a property to some member of the group, but to a particular one (the speaker; 
the hearer etc.). Thus, what these authors really end up with is something like: the group 
is x, y (where x = Newman and y = Elaine), and the property being group-ascribed is 
that we are members of a group where x is thirsty. Would Distinctness then follow from 
the fact that Arlette and Brigitte occupy different places in the ordered set modeling the 
group? I don’t think so, since at least the property being group-ascribed would be the 
same. 
 
2. Model belief as the x-ascription of a property, where x can take values different from 
‘self’, such as ‘addressee’. The idea is that some beliefs are modeled as self-ascriptions 
of properties but others as the addressee-ascription of (the same) property. We can also 
perhaps group-ascribe, third-personally-ascribe, world-ascribe a property, Newman-
ascribe etc. But I do not care about these possibilities right now. As long as we have a de 
se form of ascription alongside a de te form, we can say that a de se and a de te belief are 
ascriptions of the very same property, but where the first is a self-ascription, the second, 
an addressee-ascription. This kind of framework has been, so far, not developed (not even 
by me, sorry!). I would appreciate having a view where de se belief would be modeled 
as self-ascription of a property, de te, as the addressee-ascription of a property, de dicto 
belief as the world-ascription of a property and de re as the X-ascription of a property 
(where X is the object the belief is about). Thus, the same property, being thirsty, could 
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be self-ascribed, addressee-ascribed, world-ascribed or X-ascribed. There are many 
issues that such a framework would raise, but I will leave at that for now. 
 
2.3.2 Publicity and “conceptual” variability  
Here’s another complaint I’ve heard a few times: “Publicity is no good; just look at any 
psychology manual devoted to concepts: 99% of the authors there agree that people’s 
concepts are highly variable, differing from one tiny contextual change to the other; if 
communication really required people to have the exact same concepts, then successful 
communication and understanding would be a faraway utopia”.  
 Here’s one example of the type of cases this person would have in mind: a recent 
experiment found that half of native Dutch speakers tested took the arm to end at the 
wrist (‘arm’ thus means the limb from shoulder to wrist), while the others took it to end 
at the hand’s fingertips (‘arm’ thus means the limb from shoulder to fingertips). If half of 
the people in the Netherlands have a different concept for such an ordinary thing as an 
arm, then it is surely wishful thinking to think people generally share their concepts.8 
 The unspoken assumption in that argument is, of course, that our concepts and 
thoughts must be individuated by our beliefs of what some representations apply to, or 
at least our dispositions to employ them when engaging in certain higher-order cognitive 
tasks, such as categorization of objects. There is only one chapter in this dissertation 
which takes this “internalist” assumption on-board: Chapter 3. In that chapter I explicitly 
discuss what to do with Publicity given so much variability. Indeed, my reply in that 
paper is sort of pessimistic: Publicity has to be severely weakened and we have to accept 
that communication and disagreement can proceed in absence of sameness of “thoughts” 
and “concepts”, conceived of in this way.  
 On the other hand, one has to remember that, except when I’m explicitly engaging 
with a particular theory of thought, what I refer to by ‘thoughts’ and ‘concepts’ might 
have very little to do with our categorization skills, or even our dispositions to apply 
words to certain scenarios. By default, thoughts and concepts are posits designed to play 
certain roles, such as Publicity, Frege’s Constraint or Explanation. This might have 
 
8 This case is reported by Majid (2010); I learned of it through Pagin (2020). The other papers in that 
volume – Shifting Concepts (2020), edited by Teresa Marques and Åsa Wikforss – present a ton of evidence 




something to do with the psychologists’ notion of ‘concept’, or not. In any case, this is 
not the fight I volunteered to participate in.9  
 
3 An overview of things to come  
As I’ve said before, four of the five chapters of this dissertation can be seen as disputes 
between Publicity and a rival contender. In order of rounds, the contenders are: 
Explanation (1), Frege’s Constraint (2), Semantic Internalism (3) and Relationism (5). 
Chapter 4 escapes that aggressive narrative with its focus on Loar-cases, but it also 
contains its fair share of punches and kicks – the fight in that case is between distinct 
criteria for successful communication.  
 
Chapter 1’s main act is a dispute between Publicity and Explanation. More precisely, I 
show that scenarios involving successful communication and understanding with 
indexical expressions are peculiar in that they force us to decide between one principle 
or the other. I laud this as the special feature of indexical attitudes – perhaps a good 
candidate for what is really special about them in opposition to “boring” de dicto and de 
re attitudes. A crucial part of this paper is a defense of my main conclusion – that there 
is indeed a conflict between Publicity and Explanation with regards to indexical attitudes 
– against Cappelen & Dever’s (2013) elusive challenges, especially their action inventory 
model argument.  
 
Chapter 2’s headline event is the puzzle arising from a conflict between Publicity and 
Frege’s Constraint. The puzzle is based on a familiar Kripkean case involving a subject 
which takes a thing to be two, and takes its name also to be two. Since she does that, she 
ends up having two thoughts where a “normal” person has only one. Considerations 
about communicative success, I argue, allow us to conclude that Frege’s Constraint – the 
principle which individuates a subject’s thoughts with respect to their cognitive profile – 
is in direct conflict with Publicity – hereby called ‘the thought-transfer model of 
 
9 Löhr (2018) explicitly argues against conflating the philosopher’s notion of concept with the 
psychologists’. Machery (2009) also makes clear that the psychologist’s notion of concept, roughly bodies 
of knowledge that are retrieved by default in certain higher order cognitive tasks, is not at all the same as 
the philosopher’s, so that these two fields are actually theorizing about distinct things. 
xvii 
 
communication’. I consider several ways out of the puzzle before conceding that the 
thought-transfer model is the weakest link.  
 
Chapter 3 centers around the decades-old fight about whether Semantic Internalism is 
compatible with Publicity. Semantic Internalism is a fancy name for a familiar idea, i.e. 
that meaning is determined by use. More precisely, it is the thesis that the concepts we 
express are determined by our dispositional use of linguistic expressions. It is not hard to 
see that this view clashes quite directly with Publicity. Many seem to communicate well, 
and understand each other, while using representations in sharply distinct ways. I assess 
several ways to dissolve the conflict and end up suggesting a solution which I find 
conservative enough: weakening Publicity. Instead of proclaiming that communication 
(and understanding, and genuine agreement) require sameness of concepts between 
individuals, I argue that it only requires that the concepts individuals have are 
conceptually guaranteed to have the same extension. In other words, as long as the 
concepts we have are such that we could know that they co-refer just on the basis of our 
dispositional use of them, then they’re good enough for communication, understanding, 
and genuine agreement. 
 
Chapter 4 is about criteria for successful communication per se (as opposed to examining 
these criteria with the ulterior motive of individuating thought and concepts with them). 
The thread that runs through this paper is a series of variations on Loar-cases, thought 
experiments where subjects communicate, successfully or unsuccessfully, regardless of 
latching onto the same referential contents as each other. A key difference between some 
of the variations I consider is whether the subjects involved are ignorant or not about 
some identity fact involving the subject matter under discussion. I resist recent arguments 
by Unnsteinsson (2018) to the effect that successful communication requires that 
individuals lack false beliefs of a certain type. By doing this, I not only vindicate the 
possibility of understanding concomitantly with confusion, but I also conclude that 
communicative success cannot ever be reduced to a mere match of truth-conditions. 
 
Chapter 5 is, again, a chapter based on a conflict. I consider a new trend in the philosophy 
of language and mind, the so-called ‘relationist’ views of thought and concepts, and argue 
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that it fails to guarantee a vindication of a substantial notion of concept publicity. It is, in 
summary, about the conflict between Relationism and Publicity. Relationism advokes 
individuating thought and concepts by means of external relations which token concepts 
may stand in. I assess several versions of these views, and try to argue that all of them 
commit the same two-fold sin: they fail to leave room for concept sharing between people 
who are not connected to each other, and they wrongly predict that some connected 
thinkers share their concepts even when their cognitive states are crucially different in 
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1. What is Special about Indexical Attitudes? 
 
Article published in Inquiry, 61:7, pp. 692-712, 2018. 
 
Abstract  
In this paper I examine the issue about whether indexical attitudes have any special 
properties or present any special challenge to a theory of attitudes and propositions. I will 
go over the claim that indexical cases coming from Perry (1977, 79) present no special 
challenges over and above more familiar cases of Frege’s Puzzle before defending the 
claim that indexical attitudes are special in the sense that it is particularly hard to make 
sense of what is it for two people to believe the same thing via indexical expressions. In 
the end, I will assess Cappelen & Dever’s (2013) considerations on intentional action 
and extract an argument from them that could, if successful, block the special indexical 
challenge. However, as I will go on to claim, their argument suffers from a considerable 
limitation and, in the end, gives us no overwhelming reason to believe that indexical 
attitudes are just as ordinary as any other.  
 
1 Introduction: What exactly is essential about indexicality? 
Sometime during the 1970’s, philosophers started paying attention to how a set of 
attitudes, those which we normally express by means of indexical expressions, seem to 
pose a special challenge to theories of propositions. Two terminological remarks:  
 
1. By “indexical attitudes” I mean those attitudes (such as beliefs and desires) that 
we normally express by means of indexical expressions (such as the first-personal 
pronoun). This is a neutral characterization and is silent about which special 
properties – if any – those attitudes are supposed to have. 
2. By “propositions” I mean the semantically efficacious contents of attitudes by 
virtue of which those attitudes gain their normative and explanatory power (e.g. 
allowing us to explain subjects’ actions, assess their rationality etc.). 
 
 The question that will concern me in this paper can be summarized as: do 
indexical attitudes present any special challenge to theories of propositions? The gloss 
on “special” is particularly relevant, since it might be that indexical attitudes are hard to 
characterize but only for the same reasons that other singular attitudes (e.g. those 
expressible by proper names) also are. Theories of proposition usually assume that 
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attitudes are dyadic relations between agents and propositions, which are then defined as 
absolute and shareable contents such that it is irrational to hold antagonistic attitudes 
(e.g. belief and disbelief) towards them at the same time. To be shareable is to be 
accessible by any speaker and to be absolute is to have a truth-value that depends only 
on the objective state of the world. There might be many arguments to the effect that 
those assumptions (and others) are not jointly consistent and Lewis might be right in 
saying that “the conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be something 
of a jumble of conflicting desiderata” (Lewis, 1986, p. 54). Nonetheless, my only 
concern is finding out whether any of those arguments arise exclusively because of 
indexical attitudes.  
 In the following sections, we will see that demarcating the ‘special indexical 
challenge’ is far from an easy task. Indeed, many have failed to see that in order to prove 
that one such challenge really exists, it is not enough to show that one cannot fully 
characterize indexical attitudes neither by means of de re nor de dicto propositions, since 
the same predicament is true of other singular attitudes (section 2.1). However, I do think 
that at least one such challenge can be demarcated. It has got to do with the following 
question: what does it take for someone to share someone else’s indexical attitudes? I 
will argue that the three most plausible answers to that question all lead to the rejection 
of some independently plausible thesis about propositions. Furthermore, I will show that 
this challenge is particular to indexical attitudes. 
 
2 Frege’s Puzzle and Indexical Cases: The “no de re and no de dicto” 
challenge 
When one is trying to argue for there being something special about indexical attitudes, 
it is natural to turn one’s attention to the work of John Perry (1977, 1979). Perry’s 
memorable characters and thought-experiments quickly became part of the philosophical 
canon, although it is often not easy to tell what is their point supposed to be. I take it that 
Perry’s discussion are usually based on two types of scenario. One type usually involves 
a subject who has information about himself without realizing that it is about himself. 
The key point of those cases is to show that indexical attitudes cannot be reduced neither 
to singular (de re) nor descriptive (de dicto) attitudes. In this section, I will argue that 
these “ignorance cases” do not display anything special about indexical attitudes. While 
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this is not an original point, I think that previous writers who have defended it failed to 
address certain worries. We will get to the second – and, in my opinion, more interesting 
– type of scenario in the following section. 
 The case of the amnesiac Rudolph Lingens is a paradigmatic example of an 
ignorance case about indexical attitudes (another famous example is the Messy Shopper): 
 
Rudolph Lingens: 
The amnesiac Rudolph Lingens is lost in the Stanford library. Lingens’s amnesia 
is severe, and he has forgotten who he is. After reading a biography of Rudolph 
Lingens, he has a belief he could express by saying “Rudolph Lingens has been 
to San Sebastián.” But at the same time, because he does not remember ever going 
to Spain, he does not have a belief that he could express by saying, “I have been 
to San Sebastián.”10 
 
 The purpose of that kind of story is to show that, even for those who are 
exceedingly savvy about wordly matters, there is always room for some residual 
indexical ignorance (i.e. ignorance of matters that would have most naturally been 
expressed by means of indexicals). More particularly, Lingen’s story suggests that, 
whichever proposition he expresses by11 “Rudolph Lingens has been to San Sebastián”, 
it is not irrational for him to endorse it while refraining to endorse whichever proposition 
he would have expressed by “I have been to San Sebastián”. Thus, given the constitutive 
assumption that propositions should be individuated so that, if it is rational to hold 
antagonistic attitudes towards two of them, then they are not the same, it follows that: 
coming out from Lingen’s mouth, those two utterances express distinct propositions.  
 At first, it is not obvious why that would be a particularly difficult challenge for 
a theory of propositions: we just need to search through the set of all propositions and 
assign these utterances two distinct ones. Since propositions are supposed to be the kind 
of thing that can be assessed for truth or falsity given a possible state of the world, they 
must either ‘say’ something general or particular about the world. To that fact 
 
10 This is inspired by, but not identical to, Perry 1979, 21-2. 
11 Wherever it does not lead to ambiguity, I will omit “uttering” when mentioning sentences with quotation 
marks. Thus, “The belief he would express by ‘I am Rudolph Lingens’” is an abbreviation for “The belief 
he would express by uttering ‘I am Rudolph Lingens’”. 
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corresponds the distinction between descriptive (de dicto) and singular (de re) 
propositions. On the assumption that propositions are absolute, these two types of 
proposition are all the propositions we have.     
 But notice that no absolute proposition will do the job. Firstly, it cannot be the 
singular (de re) proposition that is true in every world in which Lingens has gone to San 
Sebastián, since this is most naturally seen as being the one expressed by the non-
indexical utterance (and there has to be at least two distinct propositions around). It will 
also not do to characterize it as the proposition that is true in every world where the 
utterer of U [Lingens’ utterance of “I have been to San Sebastián”] has been to San 
Sebastián, since it is easily conceivable that Lingens fails to realize the he himself is the 
utterer of U (and, as a consequence, believes that proposition without having the 
indexical attitude). Secondly, it seems that no purely descriptive (de dicto) proposition 
will be of any help. We could conceive of Lingens believing that, e.g. the one and only 
amnesiac in the Stanford Library has been to San Sebastián without him having any 
correspondent indexical attitude (because he could fail to believe the he himself is the 
only amnesiac around). This points generalizes: assuming that Lingens believe that he is 
in a reduplication world (where every qualitative property is satisfied by at least two 
different individuals), there will be no uniquely satisfied property F such that we could 
say that, when Lingens thinks of himself by means of the first-personal pronoun, he 
thinks of himself as the F. In other words, there is no property F such that it is irrational 
for Lingens to believe that he himself has been to San Sebastián while failing to believe 
that the F has been to San Sebastián. 
 This is our predicament: the logical space of absolute propositions is exhausted 
by the set of all de re and de dicto propositions and none of those serve to properly 
characterize indexical attitudes. Thus, these attitudes cannot be characterized as dyadic 
relations between agents and absolute propositions. However – and most relevantly for 
our concerns – is this predicament essentially related to indexical attitudes? It is quite 
easy to show that it is not.  
 It did not take many years until people realized that the “no de re and no de dicto” 
challenge, although legitimate, is less about indexicality than about the hyper-
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intensionality of singular thought12. Both Magidor (2015) and Cappelen & Dever (2013) 
make a very strong case that this very challenge arises by means of cases which are prima 
facie unrelated to indexicals. To see that, notice how easy it is to construct an analogue 
of Linguen’s story not involving indexicals (nor amnesia): 
 
(non-indexical) Rudolph Lingens: 
Rudolph Lingens is lost in the Stanford library. Lingens’s knows that he is 
Rudolph Lingens but does not know that he is also known under a different name: 
Joseph K. After reading a biography of Joseph K (who happens to be himself), 
he has a belief he could express by saying, “Joseph K has a published biography.” 
But at the same time, he also has a belief that he could express by saying, 
“Rudolph Lingens does not have a published biography.” 
 
 This non-indexical story seems to pose the same challenge to theories of 
propositions than does its indexical counterpart. The difficulty in characterizing the 
propositions expressed by Lingens’ two utterances is the same as we previously had. 
Firstly, one cannot characterize them by means of the de re proposition true in each world 
where Lingens has a published biography, since none of the two utterances seem to have 
a stronger claim on that proposition than the other. Secondly, no de dicto proposition 
(e.g. the one and only lost person in the Stanford Library has a published biography) can 
do the trick, since, for any de dicto proposition, we can conceive of Lingens believing it 
while disbelieving whichever are expressed by each of his utterances (and vice-versa). 
Thus, the predicament we reach is the same: proper name attitudes cannot be 
characterized as dyadic relations to absolute propositions. 
 Here is a reaction someone could have at this point: “even though the structure 
of the predicament is the same both for indexical and non-indexical cases, the solutions 
available to each are distinct – this is enough to show that there is something special 
about indexical attitudes”. This is a fair claim and should be taken seriously. Which types 
of solutions can we employ after discovering that propositional attitudes cannot be 
characterized as dyadic relations to absolute propositions? It seems there are at least those 
 
12 Stalnaker (1981) was probably the first to press this point. Cappellen & Dever (2013) brought 
these issues back to the spotlight and got the discussion running again. At the same time Magidor (2013) 
was advancing very similar claims.  
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two possible solutions: one can either reject the claim that attitudes are merely dyadic 
relations (and then introduce a third factor in their account) or the claim that all 
propositions are absolute. 
 Perry (1979) preferred to reject the dyadic claim than to let go of the absoluteness 
of propositions. Thus, his solution is a type of “third-factor strategy”, according to which 
one needs a third ingredient – on top of the subject and the absolute proposition – to fully 
characterize an attitude. Perry called that third ingredient the ‘belief state’, although talk 
of ‘guises’ or ‘modes of presentation’ might also ring a bell. The important feature of 
that strategy is that it opens the way for there being different ways of, e.g. believing the 
same absolute proposition. This allows one to claim that, while Lingen’s utterances (both 
in the indexical and in the non-indexical stories) have the same absolute de re proposition 
as their content, they encode different ways of believing that content. Perry’s theory is 
an instance of the general strategy of differentiating between the content of a belief from 
the way it is believed.  
 The third-factor strategy applies across the board, i.e. there is nothing about the 
introduction of a third ingredient in an account of attitudes that seems to be specially 
about indexicals or which would preclude its application to non-indexical attitudes. For 
just one concrete example, this third ingredient could be the representational vehicle by 
means of which one believes a proposition. Thus, one could claim that it is possible to 
believe the same singular proposition via the proper name “Lingens”, the proper name 
“Joseph K” or the first-personal pronoun “I” - and that those three manners of believing 
the same proposition all amount, in the end, to type-distinct beliefs. Whether this is a 
good theory or not should not concern us here. The important point is that, as a candidate 
solution to the phenomenon of opacity, the third-factor strategy does not seem to have a 
restricted application either to indexical or non-indexical attitudes. 
 However, things are not so clear when we look at the second general type of 
solution to the “no de re and no de dicto” predicament: the strategy of introducing non-
absolute (or relative) propositions. Lewis’ (1979)  is perhaps its best example. Its crucial 
move is to complicate the notion of proposition. While one can assess the truth-value of 
an absolute proposition given no more than the full specification of a possible world, 
more is needed to assess a relative one. Take, for example, the case of first-personal 
attitudes. The natural idea is that a first-personal attitude expresses a proposition whose 
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truth-value varies across different subjects. According to this idea, the proposition 
Lingens expresses by “I have been to San Sebastián” is true or false relative to a pair of 
a world and a thinker, i.e. it is true just in case that thinker has been to San Sebastián in 
that world. Thus, it is true in the pair consisting of Lingens’ world w and Lingens – the 
pair <w, Lingens> – but false in the pair consisting of our actual world w¹ and (up to this 
date) me – the pair <w¹, MV>. By introducing this new class of propositions, one is able 
to discriminate between having a first-personal attitude and having a proper name 
attitude. One can say that the former has relative propositions as its content whereas the 
latter has old-fashioned absolute ones. The same strategy can be generalized to other 
indexical expressions, e.g. temporal indexical attitudes (“Now is the time!”) express 
time-relative propositions and locative indexical attitudes (“Here is the place!”) express 
place-relative propositions. However, it is not clear whether that strategy sheds any light 
on non-indexical attitudes. That is, what relativization could we put in place so that one 
would be able to distinguish between the propositions expressed via, e.g. coreferential 
proper names? 
 Lewis (1979, p. 135) himself was the first to point out that his theory was a bit 
too specific. Interestingly, he did not think that this was a big problem: “My hunch is that 
this problem [the general phenomenon of singular thought] cuts across the issues I want 
to discuss [indexical attitudes], so I shall ignore it”. (Lewis 1979, p. 135). Unfortunately 
for him, Lewis’ hunch does not have as much weight these days as it had in the late 
seventies, when the literature on indexicality was flourishing and virtually no one 
doubted that indexical attitudes were special in some sense. Indeed, as soon as one starts 
to wonder whether indexical attitudes pose any special challenge over and above other 
singular attitudes, any theory of propositions which is only able to account for the former 
will need to have really good excuses.  
 I think the right reaction to have about those issues is simply to point out that 
Lewis’ strategy can in fact be extended so as to encompass all singular attitudes. One just 
needs to take into account the so-called “centered descriptivist” strategy13, according to 
which all singular expressions refer in virtue of being associated with definite 
descriptions containing indexical elements. Glossing over important details, one could 
 
13 The roots of that theory are present in Lewis (1979, 1983) himself and Searle (1983). The 




claim that a name like “Lingens” refers to the person being called “Lingens” by the 
persons from whom I’ve acquired that name and that “water” refers to the clear and 
potable liquid filling the rivers and oceans in our environment. The presence of 
indexicals in these descriptions make it obvious that the attitudes characterized by them 
will not have absolute truth-conditions.  
 Now, even if centered descriptivism were proven to be a successful account of 
singular attitudes (we are as far as we can be from a consensus on that), one could 
complain that, as a solution to Frege’s Puzzle, it only generalizes to non-indexical 
attitudes by reducing them to indexical ones. Thus, if it turned out that centered 
descriptivism is the best account of our singular attitudes, we would not have proven that 
indexical attitudes do not present any special challenge to theories of proposition: we 
would only have proven that much more attitudes are indexical in the first place14.  
 Someone suspicious about the importance of indexical attitudes could then 
complain: “we have two extant solutions for the indexical and non-indexical cases of 
Frege’s Puzzle – the Perrian and the Lewisian. They seem equally able to account for all 
the data but the latter additionally requires us to make the revisionary claim that all 
singular attitudes are indexical, thus, the Perrian one is clearly in better shape”.  
 This leads us to a point in the discussion where not much is left to be said unless 
we are willing to get our hands dirty and start assessing concrete examples of Perrian 
theories and see how well they work. For just an example of how quickly things get 
complicated, it seems that concrete examples of Perrian theories typically end up having 
to claim that indexical attitudes have special properties not shared by non-indexical ones. 
Thus, even if the overall structure of Perrian solutions does not seem to imply any 
substantial distinction between indexical and non-indexical attitudes, what we find while 
examining concrete Perrian implementations is that, for one reason or another, they end 
up having to ascribe some special property to indexical ones. For just two examples, both 
Perry’s own positive account and, more recently, García-Carpintero’s (2016, p. 194) start 
from reasonable assumptions about attitudes and – because of issues related to action 
motivation – end up concluding that indexical attitudes have some form of ‘limited 
accessibility’, such that it is particularly hard to hold someone else’s indexical attitudes. 
 
14 Ninan (2016, p. 98) expresses the same worry. 
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 Instead of assessing concrete accounts of singular attitudes and investigating 
whether there could be an implementation of a Perrian theory which did not entailed 
anything special about indexical attitudes, I will take the hint that it is in relation to action 
motivation and sharing-conditions that indexical attitudes really become peculiar and 
analyze the interconnections of those issues. My excuse for doing so is not so much that 
the first line of inquiry is impossible to be pursued, but just that, as long as there are 
interesting issues to dissect without leaving the most general level of discussion, it is 
important that it be done before going deeper into more intricate material. As I hope to 
show in the next section, one can advance a pretty robust argument to the effect that 
indexical attitudes are specially challenging without having to say anything substantial 
about which solutions to Frege’s Puzzle one should adopt. 
  
3 Indexicals and Action Explanation 
As we’ve seen in the previous sections, the “no de re nor de dicto challenge” did not 
allow us to draw any fundamental distinctions between indexical and non-indexical 
attitudes. As far as it goes, we can only conclude that the attitudes we express by means 
of indexical expressions are usually not identical to the ones we express by means of 
proper names. One place to look for peculiarity of indexical attitudes is in its relation to 
intentional action. Minor tweaks to Lingen’s first story may suggest that, not only his 
two utterances seem to express distinct propositions (or, alternatively, to express the 
same proposition in a different way) but also that only the indexical one is able to give 
rise to intentional action: 
 
Rudolph Lingens (Action): 
The amnesiac Rudolph Lingens is lost in the Stanford library. Lingens’s amnesia is 
severe, and he has forgotten who he is. After reading a biography of Rudolph Lingens, 
he has a belief he could express by saying, “Rudolph Lingens’s family is in San 
Sebastián” and a desire he could express by “I desire that Rudolph Lingens reunites with 
his family”. However, only after realizing that he himself is Rudolph Lingens (a 
realization he could express by saying “I am Rudolph Lingens!”), does he acquire 




 The underlying idea suggested by that version of the story is that, so long as one 
only has non-indexical attitudes, one will not be capable of finding out how the subject 
matter of these attitudes are related to oneself and, since performing an action requires 
knowing how one is related to the object of one’s action, one will not be able to form an 
intention to act on the basis of them. In other words, one is never motivated to act unless 
one has some beliefs one would express indexically. Following Cappelen & Dever (p. 
37) – henceforth C&D, one can rephrase that point in terms of what it takes to explain 
someone’s intentional actions. The idea being that one cannot explain the intentionality 
of one’s actions without mentioning, at some point, some indexical belief of that agent: 
 
 NIC (Non-indexical Incompleteness Claim): 
 All non-indexical action explanations/rationalizations are incomplete because of 
a missing indexical component. 
 
 A first point to note is how implausible NIC is given our ordinary practice of 
explaining the actions of our peers. Is it not the case that we, more often than not, explain 
the reason behind people’s actions without mentioning any self-representational 
component? Is it not enough to explain why someone voted for the communist candidate 
to point out that this agent believed that if everyone voted for the communist candidate, 
then the world would be a better place? Why would we need to include any self-
representational attitude in that action explanation? The belief she would have expressed 
by “I am a part of everyone”, besides seeming silly, appears to play no role in her action. 
Perhaps the idea is that, in order to perform coarse-grained actions like voting, one needs 
to perform a multitude of finer-grained actions such as using one’s hand to put the ballot 
on the urn. Then, one could claim that those basic bodily actions presuppose some sort 
of self-representation by means of the subject (e.g. knowing where one hand is in relation 
to the urn). But that claim is just as implausible as the idea we had begun with. As we 
perform basic bodily actions, there is very little need of representation to be going on in 
our conscience – we rarely have explicit thoughts about where our body is and its relation 
to the objects of our environment. As long as there is any use for the information encoded 
in those thoughts, it is something our subconscious motor system is more than capable 
of taking account of. In summary, there seems to be no argument to the effect that most 
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of our ordinary action explanations are incomplete or that every basic action need be 
motivated by some self-representation.  
 A second point to note is that, even if we grant that Lingen’s action can only be 
explained by mentioning an “I”-belief (“I am Rudolph Lingens!”), NIC is a universal 
generalization and, strictly speaking, does not follow from considering an isolated case 
(C&D, p. 41-2). At most, Lingen’s case would seem to prove a weaker claim such as: 
 
 NIC2 (Weak Non-Indexical Incompleteness Claim): 
 Some action explanations/rationalizations ineliminably contain an indexical 
component. 
 
 However, C&D (p. 39) argue that there is no way “to read NIC2 as anything but 
a trivial corollary of the opacity of action explanations/rationalizations.” Magidor (2013, 
p. 17) makes essentially the same point and observes how some non-indexical elements 
can also occur ineliminably in some action explanations. For example, in order to explain 
why Lingens acquires an intention to go to San Sebastián, one must mention certain 
beliefs and desires involving “San Sebastián”, as opposed to “Donostía”, even though 
both are names for the same city. Thus, it seems that, at least as far as this particular 
action explanation is concerned, the name “San Sebastián” occurs ineliminably.  
 I think C&D and Magidor’s conclusions are a bit too quick. Even if NIC2 does 
not allow us to claim that every action is indexical (which I wholeheartedly agree is a 
hopeless claim to make), if we just ask ourselves about what does it take to share someone 
else’s indexical attitudes and keep an eye on the implications of that question to action 
explanation, we will have in our hands a neat argument in favor of a special indexical 
challenge. Furthermore, I will have shown that this case follows from a premises that are 
accepted even by its most notorious detractors.  
 
4 What does it take to share someone else’s indexical attitudes? 
So far we have conceded that indexical attitudes are sometimes not identical to proper 
name attitudes and even that indexical expressions might be ineliminable from some 
action explanations. However, none of this was enough to prove that indexical attitudes 
are sui generis in any substantial sense. I think there really is a special indexical challenge 
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in that vicinity, but the best way to get to it is via indirectly considering what does it take 
for someone to share someone else’s indexical attitudes.  
 One important comment: in the remainder of that paper, I propose to focus on 
first-personal attitudes – those expressible by means of the first-personal pronoun. My 
reasons for doing so are multiple: most of the literature on indexical attitudes (e.g. C&D) 
focus only on issues arising from first-personal attitudes (indeed, the concept of de se 
attitudes is usually taken as synonym for indexical attitudes); even if temporally indexical 
attitudes could be proven to be as fundamental as first-personal attitudes, discussions 
about the former are additionally complicated because of issues in the metaphysics of 
time (e.g. it would seem that even deciding what “now” refers to depends on whether one 
is an A-theorist or B-theorist about time). Finally, even if one complains that my 
discussion is exclusively concerned with first-personal attitudes, if my argument is 
cogent, it is more than enough to show that indexical attitudes (or at least a subset of 
them) do indeed raise a special challenge to a theory of propositions. Without futher ado, 
the argument. 
 Take some arbitrary agent Amelia who has a belief she expresses by uttering “I 
am an aviation pioneer”. What would it take for Berthold, who is distinct from Amelia, 
to hold the same belief that she expresses by means of that utterance? My argument, 
which I take to be a development of an argument found in Ninan (2016)15, is that the 
three most plausible answers to that question each lead to the rejection of a different but 
independently plausible thesis about attitudes. Here are the three possible replies: 
 
 Option #1: For Berthold to share Amelia’s first-personal attitude, he would need 
to form a belief (perhaps in response to Amelia’s utterance) which he would express by 
means of “You [pointing at Amelia] are an aviation pioneer”.   
 Option #2: For Berthold to share Amelia’s first-personal attitude, he would need 
to have himself a first-personal attitude about himself, one which he would express by 
means of “I am an aviation pioneer”. 
 Option #3: It is impossible to share someone else’s first-personal attitudes (e.g. 
they are private, or limited accessibility etc.) 
 
15 I think Ninan’s paper has all the ingredients for the construction of this argument, but that it 
somehow fails to put all the pieces together. All in all, I was deeply influenced by reading his paper and 




 Let us begin by considering Option #1. It is supposed to be the most plausible of 
them, since it makes the sharing of a first-personal attitude a completely ordinary and 
easy affair. It can be seen as grounded on the principle that, when two subjects are in 
agreement with each other in virtue of some of their beliefs, then these beliefs are 
identical. In other words, since Berthold’s second-personal belief seems to be the right 
belief to form in face of Amelia’s utterance, it would seem that they agree with each other 
in virtue of the attitudes they express (even though she expresses it first-personally and 
he, second-personally). One who thinks that first-personal attitudes are just as ordinary 
as any others should be drawn towards Option #1, since it entails that thinking of oneself 
via the first-person is no more special than thinking about someone else via the second-
person (and there does not seem to be anything mysterious about the latter). However, 
Option #1 has the consequence that the exact same belief will have distinct motivational 
roles for distinct agents. Imagine that Amelia and Berthold find themselves in a situation 
where there is urgent need for the expertise of an aviation pioneer, and that only Amelia 
fits that bill. Even though both believe the same thing by means of their, respectively, 
first-personal and second-personal attitudes, they would plausibly be disposed to perform 
different actions: Amelia would run to offer her help while Berthold would just stand by 
and hope for the best.  
 More generally, Option #1 would conflict with the principle (let us call it, 
following Ninan, “Explanation”) that two agents who are doxastically identical should 
be disposed to perform the same actions. Explanation should not seem like a gratuitous 
ad hoc principle. Instead, it is one of the most entrenched principles governing folk-
psychology. It is because of Explanation that it makes sense to explain people’s behavior 
by means of their beliefs/desires and expect that this explanation be generalizable to 
distinct agents. If beliefs systematically had different motivational roles for different 
people, it would be impossible to predict people’s actions based on what they believe and 
desire. It’s not an exaggeration to say that, if Explanation were more often false than true, 
folk-psychology itself with its practice of ascribing semantic contents to attitudinal states 
would lose much of its raison d’être. Option #1 seems to entail that, for at least some 
attitudes, the first-personal ones, Explanation is bound to fail. 
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 Since we have good reasons to protect Explanation, it could be good to try out 
the other possible answers to the attitudinal sharing question. However, both Option #2 
and #3 seem to lead us to distinct conflicts with other independently plausible theses 
about attitudes and their contents. To be sure, both Option #2 and #3 allow us to maintain 
Explanation in its full generality, but that victory might be illusory seeing that they make 
us reject, respectively, the absoluteness of attitudinal contents or their shareability. 
 According to Option #2, when Berthold believes of himself that he is an aviation 
pioneer, he believes the same that is believed by Amelia when she believes of herself that 
she is an aviation pioneer. While it is true that two subjects who self-ascribe the same 
property are usually disposed to perform the same actions (unless they have other 
differing beliefs and/or desires in the vicinity), Option #2 entails that the same belief 
could be true for an agent and false for other (let us call “Absoluteness” the thesis it 
rejects). Thus, it entails that at least some objects of our attitudes are not absolutely truth-
evaluable. Making way for objects of knowledge that are not themselves true or false 
irrespective of their knowers would be a significant departure from orthodoxy. Whether 
one could come up with good arguments for that is not what I intend to assess. 
 Option #3 obviously leads us to the claim that some attitudes are special in the 
sense that they cannot be shared by different subjects. Interestingly enough, Frege 
(1991/1918, p. 359) seemed to be attracted to such an account of first-personal thoughts, 
even going as far as claiming that “everyone is presented to himself in a special and 
primitive way, in which he is presented to no one else. And only [the thinker of a first-
personal thought] can grasp thoughts specified in this way”. I hope that my way of 
framing the special indexical challenge makes it clear why such a position would be 
particularly attractive: it allows one to characterize first-personal attitudes while 
maintaning Explanation and Absoluteness. However, its drawbacks are obvious. As soon 
as one rejects the general shareability of attitudes (let us call “Shareability” the thesis 
being rejected), one will need to come up with many revisionary stories about how 
communication works (since the same first-personal attitude cannot be put forward from 
speaker to hearer), disagreement (what is it to disagree about someone who claims to be 
an aviation pioneer?) etc.  
 In summary, whichever particular account of what sharing a first-personal 
attitude one chooses, one will need to reject some deeply entrenched thesis about 
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attitudes: Explanation, Absoluteness or Shareability. If, for example, one feels strongly 
about Explanation (as one should), then one will be led into either rejecting Absoluteness 
or Shareability. As Ninan (2016, 109-117) points out, that way of framing the dialectics 
fits really well with the fact that people like Frege and Perry were forced, for one reason 
or another, to claim that indexical attitudes are unshareable in some sense. The same goes 
for the fact that people like Lewis felt so strongly about introducing non-absolute 
propositions to account for our attitudes. These philosophers were choosing among the 
available routes given the special indexical challenge. Another plausible theoretical way 
out would be accepting that Explanation really fails for indexical attitudes. That is, one 
could claim that indexical attitudes are special in the sense that sharing them (in the sense 
of Option #1) does not entail being motivated to act alike. One could alleviate the 
consequences of that claim by suggesting that not identity of belief, but identity of type 
of indexical belief (e.g. when two subjects have first-personal beliefs about themselves) 
is the important relation for prediction of agency. If one chooses to take that route, the 
conclusion of the argument is that indexical attitudes are special in the sense that we need 
two distinct relations (as opposed to only one for the case of other singular attitudes) to 
characterize what is it to agree in virtue of them and to be disposed to act alike. 
 Finally, it should be clear that this is really a special indexical challenge. In other 
words, these complications would simply never arise if it weren’t for indexical attitudes. 
That should be clear from the fact that, e.g. proper name attitudes, are such that it is very 
easy to characterize what it is to share them. We simply do not count someone who has 
a Lingen-belief as agreeing with someone who only has a Josef K-belief. More generally, 
we never count two people as agreeing about a belief when they use different proper 
names to express them. This ensures that there are no cases of agreement about proper 
name attitudes which motivate different actions. Thus, as far as proper name attitudes are 
concerned, we can just say that two subjects share a proper name attitude when they agree 
with each other in virtue of their respective attitudes. 
  
5 Cappelen & Dever’s Action Inventory Model 
As convincing as the argument just presented is, it is not immune to criticisms. One way 
to put pressure on its conclusion is by challenging the claim that Option #1 is 
incompatible with Explanation. C&D’s discussion of intentional action (p. 49-56) 
16 
 
suggests one ingenious way of arguing for that compatibility claim. In order to assess 
their argument, we need to first be clear on what is the precise formulation of Explanation 
in question. A first try would be: 
 
 (Explanation 1) If two agents have the same beliefs and desires, then, they will 
behave in the same way. 
 
 That goes in that right direction but not far enough. Firstly, notice that the 
antecedent of Explanation 1 is tremendously strong. Surely we do not need two agents to 
be doxastically identical in order for us to be able to predict that they will behave in the 
same way – what matters is that they have the same beliefs and desires about the relevant 
subject matter. For example, it does not matter that Amelia believes (and Berthold denies) 
that the Earth is flat, if the relevant subject matter is that people need an aviation pioneer. 
Secondly, it is also not the case that everytime two agents have the same relevant beliefs 
and desires, they will be able to behave in the same way. One can have as many attitudes 
as one likes, but if one’s legs are tied down to the ground or if one is paralyzed by an evil 
genius, there will be many actions one will not be able to perform. Thus, it is natural to 
add some kind of proviso in the antecedent of the principle in order to account for cases 
where one is not able to behave as one desires because of external factors: 
 
 (Explanation 2) If two agents have the same (relevant) beliefs and desires and 
the same (relevant) actions are available to them, then, they will behave in the same way.  
 
 While that principle seems to fare better than the last one, it still lends itself to 
more than one interpretation. Notice that there is considerable vagueness about when two 
people behave in the same way or not. The question is: when are two action tokens 
instances of behaving in the same way? There are literally infinite way of classifying 
action tokens into action types and some of those ways will trivially entail that any two 
tokens were instances of the same behavior. For example, if one classifies Amelia’s 
action as an action performed by a human being, then it was an instance of behaving in 
the same way as Berthold (even though she ran to help people and he just stood by 
wishing for the best). Conversely, if we individuate Amelia’s action as an action 
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performed by Amelia, then it will never be the case that someone distinct from her will 
perform an action token that is an instance of behaving in the same way as her. 
Individuating actions is far from a trivial task, but I think we actually get by really well 
in our ordinary talk about actions and behavior. I think it is plausible to say that, given 
the description of ordinary scenarios such as Amelia and Berthold’s, most people would 
be in agreement as to how to describe the actions they performed. Some discrepancy is 
surely to be expected, but I take it that most would lean towards saying that Amelia’s 
action was something in the vicinity of running to help people and that Berthold’s was 
that of standing by. Most importantly, these are descriptions of their actions which 
abstract away from their respective agents, focusing only in their qualitative component. 
In that spirit, let us assume that two agents can be said to have behaved in the same way 
if and only if they have performed action tokens which can be subsumed under the same 
ordinary (agent-neutral) action type. For example, Berthold would have behaved in the 
same way as Amelia if and only if he had performed an action which could be subsumed 
under the type running to help people. 
 That stipulation solves some of the interpretation problems, but notice that the 
proviso of Explanation 2 also talks about actions, so one should expect that the same 
complications about action individuation will also come about there. The question is: 
when can two agents be said to have the same (relevant) available actions? I take it that, 
ordinarily, we have no trouble assessing whether some action could have been performed 
by someone. It is easy to judge that someone in handcuffs could not perform the action 
of hugging, or that someone paralyzed by an evil genius could not jump around. I take 
this to show that in ordinary action-talk we have the following operative principle in the 
background: an agent can perform an action subsumable under an ordinary (agent-
neutral) action type if and only if that agent can perform that action under that very same 
ordinary (agent-neutral) action type. For example, Berthold can perform an action 
subsumable under running to help people if and only if Berthold could have ran to help 
people. 
 
 (Explanation 3) If two agents have the same (relevant) beliefs and desires and 
they could both have performed the (relevant) actions under an ordinary agent-neutral 
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action type, then, they will perform action tokens which could be subsumed under the 
same ordinary agent-neutral action type. 
 
 So far so good. I am of the opinion that something like Explanation 3 comes very 
close to fully characterizing our ordinary folk-psychological principle equal behavior 
prediction for people who believe and desire alike. But notice that if this is the correct 
formulation of the Explanation principle, then it really is incompatible with Option #1. 
Both Amelia and Berthold, we have agreed, have the same relevant beliefs and desires 
(they both believe Amelia is an aviation pioneer and they both desire that an aviation 
pioneer run to help the people in need). They also seem to have the same relevant actions 
available, since Berthold could very well run to help people and Amelia could very well 
have stood by. There is no physical/psychological constraints that would incapacitate 
them from performing actions under those agent-neutral types. Nonetheless, they still go 
on to perform different actions: Explanation 3 fails. As we have seen in the previous 
sections, this is precisely one of the horns of the special indexical challenge: unless we 
are ready to admit that indexical attitudes have some special property (either the same 
indexical attitude has different motivational role for different agents, or they have non-
absolute contents or they are unshareable), we reach a dead-end. 
 In order to rectify the principle, one can either accept that indexical attitudes are 
special and then tweak the principle so that it accounts for their particularities, or one can 
question Explanation 3 itself and try to reformulate its conceptual basis. I take it that the 
first option is implicitly adopted by folk-psychology: it is the reason why the thesis that 
indexical attitudes are special sounds so intuitive in the first place.  C&D, not satisfied 
with that, are, to the best of my knowledge, one of the only authors to try to pursuit the 
second option16. By doing that, they end up making a fairly revisionary claim about 
intentional explanations, but if they succeed, that revisionary claim comes with the 
benefit of freeing us from the claim that indexical attitudes are more special than other 
ordinary ones. 
 Let us call the account which adopts Explanation 3 and that I take to be operative 
in ordinary action-talk “the indexical model”. The point where C&D diverge from the 
indexical model is in their understanding of what does it take for an action to be available 
 
16 Magidor (2015, p. 20) also goes in the same direction, but leaves her point in very broad strokes.  
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to an agent. As we have seen, there are infinitely many ways to individuate an action 
token. Notice that whether an action token is available to an agent highly depends on 
which specific action type one chooses to describe that token. If one describes the 
relevant action in Amelia and Berthold’s case as an action performed by Amelia, then it 
trivially follows that Berthold is not able to perform it. However, that action type is a 
completely trivial one and surely not of the right granularity to be plugged into a principle 
of intentional explanation. Nonetheless, C&D believe that there are action descriptions 
which are, at the same time, (I) such that only Amelia could have performed it but not 
Berthold and (II) of the right granularity to be used in intentional explanations.  
 Take an agent-specific description of an action token to be a description which 
includes the ordinary (agent-neutral) component of that action but also its particular 
agent. In that sense, Amelia’s action can be subsumed under the agent-specific 
description “that Amelia runs to help people”. That type is not as trivial as the other one 
we’ve mentioned and could very well have the right amount of granularity to make our 
ordinary intentional explanations work: 
 
 (Explanation 4) If two agents have the same (relevant) beliefs and desires and 
they could both have performed the (relevant) actions under their respective agent-
specific action types, then, they will perform action tokens which could be subsumed 
under the same ordinary agent-neutral action type. 
 
 As I read C&D, they are suggesting that Explanation 4 is just as good a principle 
for intentional explanations as Explanation 3. Furthermore, Explanation 4 seems to be 
perfectly compatible with Option #1. It is compatible because, for the case of Amelia and 
Berthold, its antecedent will come out false. That is, even though they share all the same 
relevant beliefs and desires, it is not the case that Berthold could have performed 
Amelia’s action under the agent-specific type that Amelia runs to help people17. 
Naturally, the reason why he cannot perform an action token under that type is that he 
has no direct control over Amelia’s body. Thus, according to Explanation 4, Amelia and 
Berthold would have both behaved in the same way if only they had the same actions 
 
17 And it is also not the case that Amelia could have performed Berthold’s actions under the type 
that Berthold stands by wishing for the best. 
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available, but they do not, thus, they perform distinct actions. This is the central claim of 
C&D’s action inventory considerations and, in my opinion, one of their most important 
arguments against there being a special indexical challenge. 
 This, then, is the scenario we reach. Explanation 3 is the commonsensical 
formulation of the principle, but it fails for cases such as Amelia and Berthold’s. Perry 
(1977, 1979) was precisely pointing to that fact when he discussed cases such as the Bear 
Scenario, which, just like our case, involves two agents who believe alike but act 
differently. The only way to hold onto Explanation 3 seems to be by claiming that, in 
these cases, certain indexical attitudes with special properties are playing some kind of 
special role.  Explanation 4, on the other hand, is a bit revisionary about what it takes for 
an action to be available to someone, but it nonetheless seems to give the right result for 
this type of cases. If every case were like Amelia and Berthold’s, then it would be a very 
easy victory for C&D and Explanation 4. But notice that for many other ordinary cases 
of intentional explanation, it is Explanation 4 that fails to output the correct predictions, 
while Explanation 3 works perfectly well: 
 
 (Nora’s Case) Carlota knows that Nora is in danger and that if someone calls the 
police, then she will be saved. Since she desires that Nora be safe, she calls the police. 
Desmond also knows that Nora is in danger and that if someone calls the police, then she 
will be saved. He also desires that Nora be safe.18 
 
 I take Nora’s Case to be a completely ordinary story about an action being 
motivated by some beliefs and desires. So much so that we do not even need to appeal to 
any indexical attitudes in order to explain why Carlota goes on to call the police. Now, it 
seems that any plausible principle of intentional explanation should predict that Desmond 
would also be disposed to behave in the same way as Carlota did. That is, any good 
account of our attitudes and the way they motivate action should be able to predict that, 
if Desmond also believes that Nora is in danger and that if someone calls the police, then 
she will be saved, then Desmond will in fact call the police. But notice that Explanation 
4 is unable to give us that prediction. That can be quickly seen by observing that the 
 




antecedent of Explanation 4 would only be satisfied if Desmond could have performed 
the action Carlota performed under the agent-specific type that Carlota calls the police. 
But surely Desmond cannot perform an action under that type for the same reasons given 
above: he does not have control over Carlota’s agency. Thus, the antecedent of 
Explanation 4 is not satisfied for the case of Nora and that means that no prediction is 
made.  
 Contrast that with how well Explanation 3 fares for that case. Since Desmond 
could very well perform Carlota’s action under the type calling the police, we get it that 
the antecedent of Explanation 3 is satisfied. Thus, it correctly outputs the prediction that 
Desmond, because he shares Carlota’s actions and has the same relevant actions 
available, will also call the police. 
 So things were not so favorable to C&D’s principle in the first place. While 
Explanation 4 seems to be compatible with Option #1, it does not allow us to make the 
right amount of predictions of behavior for our concepts of belief and desire to play the 
role that they have in folk-psychology. In other words, Explanation 4 allows us to go on 
without special indexical attitudes makes us unable to make very ordinary predictions of 
same behavior. Explanation 3, on the other hand, allows us to make those ordinary 
predictions, such as in the case of Nora, but it does get into trouble when considering 
cases such as Amelia and Berthold’s. It is because of those cases that indexical attitudes 
are ascribed such special properties as unshareability of non-absoluteness. Now, what 
C&D would need to show – if Explanation 4 is to be considered a real contender for 
principle of intentional explanation – is that they can tweak their theory in such a way as 
to be able to explain simple cases such as Nora’s. My own suspicion is that the only way 
available to them will be claiming that some attitudes have some kind of special property 
and these special properties explain why things are different from cases such as Amelia 
and Berthold’s to Nora’s one. But if they are willing to admit that some attitudes have 
special properties, then we might as well just stick to the indexical model with its special 
indexical attitudes. That model is not only well equipped to deal with intentional 
explanation but also in consonance with our folk-psychological intuitions about how 






In this paper I have examined the issue about whether indexical attitudes have any special 
properties or present any special challenge to a theory of attitudes and propositions. In 
section 2, I defended the thesis that, as far as some cases such as the Messy Shopper go, 
they do not present any special challenge over and above the general challenge of Frege’s 
Puzzle, which is common to all singular attitudes, not only indexical ones. In section 3, 
I proposed to focus on the interrelations between indexical attitudes and action 
explanations. I argued that, while it is implausible to claim that all action must be 
motivated by indexical representations, that at least some of them might be, and that this 
could prove to be an interesting point in itself. In section 4, I built on previous 
considerations and showed how one can get to a special indexical challenge by asking 
what does it take to share someone else’s first-personal attitudes. I defended the thesis 
that every plausible answer to that question leads us to reject independently plausible 
theses about attitudes. I argued that this is a robust defense of the claim that indexical 
attitudes have special properties and that it is based on very plausible premises. Finally, 
in section 5, I assessed Cappelen & Dever’s considerations on intentional action and 
extracted from their work an argument which could block the special indexical challenge 
offered in the previous section. I argued against their argument on the basis of the fact 
that their account of intentional explanations fail to output the correct predictions for 
many ordinary cases. On the other hand, what I called the indexical model – which has 
in its core the claim that indexical attitudes are special – seems well-suited to account for 
intentional action of all varieties. Thus, I concluded that these authors have failed to 













Burge, Tyler (2000). Reason and the first person. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald 
(eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.  
Cappelen, H. and J. Dever (2013) The Inessential Indexical. Oxford: OUP. 
Chalmers, D. (2006) The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics, in Two-
Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, M. Garcia-Carpintero 
and J. Macia (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55–140. 
García-Carpintero, Manuel & Torre, Stephan (eds.) (2016). About Oneself: De Se 
Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. 
García-Carpintero, Manuel. Token-Reflexive Presuppositions and the De Se. In Stephan 
Torre & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and 
Communication. Oxford University Press. 
Frege, Gottlob (1991). Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy. Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Jackson, F. (1998), From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, D. (1979) ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,’ Philosophical Review 88: 513–543. 
Magidor, Ofra (2015). The Myth of the De Se. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):249-
283. 
Ninan, Dilip (2016). What is the Problem of De Se Attitudes? In Stephan Torre & Manuel 
García-Carpintero (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. 
Oxford University Press. 
Perry, J. (1977). Frege on demonstratives. Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.  
Perry, J. (1979) ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical,’ Noûs 13: 3–21. 
Searle, John (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 









2 A Puzzle about Understanding 
(with Andrea Onofri19) 
 
Abstract 
It seems plausible that understanding our peers in communication requires entertaining 
the same thoughts as they do. We argue that this view is incompatible with other, 
independently plausible principles of thought individuation. Our argument is based on a 
puzzle inspired by the Kripkean story of Peter and Paderewski: having developed several 
variations of the original story, we conclude – albeit only tentatively – that understanding 
and communication cannot be modeled as a process of thought transfer between speaker 
and hearer. While we are not the first to reach this conclusion, the significance of our 
argument lies in the fact that it only relies on widely accepted premises, without 
depending on any especially controversial theory of mental and linguistic content. We 
conclude with a plea: if understanding doesn’t require thought identity, then we urgently 
need a systematic account of that relation which allegedly explains communicative 
success without amounting to full identity of thought. 
 
1 Introduction 
What conditions must be satisfied for a hearer to successfully understand a declarative 
utterance? This is obviously a central question for any account of linguistic 
communication. Unsurprisingly, the question has received a lot of attention in recent and 
not-so-recent discussion within philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and other 
areas. Also unsurprisingly, no universal consensus has been reached, yet there are some 
basic principles which many philosophers working on these topics have accepted as 
prima facie plausible, maybe even indispensable – “constraints”20 that any plausible 
account in this area should meet.  
 Our first goal is to identify a set of principles that have enjoyed this privileged 
status and show that they cannot all be true. We will present a puzzle about 
understanding: having examined a set of attractive and widely accepted claims about 
thought and communication, we will show that the set is inconsistent, with the aid of 
some plausible auxiliary premises. We also have a second, more constructive goal: 
offering a tentative solution to the puzzle. Our ultimate diagnosis is that an influential 
and popular account of communication – the so-called “thought-transfer model” – ought 
 
19 Andrea is a profesor de tiempo completo (tenure-track) in the Philosophy programme at the Universidad 
Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, Mexico. 
20 We borrow the expression from Fodor (1998). 
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to be rejected as the least plausible element of our inconsistent set of principles. While 
we’re not the first to suggest that this commonsensical view of communication must go, 
our argument, as will be seen, is more general – and thus more definitive – than others 
previously proposed. At the same time, we will show what this theoretical choice 
involves and why it should not be taken lightly – which is why our solution is only a 
tentative one. 
Other authors have presented arguments in the vicinity of our puzzle. The basic 
idea takes inspiration from Kripke (1979) and appears in Loar (1988) and Onofri (2016); 
to a lesser extent, Crimmins (1992) and Heck (2002) also present a similar argument. 
While we are obviously indebted to these predecessors, it is also important to highlight 
the differences. We will discuss a number of different cases where our puzzle arises. 
These cases are both different from and more varied than those discussed by the authors 
cited above. This is necessary, for some alleged solutions to the problem will turn out to 
be insufficiently general – they can deal with some, but not all the variations of the 
puzzle. So the argument only has force when we consider the full range of cases, 
something that the above authors do not do. Furthermore, all of the authors we have just 
cited present the problem as a conflict between the thought-transfer model and Fregean 
criteria of thought individuation. But this is incorrect, or at least incomplete, since other 
important premises are needed to generate the puzzle. We will offer a more complete 
view of the territory – first by making explicit all the principles that form our inconsistent 
set, then by discussing in detail which of those principles ought to be rejected. 
The paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we introduce the basic case 
on which our argument is based. In Section 3 we explain why the case in question 
presents us with a puzzle. In Section 4 we devise two variants of the basic case to show 
that the puzzle is even more pressing than it initially seems. In Sections 5 and 6 we 
consider two attempts to solve the problem by dropping some influential principles about 
thought preservation, communication, and individuation. Having rejected these 
strategies, we propose our solution to the puzzle in Section 7, where we identify the 
thought-transfer model as the weaker element of our inconsistent set and explain why 





2 Considerations on a well-known Kripkean theme 
In a famous paper from 1979, Kripke tells the story of Peter’s unfortunate predicament. 
As Kripke describes the story (Kripke 1979, pp. 398-399), Peter first learns of this man 
called ‘Paderewski’ who is an accomplished pianist, thus acquiring the belief that he 
would express as: ‘Paderewski has musical talent.’ Later, in a different context and 
surrounded by different people, Peter learns of somebody called ‘Paderewski’ who was 
a politician in pre-war Poland. Since Peter doubts that politicians ever have musical 
talent, he infers that this man is not the one he had previously learned about and that it is 
just a coincidence that they are namesakes. Peter thus acquires the belief that he would – 
in this context – express as: ‘Paderewski does not have musical talent’. The problem, 
however, is that Peter is mistaken: contrary to what he thinks, the “first” and the “second” 
Paderewski are the same person. So Kripke’s question arises: does Peter, or does he not, 
believe that Paderewski has talent? He surely has two beliefs with incompatible truth-
conditions, one which he’d express by ‘Paderewski has musical talent’, another which 
he’d express by ‘Paderewski does not have musical talent’. Should we then conclude that 
Peter believes a contradiction? Kripke never suggests a definitive answer, contenting 
himself with cryptic remarks such as “[when we consider these cases] our practices of 
interpretation and attribution of belief are subjected to the greatest possible strain, 
perhaps to the point of breakdown” (Kripke 1979, p. 269). Yet these cases can still yield 
fruitful philosophical reflection, even if we set aside Kripke’s question about Peter’s 
beliefs. More specifically, we suggest reframing the Kripkean case as raising a problem 
about successful understanding and communication, rather than belief attribution. As we 
will see, while reporting Peter’s beliefs may be particularly tricky, the issue of whether 
subjects like Peter can engage in successful communication seems much more tractable.   
Before presenting our variants of Kripke’s case, it will be helpful to introduce 
some basic terminology that is often used in the literature.21 Suppose speaker S makes an 
utterance directed at hearer H. We can then say that S expresses a certain thought tS 
through her utterance, while H entertains a certain thought tH as a result of the utterance. 
If H believes the utterance is true, then she stands in the belief-relation with thought tH; 
if H believes the utterance is false, then she stands in the belief-relation with the negation 
 
21 See for instance Frege (1892, 1918/1956) and Fodor (1998). 
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of tH. Using an equivalent formulation, we can say that H can accept tH as true or reject 
tH as false. Finally, H might be agnostic and suspend judgment about the utterance, in 
which case she will simply entertain tH without accepting it nor rejecting it. We take this 
terminology to be minimal enough that theorists of different persuasions could accept it 
– for instance, we are not taking any particular stance on whether thoughts are abstract 
objects22 or mental representations23, nor are we subscribing to any particular theory of 
belief ascription24. We also take no stance on whether thoughts are wholly individuated 
by their semantic properties or by non-semantic features as well – such as syntactic 
properties in the Language of Thought, origin, causal-historical relations to external 
objects, and so on.   Our goal is to describe our cases and set up our discussion in a way 
that is compatible with different theoretical frameworks. 
Let’s now introduce the basic version of our case. The central idea is simple: we 
imagine the confused subject Peter trying to communicate with a non-confused subject 
– that is, someone who is aware of the relevant identity. For instance, suppose Wendy 
knows that the pianist called ‘Paderewski’ and the politician called ‘Paderewski’ are the 
same person. Now imagine that Wendy and Peter meet in a context (C¹) where classical 
music is a salient topic, such as a concert where Paderewski has just given a performance. 
Wendy utters ‘Paderewski has musical talent’, thereby expressing a thought t. Given the 
context of Wendy’s utterance, Peter thinks she must be talking about the pianist and takes 
her utterance to be true. So there is a certain thought t¹ that Peter accepts – a thought he 
would express by ‘Paderewski has musical talent’ in contexts where the pianist was under 
discussion. Think now of a distinct context (C²) where pre-war politics in Eastern Europe 
is the main topic, such as a rally where Paderewski has just given a political speech. 
Wendy utters ‘Paderewski has musical talent’, thereby expressing the same thought that 
she expressed in her previous conversation with Peter. In the new context, however, Peter 
thinks that Wendy must be talking about the politician and takes her utterance to be false. 
So there is a certain thought t2 that Peter rejects – a thought he would express by 
‘Paderewski has musical talent’ in contexts where the politician was under discussion. 
 
22 See for instance Frege (1918/1956), Peacocke (1992). 
23 See for instance Fodor (1998), Laurence and Margolis (1999, 2007). 
24 The literature on this particular topic is very large – for some fairly recent works, see for instance Braun 
(1998), Soames (2002), Chalmers (2011). 
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What should we say about Peter and Wendy’s communicative exchanges in C¹ 
and C²? Should we say that their communicative efforts are successful? Put more simply, 
does Peter understand Wendy? An affirmative answer seems prima facie plausible. In 
C1, Peter correctly identifies the referent as the pianist called ‘Paderewski’; in C2, he 
correctly identifies the referent as the politician called ‘Paderewski’. Peter has thus 
identified the object of the utterance in both cases, and he has done so in a way that does 
not seem “deviant” or “lucky”.25 This suggests that Peter understands Wendy’s two 
utterances of ‘Paderewski has musical talent’. However, this seemingly innocent 
assessment of the case can quickly lead to troubling consequences. 
 
3 The puzzle 
A widely endorsed principle holds that, whatever else one might want to say about 
thought individuation, it must closely track the thinker’s rationality, so that it is irrational 
to take contrasting attitudes towards a thought tA and a thought t
B if tA and t
B
 are the same 
thought. In converse form, the claim is: if a subject rationally holds contrasting attitudes 
towards a thought tA and a thought t
B, then tA and t
B must be distinct. In the literature this 
principle goes by various names; following Schiffer (1978), we’ll call it ‘Frege’s 
Constraint’ because of its strong connection to Frege’s seminal ideas in ‘On Sense and 
Reference’ (Frege 1892). 
Now, the case described in the previous section is precisely the type of situation 
where Frege’s Constraint applies. As Kripke himself notes, it seems incorrect to describe 
Peter as irrational – Peter might be a leading logician and thoroughly desire to avoid 
contradiction, while still holding incompatible beliefs because of his ignorance about the 
relevant identity. This is where Frege’s Constraint comes in: if Peter is rational, then the 
relevant thoughts must be different. To explain this in more detail, consider context C1 
first. Since Peter thinks the pianist is under discussion, he takes Wendy’s utterance 
‘Paderewski has musical talent’ to be true. So there is a certain thought t1 that Peter 
accepts as true. Now consider context C²: here, Peter thinks the politician is under 
discussion, so he takes Wendy’s utterance ‘Paderewski has musical talent’ to be false. 
So there is a certain thought t2 that Peter rejects as false. Peter’s attitude towards t¹ is 
 
25 For an example of a case where the hearer identifies the right referent in a lucky way and therefore does 
not seem to understand, see Loar (1976). 
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therefore different from his attitude towards t2: Peter accepts t¹ as true, whereas he rejects 
t2 as false. By Frege’s Constraint, it follows that t¹ and t2 are different thoughts. An 
attractive and popular principle of thought individuation thus demands that we take 
Peter’s thoughts as distinct.  
Let’s now introduce a second influential principle: the thought-transfer model of 
communication26. This model is based on a simple idea appearing in the work of 
philosophers as distinct (and distant) as Locke, Frege and Stalnaker27: if you make an 
utterance and I understand you, then I must be entertaining the same thought that you 
expressed. Understanding, in other words, requires that speaker and hearer entertain the 
same thought. Successful communication presumably requires understanding, so a 
speaker and a hearer who communicate successfully must entertain the same thought. 
The attractiveness of this simple thought-transfer model of understanding and 
communication is easy to see. How could I be said to have understood you if the thought 
I have entertained is distinct from the one you expressed? And how could you have 
successfully communicated your thoughts to me if your thoughts – the ones you 
expressed – are not the ones I have entertained? 
We can now formulate the main conflict this work is about. Return to Wendy and 
Peter’s communicative exchanges in C1 and C2. As we have seen, Peter seems to 
understand Wendy in both of those exchanges, yet this claim seems incompatible with 
the two influential principles we have just introduced – namely, Frege’s Constraint and 
the thought-transfer model. To see why, note that, if Peter understands Wendy in C1, then 
by the thought-transfer model he entertains a thought t1 that is the same as Wendy’s 
thought. Mutatis mutandis, if Peter understands Wendy in C2, then by the thought-
transfer model he entertains a thought t2 that is the same as Wendy’s thought. So, if 
Wendy expresses the same thought in those two conversations, that thought will be 
identical with each of Peter’s thoughts t1 and t2. By the transitivity of identity, Peter’s t1 
and t2 will then be the same thought; but that is incompatible with Frege’s Constraint, 
which holds that Peter’s thoughts are distinct. Here is a more precise formulation of the 
argument – what we’ll call ‘the puzzling argument’ or more simply ‘the puzzle’: 
 
 
26 See for instance Egan (2007) and Torre (2010), who call it the ‘belief-transfer model of assertion’. 





1. Wendy expresses the same thought t by uttering ‘Paderewski has musical 
talent’ in C¹ and C². 
2. Peter understands Wendy’s utterances in C¹ and C². 
3. As a result of Wendy’s utterances in C¹ and C², Peter entertains a thought 
t¹ (in C¹) and a thought t² (in C²) which are both identical with Wendy’s 
thought t [by 1, 2, and the thought-transfer model]. 
4. t¹ and t² are identical [by 3 and the transitivity of identity]. 
5. t¹ and t² are distinct [by Frege’s Constraint]. 
 
(4) and (5) are contradictory, so something must have gone wrong – but what? Several 
strategies are available. One could reject premise (1) by arguing that Wendy does not 
express the same thought in C¹ and C². One could reject (2), claiming that Peter does not 
understand Wendy in one or both contexts. One could reject the thought-transfer model 
and thereby block the step from (1)-(2) to (3). Finally, one could reject (5) by rejecting 
Frege’s Constraint.28 We’ll discuss each of these possible solutions in what follows. 
 
4 Does Peter understand? Two further cases 
One could simply rule out our initial assessment of the case as incorrect, holding that 
people who are as confused as Peter do not get to successfully understand non-confused 
people like Wendy. Indeed, authors like Cumming (2013) and Unnsteinsson (2018) have 
defended views in the vicinity. The key move here would be emphasizing the gravity of 
Peter’s confusion. One might begin by noting that Peter will not draw some of the 
inferences that Wendy expects him to draw: for instance, hearing Wendy’s utterance in 
C², Peter will fail to infer that there’s a pianist who is also a politician. One might then 
note that Peter’s mistake is even more serious than just failing to draw some inferences, 
for he is in fact taking a single name to be two. In C2, Peter fails to recognize that the 
name Wendy is using, ‘Paderewski’, is the same name that she had used in a previous 
context – Peter is failing to correctly individuate the words his interlocutor is employing. 
 
28 For now, we set aside premise (4) and the transitivity of identity, but we’ll return to this in Section 7. 
31 
 
So Peter has failed to understand Wendy and premise (2) of our puzzling argument is 
false. 
Now, we are unsure whether Peter misunderstands in this case – he has certainly 
made a mistake, but he has also identified the referent correctly. Furthermore, his mistake 
is not so uncommon. Many subjects “take one thing to be two”, so if Peter 
misunderstands this might overgenerate: many communicative interactions which we 
would intuitively take to be successful would have to be classified as unsuccessful.  
Luckily, we need not delve deeper into the issue. We will now discuss two 
variants of Peter’s case: in these variants it seems clear that Peter does understand 
Wendy, so that it would be highly implausible to reject premise (2) of the puzzling 
argument. We will therefore need a different strategy if we want to solve the puzzle in 
its full generality. 
 
4.1 First variant: indexicals 
The puzzle from the previous section involved proper names, but the same problem arises 
with other kinds of expressions. Consider for instance the following variant, which 
involves the first-person pronoun. At a party, Peter is talking to a group of guests. The 
guests are talking about their respective talents and one man says: ‘I have musical talent’. 
Peter trusts the guest and accepts the utterance as true. Just a few hours later, the same 
man is giving a speech at a political rally. Peter is also attending, but – being far from the 
stage – he does not recognize the speaker as the man he met at the party. While boasting 
about his own qualities, the speaker says: ‘I have musical talent.’ Peter is convinced that 
the speaker must be lying or exaggerating, so he rejects the utterance as false.  
 As in previous cases, Peter is confused – having failed to recognize the speaker 
as the party guest, he takes one thing to be two. The crucial question then is: has Peter 
understood the man’s two utterances in spite of being confused? It seems clear that he 
has. Both at the party and at the rally, Peter identifies the referent correctly – at the party, 
he identifies the referent as the guest in front of him; at the rally, he identifies the referent 
as the man on stage. Furthermore, being a competent speaker, Peter knows very well that 
the same type of expression (the first-person pronoun) is being used in the two cases. 
This constitutes a difference with cases involving proper names, where Peter takes one 
name (‘Paderewski’) to be two. Of course, Peter has made a mistake: he failed to 
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recognize the man, so he now holds two incompatible beliefs about him. But this mistake 
cannot possibly impair his understanding of the utterance; if it did, then communication 
would fail whenever the first-person pronoun was being used by a speaker that we have 
failed to recognize.  
This variant is of course modelled on the case examined in the previous section. 
One might suspect that the reason why we have been able to reframe the puzzle has 
something to do with the peculiarity of the first-person indexical and its mental analogue: 
the self-concept. Much has been written about the sui generis character of first-person 
thought, so one may suspect that any argument based on this puzzling type of 
representation cannot be so quickly applied to a wider range of cases. Indeed, one popular 
view, stemming from Frege (1918), is precisely that first-person thoughts are not 
shareable – they are of limited accessibility, only thinkable by their owners (Perry 1979). 
If one is sympathetic to this view, one will hardly be moved by the present argument.  
 But the argument just presented does not at all depend on the first-person 
indexical – it can very easily be reformulated with other context-sensitive expressions, 
like the second-person pronoun. Again, suppose Peter is at a party, talking to a group of 
guests. Wendy is also present and at one point she says to one of the guests, a man: ‘You 
have musical talent.’ Peter trusts Wendy’s judgment and accepts her utterance as true. A 
few hours later, the same man is giving a political speech. Peter and Wendy are in the 
audience; Wendy knows that the speaker is the man from the party, but Peter fails to 
recognize him. At some point Wendy says to the speaker: ‘You have musical talent.’ 
This time, however, Peter thinks that Wendy must be wrong, so he rejects her utterance 
as false. This case does not involve the first-person indexical, but the same problem 
arises: through a perfectly ordinary interpretation process, Peter has assigned the right 
referent both to Wendy’s first utterance (the man at the party) and to her second utterance 
(the man on stage). It thus seems clear that Peter understood both utterances. One could 
easily construct further variants of the puzzle with other indexicals, but this case is 
enough to prove our point: the puzzle does not depend on any peculiar features that the 
first-person indexical might have. 
It will be helpful to explain in more detail how the argument unfolds in cases 
involving indexicals. Here is the structure of the puzzle in the last case we proposed – 




 The puzzle (indexical variant) 
 
1. Wendy expresses the same thought t by uttering ‘You have musical talent’ 
in C¹ and C². 
2. Peter understands Wendy’s utterances in C¹ and C². 
3. As a result of Wendy's utterances in C¹ and C², Peter entertains a thought 
t¹ (in C¹) and a thought t² (in C²) which are both identical with Wendy’s 
thought t [by 1, 2, and the thought-transfer model]. 
4. t¹ and t² are identical [by 3 and the transitivity of identity]. 
5. t¹ and t² are distinct [by Frege’s Constraint]. 
 
Our puzzle thus turns out to be more general – and more difficult – than one might have 
thought at first. It is not only a puzzle about names, for it also arises with indexicals; it is 
not only a puzzle about the first-person, for it also arises with other indexicals; and it 
cannot be solved just by claiming that Peter misunderstands, for that solution is 
completely implausible in the cases we have just examined. 
 
4.2 Second variant: Wendy knows 
It gets worse: there are other variants of the puzzle where there is no reason to claim that 
Peter misunderstands. Suppose Wendy is well aware of Peter’s confusion: she knows 
that the pianist and the politician called ‘Paderewski’ are one and the same person, but 
she also knows that Peter is not aware of their identity. Then Wendy says ‘Paderewski 
has musical talent’ in C¹. She knows that Peter will take her utterance to refer to the 
pianist called ‘Paderewski’, but not to the politician; however, she thinks it is not 
important for her communicative purposes to correct Peter’s mistake, so she does not. 
Later, in C², Wendy says: ‘Paderewski has musical talent’. Again, Wendy knows that 
Peter will interpret her utterance as referring to the politician, not the pianist, yet she does 
not bother to correct Peter’s mistake, thinking that this will not interfere with her 




It seems clear that he has. Wendy is well aware that Peter will not take her 
utterance to refer to both the pianist and the politician, yet she does not bother to correct 
him, thinking that he’ll understand her anyway. In this new setup, it’s hard to see why 
we should refrain from ascribing understanding to Peter. Wendy thinks that Peter 
understood her despite his confusion; why should we think otherwise? 
We thus have a further variant of the puzzle where it is very clear that Peter 
understands Wendy.29 In combination with the indexical case presented above, this 
shows that there are at least two kinds of cases where it is wildly implausible to reject 
premise (2) in order to solve our puzzle. Let us then turn to examine other possible 
solutions. 
 
5 Belief retention and communication 
One strategy that might look promising at this point is rejecting premise (1). Why think 
that the speaker is expressing the same thought through her utterances in C1 and C2? The 
answer is that (1) is supported by some very plausible principles concerning the retention 
and communication of belief. 
 Start with belief retention. Ordinary subjects like Wendy seem able to retain their 
beliefs across time. In all of our cases, there is a belief that the speaker retains throughout 
her two exchanges with Peter. Consider Wendy, who asserts ‘Paderewski has musical 
talent’ in C1 and C2. At some point, Wendy formed a belief about Paderewski’s talent, a 
belief she expressed in C1 and then expressed again in C2. In her second conversation 
with Peter, Wendy intends to re-express a belief that she holds from before, not a “new” 
belief she formed after their first conversation. 
This natural and appealing description of the case assumes that the same belief 
was formed and then retained – there hasn’t been a succession of distinct beliefs, but 
rather a single belief that persisted across time. This claim is not just pre-theoretically 
plausible; the idea of belief retention also allows us to distinguish two very different ways 
in which a subject might think about the same object at different times. One can think 
about the same object without representing it as the same,30 failing to recognize it as the 
 
29 The argument in this version would have the same structure as previous ones, so we won’t repeat it here. 
30 For discussion of the distinction see Fine (2007), Recanati (2012). 
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object that she was previously thinking about. John Perry provides an example of this 
phenomenon: 
 
Suppose I ask two friendly Chicagoans which building is Union Station. One 
points to a building the three of us are standing beside, the other to a building 
some distance away, across a street. Both are correct, as Union Station is mainly 
under the street, rising up on either side of it. But I do not know this. My mind 
changes as I turn to each of the honest-looking natives. First I accept ‘This is 
Union Station,’ and then ‘That is Union Station.’ (Perry 1980, p. 323) 
 
As Perry notes, ‘this does not seem to be a case of what we would ordinarily call 
continuing to believe the same thing.’ (ibid.) The subject in Perry’s example ascribes the 
same property to the same object at both times, but her two beliefs at those times are not 
connected in the right away, for he (wrongly) takes himself to be thinking about different 
objects. We can therefore describe the subject as having formed a new belief. Contrast 
this with someone like Wendy, who ascribes the same property to the same object at 
different times without thinking that the referent has changed: this subject is correctly 
described as having retained the same belief. In light of all this, premise (1) of our 
argument becomes very plausible. Consider the basic version of our case (analogous 
considerations apply to the two variants from Section 4). Wendy knows there is a pianist 
called ‘Paderewski’ who is also a politician. At some point, she forms a belief about 
Paderewski – she now believes that the pianist and politician called ‘Paderewski’ has 
musical talent. In her first conversation with Peter at the concert, she expresses that belief 
through her utterance: ‘Paderewski has musical talent’. Later, in her second conversation 
with Peter at the political rally, she expresses that belief again by uttering the same 
sentence: ‘Paderewski has musical talent’. In light of the above considerations about 
belief retention and communication, we take this to be a correct representation of 
Wendy’s situation. So Wendy has expressed a single belief in C1 and C2, and premise (1) 
is true. 
Could one still argue against this premise? One possible counter-argument has to 
do with the subject’s knowledge of the relevant identity. To see how this might go, start 
with a basic question: if a subject thinks that a is different from b, but later learns that a 
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and b are the same object, what happens to her mental representations of a and b? Does 
the subject “merge” the two representations into one, or does she keep the two 
representations as separate items in her cognitive repertoire?31 Each of these two options 
has been defended in the literature; here we will not discuss their respective merits, but 
only a possible connection with our main topic. Suppose we reject the “merge” model, 
holding instead that someone who learns the identity between a and b will keep two 
separate representations – for instance, she might keep two distinct “files” for the object, 
rather than merging them into a single file (see Recanati 2012, 2016). One could then 
reject premise (1) of the puzzling argument, arguing along the following lines: the 
speaker in our cases has two separate mental representations for the referent, using one 
or the other depending on the context. For instance, even though our speaker Wendy 
knows that the pianist and the politician are the same person, she might still have two 
separate files for Paderewski. When the conversation focuses on Paderewski’s musical 
skills, Wendy would use the first file; however, Wendy would use the second file when 
having a conversation about Paderewski’s political activity. According to this argument, 
Wendy does not express the same thought in her two conversations with Peter, but rather 
different thoughts constituted by different mental representations of Paderewski. So the 
first premise of our puzzling argument is false. 
 Unfortunately, this response assumes that Wendy was – at some point in the past 
– ignorant in the same way that Peter currently is, being unaware that the pianist and the 
politician are the same person. But suppose Wendy always knew about Paderewski’s two 
talents; then there would be no moment in the past where she had two distinct files about 
him (one for the pianist, the other for the politician). The question about whether files 
are merged or not would then be out of place. This is even clearer in other versions of 
the puzzle. Suppose our speaker makes two utterances of ‘I have musical talent’ at 
different times (see Section 4.1). Here the speaker does not at some point ‘learn’ that the 
referent of the first utterance and the referent of the second utterance are the same person 
(namely, himself); he might simply know that all along, or never even consider the 
relevant identity question in the first place. So the speaker never had two distinct files 
about which we may wonder: “Have they been merged after the relevant identity fact 
 




was learned?” The response we are discussing thus seems moot with respect to our main 
cases, no matter whether one accepts or rejects the merge model.32 
Summing up our discussion in this section, rejecting premise (1) means 
abandoning a very plausible principle without thereby being able to solve the puzzle. 
Clearly, a different solution is needed. 
 
6 Rejecting Frege’s Constraint? 
We initially presented Frege’s Constraint as an all-or-nothing thesis: whenever a subject 
rationally holds contrasting attitudes towards a thought tA and a thought t
B, then tA and t
B 
must be distinct. However, some think it’s desirable to enable special circumstances in 
which a thinker’s rationality is unaffected by her taking contrasting attitudes to one and 
the same thought. In order for that to be possible, one has to accept the possibility that 
rational thinkers could be mistaken about the identity conditions of their own thoughts – 
sometimes, perhaps only in very unfortunate circumstances, taking one thought to be 
two, or two thoughts to be one. 
 Now, the possibility that is of interest to the present discussion is the former 
(rationally taking one thought to be two), not the latter (taking two thoughts to be one). 
Still, a great part of the discussion of these issues – usually under the banner of debates 
about the “transparency” of thought –33 focuses on the second, i.e. cases where, due to 
unlucky circumstances, a subject treats two concepts that do not even co-refer as being 
the same. Examples usually include cases of mistakes in perceptually tracking objects. 
For instance, a subject is tracking a bee flying in her visual field and thinks ‘this bee is 
buzzing’; unbeknownst to her, she starts tracking a second bee as the first swiftly crosses 
its path; so she thinks ‘this bee is [still] buzzing’ and then infers ‘one and the same bee 
was buzzing all along’, assuming she has successfully kept track of the same bee 
throughout the perceptual episode. It seems that the premises leading to the conclusion 
 
32 There are other possible objections against premise (1) of our puzzling argument. For instance, one might 
argue that Wendy is expressing surrogate metarepresentational thoughts that mimic Peter’s confused point 
of view (see Recanati’s discussion of “vicarious files” in chs. 14-15 of Recanati 2012). We think that 
strategy would only have any plausibility in cases where a thinker knows about the other’s confusion, so 
it would not apply to the first two variants of the puzzle, but we will not develop this here for reasons of 
space. 
33 The term ‘transparency’ comes from an influential paper by Boghossian (1994). For a recent survey of 
the debate, see Wikforss (2015). 
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do not even refer to the same bee, so that the reasoning is simply invalid. But the 
inference seems rational – in an intuitive sense, the subject was unlucky in drawing an 
invalid inference. It has thus been suggested that we simply accept that this subject is 
rational, despite falsely believing that she is referring to the same bee all along (Gerken, 
2011; Schroeter, 2007).  
 Does this idea have consequences that are relevant for our cases? That is, if we 
accept that one can rationally take two different thoughts to be one, should we also accept 
that one can rationally take one thought to be two? It is not clear that we should. One 
might hold that taking two thoughts to be one can be rational, while taking one thought 
to be two is always irrational. Indeed, while arguing that in some cases one could 
rationally treat two non-coreferential thoughts as the same, Schroeter (2007, p. 602, fn. 
6) points out that Frege’s Constraint is compatible with her view and explicitly rejects 
the possibility that a rational subject might treat one and the same thought as two. 
In any case, there are authors who explicitly argue for the possibility of rationally 
taking one thought to be two. For instance, this is how Sainsbury & Tye (2012, pp. 131-
138) analyze the Kripkean story about Paderewski. Their own account of the case rests 
on the claim that Peter accepts and rejects what is in fact the very same thought; however, 
Peter is not irrational, since he thinks (wrongly) that the thought he accepts is distinct 
from the thought he rejects. Peter’s rationality is thus safeguarded, because of his 
ignorance about the identity of his own thought. 
There is no space to go into the deeply ramifying implications of this view. It will 
be enough for our purposes to invoke, once again, the indexical variant of the Kripkean 
puzzle. More specifically, we believe that, even if Sainsbury & Tye’s story about 
Kripke’s original case works, it does not seem to extend to the indexical variant. It is not 
hard to see why this is so. 
Sainsbury & Tye’s interpretation of the Kripkean story is based on their own 
originalist theory of concepts. According to originalism, two concepts are the same if and 
only if they have the same origin. We do not need to go into the details of their view to 
see that, in a very intuitive sense, Peter’s two thoughts t¹ and t² are constituted by concepts 
of Paderewski that have the same origin. There is a network of interconnected uses of the 
single name ‘Paderewski’ that causally and historically descend from a single original 
use – for instance, Paderewski’s parents “baptizing” the child with that name. In simpler 
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terms, Peter’s concepts derive from two uses of the same name. So the two concepts have 
the same origin; therefore, they are the very same concept. So far, so good. 
The problem is that this strategy doesn’t generalize – even if we grant that it 
succeeds with proper names, it fails to apply to indexicals. Consider for instance the 
indexical variant of Kripke’s case that we have previously devised. In that variant, 
remember, there is no public name that Peter takes to be two. Instead, Peter is interpreting 
Wendy’s two utterances of ‘You have musical talent’, which crucially involve the 
second-person pronoun ‘you’. Now, the second-person pronoun is clearly not a proper 
name like ‘Paderewski’; it is an indexical, one which is often treated as analogous to 
demonstratives like ‘this’, ‘that’ and ‘s/he’ (in its deictic uses).34 But, as Sainsbury & 
Tye (p. 51-53) themselves acknowledge, concepts that correspond to indexical 
expressions are unlike other concepts in many respects: 
 
It’s a feature of indexical concepts that a speaker can introduce them for himself, 
independently of other thinkers. This contrasts with public concepts acquired by 
immersion, like the concept PADEREWSKI. It’s not up to individual users to 
settle anything about the nature or semantics of that concept. (Sainsbury & Tye, 
p. 52, fn. 15) 
 
One consequence of this asymmetry is that, according to Sainsbury & Tye, the identity 
conditions of indexical and demonstrative concepts are much more closely connected to 
their thinker’s beliefs and intentions. One can argue that Peter’s ‘Paderewski’-utterances 
express the same concept even though he thinks they don’t, since the concepts expressed 
by proper names are “public” and “insulated” from the thinker’s idiosyncratic intentions. 
But this is much harder to defend when indexical and demonstrative expressions are 
concerned. According to Sainsbury & Tye, we can only determine whether two 
demonstrative concepts are the same by first inquiring whether the thinker herself takes 
them to be the same. Consider for instance Perry and Evans’s famous case of a subject 
who thinks he is looking at different ships, when in fact he is looking at one very long 
ship that is visible through different windows. Sainsbury & Tye say: 
 





The two uses of the complex demonstrative concept-template THAT SHIP 
involve distinct specific demonstrative concepts [...]. This can be inferred from 
the speaker’s intentions and reactions. For example, he has no inclination to bring 
forward the information was built in Japan when having the thought associated 
with the view from the second window. [...] two concepts, concepts originating 
in distinct acts of concept introduction. (ibid., pp. 51-52) 
 
We can now apply Sainsbury & Tye’s view to our case. Upon hearing Wendy’s two 
utterances of ‘You have musical talent’, does Peter entertain the same thought? As we 
have seen, that depends on Peter’s beliefs and intentions: does Peter take himself to be 
thinking the same thought? In our case, he does not – upon hearing Wendy’s second 
utterance, Peter fails to recognize the referent as the same person that she was talking 
about earlier, so he takes himself to be thinking a different thought about a different 
person. This means that, just like the subject in the ship case, he has “no inclination to 
bring forward the information” acquired in the first context and apply it to the man in the 
second context. So Sainsbury & Tye would have to grant that Peter’s two concepts are 
distinct, as they do with the subject in the ship case. In Sainsbury & Tye’s terminology, 
Peter’s token concepts have distinct origins – his two independent encounters with the 
referent – so they are distinct tout court. 
Now, Sainsbury & Tye could respond that, when Peter interprets Wendy’s two 
utterances, his thoughts somehow have Wendy’s thoughts as their origin; but Wendy 
expresses a single thought through her two utterances (Section 5), so Peter’s thoughts 
have the same origin and count as identical after all. The first problem is that this is 
simply incompatible with Sainsbury & Tye’s own account of indexical concepts. As we 
have seen, Peter is just like the subject in the ship case: they both fail to recognize the 
object they’re in perceptual contact with, thus failing to “bring forward” the information 
acquired in their first encounter with the referent. In the ship case, Sainsbury and Tye 
postulate distinct concepts because of the subject’s failure in bringing forward the 
relevant information, so they would have to do the same in Peter’s case. But there is a 
second, more fundamental problem: Peter’s concepts do not originate in his exchanges 
with Wendy. At the party, Peter sees a man and forms a demonstrative concept for him; 
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then Wendy makes her utterance and Peter identifies the referent as the man in question, 
someone he is thinking about in a demonstrative manner. At the political rally, Peter sees 
the man on stage and forms a demonstrative concept, then Wendy makes her utterance 
and Peter identifies the referent as the man he is thinking about demonstratively. So the 
origins of Peter’s concepts are not Wendy’s two utterances, but his two independent 
sightings of the same man; and surely these are different origins by Sainsbury & Tye’s 
own lights. 
Summing up, even if Sainsbury & Tye’s originalist account was successful in 
Kripke’s case, it would still fail to apply to our indexical variant, where there is no reason 
to postulate a single origin for Peter’s concepts. So it remains much more plausible to 
hold that Peter’s thoughts t¹ and t² are distinct, as Frege’s Constraint predicts. Like 
previous attempts, then, rejecting Frege’s Constraint fails to solve our puzzle in its full 
generality. 
 
7 The thought-transfer model 
There are two further assumptions in our puzzling argument that have not been examined 
yet: the thought-transfer model and the transitivity of thought identity. Both principles 
are necessary for the argument to go through; reject one of them, and the puzzle will 
disappear. Could that be the solution?  
 Before answering that question, note that rejecting the transitivity of thought 
identity is just one way of abandoning the thought-transfer model. Since numerical 
identity is transitive, we cannot hold that two thoughts are numerically identical without 
the relation between them being transitive. What one could hold is that, when we say that 
two agents entertain ‘the same thought’, we do not mean that there is a single thought 
that they both entertain. But then what do we mean? The proponent of this move will 
need to find an alternative – a relation R that holds between the thoughts of different 
subjects and is weaker than numerical identity. Before discussing some options, note that 
this has consequences for the thought-transfer model, which claims that communicating 
subjects express the same thought: if ‘same thought’ expresses a non-transitive relation 
R, the model requires something weaker than numerical identity. Rejecting transitivity 
thus turns out to be one way of weakening the thought-transfer model. We will therefore 
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focus the rest of our discussion on the possibility of rejecting thought-transfer, treating 
the rejection of transitivity as one variant of this strategy. 
Nowadays the thought-transfer model is not as popular as it used to be, having 
been recently criticized on various fronts. First, the model has been rejected by a number 
of authors who adopt Lewis’s view about de se thought:35 these authors find Lewis’s 
view independently plausible, see that view as incompatible with the thought-transfer 
model, and conclude that the latter has to go. Another group of views that put pressure 
on thought-transfer is formed by conceptual/inferential role theories and internalist 
theories of content36 – proponents of these views generally recognize their own theory as 
incompatible with the idea that communicating agents share the same thought. Finally, 
many psychologists working on concepts think that people’s concepts are radically 
distinct and even diverge within the same subject in slightly different contexts. This 
should come as no surprise: psychologists generally take concepts to be determined by 
the bodies of information individuals retrieve in the course of exercising higher-order 
cognitive capacities, such as categorization, and these bodies of information have been 
repeatedly shown to be highly variable from individual to individual (and from context 
to context).37 
It will be helpful to use an example to illustrate the conflict between the thought-
transfer model and one of the views we have just mentioned: Lewis’s account of belief 
content as centered content. The point is clearly illustrated by Weber (2013), who calls 
the thought-transfer model the “FedEx model” and Lewis’s account “the centered belief 
account”:  
 
A believes that she has Groat’s disease and tells B: ‘‘I have Groat’s disease’’. If 
everything goes well, we expect B to learn that A (or the speaker) has Groat’s 
disease, while remaining agnostic about whether she herself has the disease. Call 
this case Good Groat’s. In the second somewhat bizarre scenario B acquires the 
 
35 See for example Torre (2010), Ninan (2010), Weber (2013), and the seven essays in the second part of 
García-Carpintero & Torre (2016). 
36 See for example Block (1993), Prinz (2002), Schneider (2011), Chalmers (2011), Pagin (forthcoming), 
Valente (2019). 
37 See for instance Machery (2009). Whether the psychologists’ notion of a concept is the same as the one 
we’re concerned with is a controversial matter that need not concern us here. 
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belief that she herself has Groat’s disease, while remaining agnostic about 
whether A is diseased. Call this situation Bad Groat’s. Clearly, communication 
has failed in Bad Groat’s. However, a centered FedEx model would classify the 
cases in the opposite way. According to the centered belief account, the content 
of A’s belief is the set of individuals with Groat’s disease. [...] As B shares a 
belief with the same content in Bad Groat’s but not in Good Groat’s, the FedEx 
model is obeyed in Bad Groat’s but not in Good Groat’s. This means that the 
former case gets misclassified as successful and the latter as unsuccessful 
communication. [...] Something has to give. As it isn’t a viable option to simply 
reverse our classification, we seem forced to give up either the centered belief 
account or the FedEx model. (Weber 2013, p. 209) 
 
Weber himself ends up rejecting thought-transfer; others have taken the same path. But 
these objections to the thought-transfer model have a clear limitation: they depend on the 
specific view underlying the objection, like the Lewisian view underlying Weber’s 
argument. And while such views have certainly been influential, they have also been 
rejected by some important figures in the debate. For instance, Stalnaker (1981) objects 
against Lewis’s theory of belief content precisely because it is incompatible with the 
possibility of entertaining the same content in communication. So the conflict between 
the thought-transfer model and the aforementioned views can cut both ways, depending 
on how plausible one finds the model to be. 
 To avoid a stalemate, we propose using our puzzle to provide a fresh perspective 
on the issue. The puzzle we have proposed does not presuppose highly controversial 
views about the nature of belief – we have presupposed neither Lewisian centered 
contents, nor conceptual/inferential role semantics, nor semantic internalism, nor the 
view that concepts are retrievable bodies of information. Instead, we have shown how a 
puzzle can be generated from a set of premises that are widely accepted and highly 
plausible; furthermore, our puzzle does not depend on a narrow selection of cases, since 
it can be generated with different kinds of expressions (names, indexicals) and different 
kinds of conversational contexts (contexts where the hearer’s confusion is known and 
contexts where it is not). 
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 In light of these considerations, the thought-transfer model now seems to face 
considerable pressure. The model is not only incompatible with some influential – but 
controversial – accounts of belief content; it also appears incompatible with a set of basic 
principles that theorists of different persuasions accept. It thus seems natural, almost 
inevitable to reject the model. That would block our puzzling argument, but at what 
price? Do we have a viable alternative to thought-transfer? Many authors think we do. 
One popular option is to appeal to similarity.38 Why think that speaker and hearer must 
share the very same thought? Why can’t they just have similar thoughts in order for 
communication to be successful? 
A full discussion of similarity-based theories would be beyond the scope of this 
paper, so we will only highlight one obstacle to solving our puzzle through similarity. 
Clearly, any similarity view has to specify what properties are relevant when evaluating 
the similarity of two thoughts. Without this specification, any two thoughts will count as 
sufficiently similar, since similarity is notoriously “cheap”: any two thoughts will share 
an infinite number of properties.39 If I say ‘Paderewski has talent’ and you identify the 
wrong person as the referent, you have surely misunderstood the utterance. Still, there 
will be an infinite number of properties in common between our respective thoughts, 
such as: being entertained by a subject; being entertained in a context where A is 
speaking; being entertained in a context where A is speaking and B is listening; and so 
on. If each shared property contributes to the similarity of the two thoughts, then we will 
eventually reach the desired similarity score. Obviously, this is not the desired result, for 
it would make miscommunication impossible – speaker and hearer would always 
communicate successfully, since their thoughts would always exhibit the required level 
of similarity. This is not by itself a fatal objection to similarity, but it does show that 
more work is needed before we can tell whether thought identity can be replaced by 
thought similarity. Once the similarity theorist has told us what the desired similarity 
metric amounts to, we will be in a position to tell whether this is a satisfactory solution 
to the puzzle. Until then, the appeal to similarity is at most a promising strategy needing 
further development. 
 
38 See for instance Harman (1993), Prinz (2002), Pagin (forthcoming).  
39 See Onofri (2016). 
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Analogous considerations apply to the notion of “type-identity”, which is often 
invoked by theorists such as Fodor (1998, 2008) and Laurence and Margolis (1999, 
2007). According to these authors, mental representations can be classified according to 
a type-token distinction, much like natural language symbols. So two subjects can share 
the same thought by tokening representations of the same type, instead of having 
numerically identical thoughts. But the point made above about similarity also applies 
here: these views ought to provide us with a set of criteria to decide which types count 
towards communicative success, and which do not. If the criteria are too strict, 
communication will be too difficult or impossible; if they are too loose, any two subjects 
will turn out to communicate successfully.40 
The same applies to another possible solution to our puzzle. As we have seen, 
premise (1) of our argument claims that Wendy expresses the same thought t in her two 
conversations with Peter. Instead of rejecting the premise as false – a move we already 
criticized in Section 5 – one could hold that ‘same thought’ must here be interpreted as 
expressing a non-transitive relation holding between Wendy’s thoughts at different 
times. It would then be invalid to derive our contradictory conclusion by applying the 
transitivity of identity, as our argument does. This kind of view has been recently 
defended by Prosser, who rejects transitivity in both the interpersonal and the 
intrapersonal case:41 
 
Strictly speaking the relation that we capture by saying that Brown thinks of O 
under the same MOP [Mode of Presentation] as Jones is not an identity relation 
but an intransitive transparency relation. But it is still exactly as true to say that I 
have retained a belief, or share a belief with someone else, as it is to say that I did 




40 See Aydede (1998), Schneider (2011) for discussion. Similarity and type-identity are not the only 
candidates. For instance, various theorists have recently defended views where the relation between 
speaker’s thought and hearer’s thought determines communicative success, without that relation 
amounting to a form of similarity or type-identity. For reasons of space, it would be impossible to discuss 
these proposals here; among others, see Fine (2007), Schroeter (2012), Heck (2012) and Recanati (2016).  
41 See Prosser (2019, forthcoming) and Recanati (2016). 
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The ‘same MOP’ relation thus fails to be transitive even in the intrapersonal case. 
(ibid., p. 16) 
 
Prosser thinks the problems arising for thought identity parallel those that arise from 
fission and fusion cases in the personal identity literature. So he suggests a parallel 
solution: taking ‘same thought’ to express a non-transitive relation, in the same way as 
various authors have taken ‘same person’ to be non-transitive. If this move is correct, it 
is more than enough to solve our puzzle – just by rejecting transitivity for thoughts held 
at different times, the puzzling argument would turn invalid. But is the move correct after 
all? As with the thought-transfer model, one would need to closely examine the relation 
that is being proposed as an alternative to numerical identity. As we have seen in Section 
5, some cases are best described as ones where the subject fails to entertain the same 
thought across time. If the candidate relation we are proposing is too weak, then we might 
misclassify these cases as ones where the same thought has been successfully retained. 
Here we cannot discuss how Prosser and others might respond, but a full solution to our 
puzzle would certainly need to address the issue. 
It’s now time to draw some general conclusions from our discussion of the 
thought-transfer model. Our puzzle shows the model to be inconsistent with a set of 
claims that are quite plausible, widely endorsed, and very difficult to reject, as the 
previous sections have shown. So we believe that, among the principles that generate the 
puzzle, thought-transfer is the least plausible one. Our conclusion is that communication 
does not involve transferring thoughts from speaker to hearer. At the same time, we have 
highlighted that this theoretical choice should not be taken lightly. Sacrificing thought-
transfer means having to offer an alternative theory of communication, which might be 
based on similarity, type-identity, or some further notion. Until these alternatives have 
been fully developed, we will not know whether thought-transfer can really be 
abandoned. So our conclusion is tentative: rejecting the thought-transfer model is the 
least costly option, but it still comes at a price. 
 
8 Conclusion 
We have presented a puzzle about understanding. Our argument was based on a set of 
cases where a confused subject is interacting with a non-confused one. The puzzle 
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derives from the plausible idea that these two subjects would be able to understand each 
other, plus a set of attractive, widely accepted principles concerning thought and 
communication. The problem arises for different kinds of expressions – names, 
indexicals – and for different kinds of speakers – speakers who don’t know about the 
hearer’s confusion, speakers who do. It is thus a general problem which requires a general 
solution – as we have seen, some strategies seem to work with one variant of the puzzle 
but turn out to be completely implausible with others. 
 In order to provide a tentative solution to the problem, we have suggested 
sacrificing the thought-transfer model of communication. As we have seen, this is not a 
novel claim in itself; what makes the claim interesting is our argument for it. Our puzzle 
arises from a small set of claims which are widely endorsed in the literature, not from a 
highly controversial theory such as Lewis’s centered-content model or internalism. So 
the reasons we have offered against thought-transfer ought to have more dialectical force 
than other more parochial considerations against it. 
Yet our solution to the puzzle is tentative, for abandoning thought-transfer does 
have a cost: our preferred alternative must yield the right predictions about the relevant 
cases of communication. If none of the alternatives achieves this, then thought-transfer 
might still be our best option and a different solution to our puzzle will be needed. So 
there is no easy solution to the problem we have presented; our puzzle about 
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Abstract 
I suggest a solution to a conflict between semantic internalism – according to which the 
concepts one expresses are determined by one’s use of representations – and publicity – 
according to which, if two subjects successfully communicate or are in genuine 
agreement, then they entertain thoughts constituted by the same concepts. My solution 
rests on the thesis that there can be successful communication and genuine agreement 
between thinkers employing distinct concepts as long as there is a certain relation (of 
conceptually guaranteed sameness of extension) between them. In section 2, I motivate 
semantic internalism and show how it conflicts with publicity. In section 3, I carve the 
logical space of possible solutions to the conflict into liberal and conservative solutions. 
Section 4 assesses Wikforss’ conservative solution to Burge’s arthritis thought-
experiment and concludes that it fails for more than one reason. Section 5 introduces a 
new case study involving a deferential concept. This case serves as the backdrop for my 
positive account offered in section 6. The conclusion of the paper is preceded by a 
comparison of my view with another recently proposed by Recanati (section 7) and some 
replies to possible objections (section 8). 
 
1 Introduction 
Roughly, the main aim of this work is arguing for the compatibility between the view 
that our use of representations determines the concepts we express with the wholly public 
nature of concepts. More precisely, I will argue that the concepts we express are 
individuated by our dispositions to apply mental and/or linguistic representations only to 
certain scenarios and will strive to show how this can be made compatible with the 
general methodological principle according to which successful communication and/or 
genuine agreement between subjects require that they share their concepts. Before 
proceeding, some setup is needed. 
Concepts, qua theoretical entities in the philosophy of language and mind, are the 
constituents of our thoughts. They are the building-blocks of the contents of our 
propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, fears and conjectures. When one believes, 
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for example, that a bachelor is an unmarried man, one has a belief whose content 
contains, among others, the concept BACHELOR.42  
There is much discussion about the ontology of concepts, especially regarding 
whether they should be treated as token mental representations or as abstract aspects of 
content expressible by mental and/or linguistic representations. This is not a paper about 
the ontology of concepts. Indeed, under the assumption that token mental representations 
can be sorted into types with respect to the property that individuates content, the 
arguments developed in here are compatible with any of the two approaches. It is, 
however, difficult to advance substantial theses about concepts while, at the same time, 
remaining ontologically neutral. It is only for the sake of simplicity that I will treat 
concepts as aspects of content and will phrase the arguments accordingly. Thus, one of 
the paper’s objectives will be assessing the conditions for a representation to have 
expressed a certain concept. Had I adopted the other approach, I would have talked about 
the conditions for a token mental representation (i.e. a concept) to be of a certain type. 
Not much of substance will hinge on this. As a general rule: if one prefers to think of 
concepts as token mental representations, then one can translate my claims about 
concepts as being about types of mental representations. 
 In the next section, I introduce a more contentious claim about concepts, namely, 
that they are individuated by reference-determining rules.43 While this is far from a 
universally accepted thesis, it is a central assumption of the web of views I intend to 
defend - those which subscribe to the view I call Internalism. After showing that 
Internalism seems to conflict with the public nature of concepts, I will divide the possible 
ways out of the conflict into a conservative and a liberal camp (section 3). After siding 
with the conservatives and pointing out the shortcomings of Wikforss’ (2001) own 
conservative strategy (section 4), I will offer, on the basis of a case study involving 
deferential concepts (section 5), a positive view according to which subjects can 
successfully communicate and genuinely agree by holding distinct concepts that are 
conceptually guaranteed to pick out the same things (section 6). Before concluding 
(section 9), I compare my view to Recanati’s (section 7) and answer to a few objections 
(section 8).   
 
42 I will employ the convention of using words in capital letters to refer to concepts. 
43 Thus, one who adopts the view that concepts are token mental representations is invited to think of them 




2 Internalism and Publicity 
This assumption will guide our discussion: a concept’s identity-conditions are given by 
what it would take for an object to fall under its extension. In other words, concepts are 
individuated by extension-determining rules (henceforth, rules). Thus, e.g. the concept 
BACHELOR is the concept it is because for something to fall under its extension is for 
something to be an unmarried man. Alternatively, we can say that BACHELOR is 
individuated by the rule that it refers to x iff x is an unmarried man. Now, it should be 
obvious that most of our ordinary concepts are not like BACHELOR, whose rule is so 
sharply expressible and about which everybody would agree. On the contrary, many of 
the concepts we routinely employ are such that they give us the conflicting feeling of 
being both competent in their use and unable to explain what they refer to. That feeling 
notwithstanding, there must be something that makes it the case that some, but not all, 
applications of a concept are correct, however vague and fugitive that might be. 
 One should not read me as committed to an outdated picture according to which 
every concept has a rule expressible as sharp necessary and sufficient conditions. As I 
said, few concepts are bound to be like BACHELOR. A rule might be significantly 
complex, e.g. involving relations of family resemblance, relations of typicality, reference 
to sense-data, motivational states, linguistic tokens, mental tokens, the opinions of 
experts etc. My talk of rules should then be taken as noncommittal as possible.44 
 We have discussed what makes a concept the concept it is and how that relates to 
what an object would have to be like for it to fall under its extension. A further question 
is: what does a thinker have to be like for us to correctly characterize her as having 
expressed a particular concept by a token representation? Accounts of what it takes to 
express a concept fall into one of these two camps: internalist or externalist. Internalists 
claim that which concepts a thinker expresses supervene on matters internal to that 
thinker, where “internal” should not be read in the sense according to which blood cells 
are internal, but that according to which one’s reasons are. To an internalist, successfully 
 
44 By assuming that concepts are individuated by reference-determining rules, I approximate my view to a 
broader research project that includes Jackson (1998), Braddon-Mitchell (2004), Chalmers (2011a) and 
many others. These authors are often referred to as neo-descriptivists, but this label can be misleading – it 
gives the wrong idea that concepts are individuated by a purely qualitative description of their extension. 
None of these authors would agree. Thus, I prefer to use the more neutral term ‘rule’ and to emphasize that 
there are, in principle, no limits to what might constitute them. 
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expressing a concept is a cognitive achievement one is responsible for; we are – to use 
an expression from Braddon-Mitchell (2004) – the masters of our meanings. There is 
more than one way to put that idea in the form of a thesis about concepts, but I take the 
core internalist claim to be that, when one expresses a concept, that is to be explained by 
that subject being in some kind of personal-level cognitive relation to what makes that 
concept the concept that it is. More particularly – and drawing on our previous discussion 
of concepts and rules – I take the core internalist thesis to be: 
 
INTERNALISM: For any concept X and representation Y, a thinker expresses X by Y 
if and only if this thinker’s use of Y is guided by X’s rule. 
 
 In line with the previous comments, ‘using a representation under the guidance 
of a rule’ has to be understood in the sense that the relevant subject, if asked, would, in 
principle, be able to explain what he meant by coming up with the relevant rule. In reality, 
things are seldom that straightforward. As previously noticed, we are seldom capable of 
explaining what we mean – that is, which rule is guiding us – by the representations we 
produce. But even in those cases, the internalist contends, the subject has some 
disposition to apply the relevant representation only to certain cases and not to others, 
and if that subject were presented with a list of actual and imaginary scenarios, we would, 
in principle, be able to abstract a rule (and thus figure out which concept it is that she is 
expressing) from considering every case to which she feels disposed to apply the 
representation and those to which she does not.  
 Internalism has more or less been the default position in the philosophy of mind 
and language until very recently.45 However good its pedigree, it has come under serious 
attack in the latter half of the 20th century from the so-called externalists.46 Externalists 
often emphasize our inability to come up with definitions for the representations we 
employ and argue that, even when we manage to come up with candidates, they are 
usually half-baked and too indiscriminate to be of any real use. The particular arguments 
these philosophers advance usually involve subjects who manage to express a particular 
 
45 As Johnston & Leslie remark (2012, p. 116), “something like this substantial picture has a good claim 
to be at the motivating core of what was once called ‘analytical philosophy’ - from Gottlob Frege, Kurt 
Gödel, A.J. Ayer, H.P. Grice and Roderick Chisholm through to George Bealer and Frank Jackson”. 
46 Among those, Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1980) stand out. 
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concept regardless of being mistaken about its rule or even completely ignorant about its 
nature. Drawing on these cases, externalists usually emphasize the role of e.g. one’s 
social environment in the determination of the concepts we express. 
 The main aim of that paper is not to adjudicate between Internalism and 
Externalism. As is often the case with foundational questions in philosophy, the best way 
to defend a particular view is not by direct argumentation – as if the decision were just a 
matter of logical deduction – but by showing that it successfully accommodates the 
theoretical desiderata and that it is resilient on the face of criticism. I believe that the 
contemporary criticism against Internalism is not as convincing as some philosophers 
make it out to be and will argue that there exist interesting internalist ways out. Let me 
summarize what I take to be the core externalist criticism of Internalism. 
 As mentioned, externalists emphasize cases where subjects seem to express 
concepts by representations whose use is not guided by the appropriate rules. These cases 
usually come in two varieties. In the first variety we have subjects who are close to being 
fully competent with a certain concept but are nonetheless mistaken about some of its 
crucial features. I take Burge’s (1979) notorious story about Bert, an individual who 
thinks he has arthritis in his thigh (even though it is an inflammation that only affects the 
joints), to be an example of that sort of case. We’ll focus on these in section 4. The other 
variety of cases involves subjects who manage to express a concept by deferring to 
others, as when one manages to think and talk about mega-bytes (or fascism, or baroque 
art etc.) without having the faintest idea of what they are. Deferential cases will be the 
focus of section 5. 
 The argumentative pull of these two types of cases obviously depends on the 
assumption that these individuals indeed manage to express the relevant concepts 
regardless of not being internally connected to their rules in the way Internalism predicts. 
As will become clear, this assumption is based on the tendency we have of classifying 
individuals who successfully communicate or who genuinely agree about some subject 
matter as sharing their concepts. That tendency should not come as a surprise, given that 
“one of the core explanatory role of concepts is to capture our most basic ways of keeping 
track of a topic in thought” (Schroeter & Schroeter, 2016, p. 5). It is not unusual to 
express this idea as a general constraint on a theory of concepts:47 
 




(PUBLICITY) Whenever two subjects (I) successfully communicate or (II) are in 
genuine agreement with each other, then that must be accounted for by them sharing a 
concept. More specifically, 
 (I) if A successfully communicates to B a thought containing the concept C¹ by 
means of an utterance U, then B must entertain a thought containing a concept C¹. 
 (II) if A genuinely (dis)agrees with B with respect to B’s utterance U that 
expresses concept C¹, A must hold a corresponding attitude to a thought containing a 
concept C¹.48 
 
 The most vivid way of arguing in favor of Publicity is by considering a story from 
Loar (1976) whose conclusion is that a speaker and a hearer who entertain co-referential 
thoughts have not necessarily succeeded in successfully communicating (or in being in 
genuine agreement): 
 
Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on 
television is someone they see on the train every morning and about whom, in that 
latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says ‘He is a stockbroker’, intending 
to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith to be referring to the man on 
the train. Now Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified Smith’s referent, since 
the man on television is the man on the train; but he has failed to understand Smith’s 
utterance.  
 
 Since Loar’s characters fail to successfully communicate regardless of holding 
thoughts that are true in just the same conditions, one concludes that this relation (mutatis 
mutandis for genuine agreement) requires more than a match of referential content. 
Sameness of concept is then expected to fill that gap.  
The two types of cases we will discuss are instances of cases where Internalism 
pushes us into claiming that the relevant individuals have distinct concepts but, because 
they are either successfully communicating or in genuine agreement, Publicity pushes us 
 
48 I will be exclusively concerned with a notion of (dis)agreement with respect to [the thought expressed 
by] an utterance. This does not mean that there aren’t other philosophically interesting cases of 




in the opposite direction. I take it that most externalist arguments against Internalism are 
based on its conflict with Publicity.49 Indeed, even authors who are sympathetic to 
Internalism admit that, unless some story is told about how people who have distinct 
perspectives or understanding about a certain subject matter can nonetheless 
communicate and stand in agreement about it, then it will fail to attract many followers.50 
Thus, if I manage to show how Internalism can be made compatible with Publicity, then 
the internalist side of the debate will have gained a significant advantage over its 
adversary.51 
 
3 Liberal and Conservative ways out of the conflict 
Let us distinguish two types of ways of solving the conflict just presented. The liberal 
ways out are those that outrightly dissociate concept expression or successful 
communication (genuine agreement) from rules. The conservative ways, on their turn, 




49 Not only Burge’s arthritis case, as we will see in section 3, but also Kripke’s (1980) famous semantic 
argument against descriptivism. The semantic argument contends that we do not associate sufficiently 
discriminating rules with the names we use and that sometimes we even associate the wrong rules with 
them. The usual examples are that of a subject who is competent in talking about the physicist Feynman 
by means of the proper name ‘Feynman’ even though she knows no more about him than that he is some 
famous physicist, i.e. the rule she employs does not determine one and only one referent. Another type of 
example is that of one who associates ‘Albert Einstein’ with the rule that it refers to the inventor of the 
atomic bomb. This individual is grossly mistaken but nonetheless seems to succeed in referring to Einstein. 
Both types of examples can be seen as presenting a conflict between Internalism and Publicity, since the 
relevant individuals seem to successfully communicate and think about Feynman or Einstein regardless of 
the faulty rules guiding their uses. 
50 One very illustrative example is Chalmers’ (2011a, p. 14, 18) crucial employment of the notion of ‘S-
appropriateness’ to account for true belief ascriptions involving concepts (‘primary intensions’ in his 
terminology) that are distinct from the ones expressed by the ascribee. Chalmers admits that he has no 
satisfactory account of it, but nonetheless gives it central importance in his account. Under the assumption 
that a theory of belief ascription can be extracted from a theory of successful communication and genuine 
agreement, the view I will defend in Section 6 under the name of ‘Publicity*’ can then be seen as 
complementary to Chalmers’ project. In summary, I believe that knowledge of sameness of extension 
based on concepts’ rules could help account for S-appropriateness in Chalmers’ context.   
51 The two types of cases which I will focus on, i.e. that of mistaken and of deferential subjects, do not 
form an exhaustive list. Cases of cognitive dynamics invite a similar conflict between Internalism and 
Publicity, and so do cases of conceptual stability across theory change, e.g. if one thinks that ATOM is the 
same concept today as it was for John Dalton in the early 19th century, then it seems that the same concept 
has survived unscathed through major revisions in the rule which constitutes it. Hopefully what I argue for 
the simpler cases will be proven relevant to these more complicated ones, although this claim will be left 
for future investigation. 
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I. Liberalism about Internalism: the concept one expresses by a representation is 
independent of the rule guiding one’s use of it. 
II. Liberalism about Publicity: a subject A may successfully communicate a 
thought that contains the concept C¹ to B even if B entertains a thought that 
contains the concept C², where C¹ ≠ C², and where this communicative success 
is not grounded on any semantic or epistemic properties of the rules associated 
with C¹ and/or C². 
III. Conservativism about Internalism: the concept one expresses by a 
representation is weakly determined by the rule guiding one’s use of it. 
IV. Conservativism about Publicity: a subject A may successfully communicate a 
thought containing the concept C¹ to B even if B entertains a thought containing 
concept C², where C¹ ≠ C², but where this communicative success is grounded 
on some semantic or epistemic property of the rules associated with C¹ and C². 
 
Liberalism about Internalism has been the preferred strategy of externalist 
philosophers, such as Burge (1979). It is equivalent to a rejection of Internalism; thus, 
one is free to give an alternative account of what it takes to express a concept – perhaps 
one in which one’s community, or at least its experts, determine which concepts one gets 
to express, even if one has no cognitive relation whatsoever to the rules in the minds of 
the experts. Liberalism about Publicity entails that communicative success should be 
accounted for by matters orthogonal to the rules guiding one’s uses of representations.52 
It is not my objective in this paper to argue against these two liberal ways out of the 
conflict. Instead, I will take their “revolutionary” character to entail that they only 
become real theoretical contenders as soon as the more conservative ways out are out of 
the game. Since I think there are good conservative ways out there, I will refrain from 
considering the liberal accounts more in depth. 
 Conservativism about Internalism maintains the connection between concept 
expression and rules but weakens the extent to which one determines the other. One way 
 
52 Unnsteinsson (2018) claims that the failure of communication in the case from Loar previously presented 
is due to the subjects having a false belief about the target of the conversation. That could be seen as view 
according to which communicative success is independent of the subject’s perspectives on the subject 
matter at hand. Cumming (2013) argues that these cases can be explained by the absence of a coordinating 
convention between the subject’s representations. Under a plausible interpretation, this also would amount 
to Liberalism about Publicity. 
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of fleshing that idea out is by claiming that, contrary to Internalism, we do not need to be 
guided by a concept C’s constitutive rule in order to express it, but merely be guided by 
a rule which sufficiently approximates it. I think a view pretty much like that can be 
extracted from Wikforss (2001). I will consider that proposal in the next section and argue 
that it fails for at least a couple of reasons. 
 Finally, Conservativism about Publicity maintains the connection between 
communicative success and rules but does not entail that the former requires identity of 
the latter. As a first pass, the idea would be that we can count some people as successfully 
communicating even when they express distinct concepts, as long as the rules that these 
people are following are related in such-and-such a way. Naturally, the difficult bit here 
will be finding a suitable relation between thinker’s rules such that, even though they 
lead these thinkers to express distinct concepts, they can nonetheless be said to be 
successfully communicating (or genuinely agreeing). I will defend a view like this one 
in section 6. 
 
4 Burge and Wikforss on arthritis and tharthritis 
In this section I consider Wikforss’ (2001) defense of an internalist view in the face of 
Burge’s (1979) “arthritis thought-experiment”. The way I see it, Wikforss tries to advance 
a conservative solution against Burge’s arguments by means of weakening Internalism. I 
am sympathetic to Wikforss’ ambitions but will argue that her account – or at least the 
kind of account that can be extracted from her discussion – fails for more than one reason. 
 Burge (1979) tells the story of Bert, a patient who tells his doctor he has arthritis 
in his thigh. Since arthritis is an inflammation that only affects the joints, the doctor 
replies: “No, Bert, you do not have arthritis!”. The interesting thing about the story is that 
we feel compelled to treat Bert and the doctor as successfully communicating by means 
of their uses of ‘arthritis’ even though each follows a different rule. Internalism compels 
us to say that, whereas the doctor expresses ARTHRITIS (the concept individuated by 
the rule that it refers to a type of inflammation of the joints), Bert expresses the distinct 
concept THARTHRITIS (the concept individuated by the rule that it refers to a type of 
inflammation of the joints and limbs). However, since we feel so strongly about counting 
them as successfully communicating (or as genuinely disagreeing), Publicity compels us 
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to claim that they are expressing the same concept. The conflict could not be more 
apparent.    
 Famously, Burge took his thought-experiment to be a reductio of Internalism, 
which he then discarded in favor of a social externalist picture according to which the 
concepts one expresses are not determined by things inside one’s head (such as rules) but 
by one’s social environment and its linguistic conventions. Instead of biting that bullet, 
Wikforss notices that Burge’s argument depends on the tacit claim that arthritis being a 
type of inflammation of the joints (and not of the limbs) is part of the rule individuating 
ARTHRITIS and not just a contingent fact about its referent. In other words, the argument 
presupposes that Bert commits a conceptual (rule) mistake, as opposed to a merely 
ordinary empirical one. To see the contrast, imagine that Bert were merely mistaken 
about some unimportant fact about arthritis, e.g. that he believed arthritis is more 
prevalent in children than adults. If that was the whole story, it would not be easy to get 
to any conflict between Internalism and Publicity, since it seems that collateral 
knowledge about some subject matter (e.g. whether arthritis is an old person’s disease) 
does not get to be part of the rule constituting the correspondent concept. Thus, Burge’s 
argument is supposed to work in virtue of the fact that Bert commits a rule-mistake for a 
concept which we are nonetheless inclined – because of Publicity-related reasons – to 
interpret him as expressing. 
 But why, Wikforss goes on to ask, should we concede that Bert’s mistake is so 
grave that he ends up meaning something distinct by ‘arthritis’ than his doctor? He is, to 
be sure, mistaken about an important fact about arthritis, i.e. its scope of occurrence; on 
the other hand, given Burge’s own description of the story, Bert is, overall, a competent 
user of ‘arthritis’, rarely subjecting it to inappropriate use. Bert knows many substantial 
facts about arthritis, e.g. he knows it is a disease that can affect the joints and even that it 
is a type of inflammation. He is also generally able to apply ‘arthritis’ correctly in many 
varied cases. Things would surely be different if Bert were like Schbert, who believes 
that ‘arthritis’ applies to round green vegetables with fleshy leaves in the shape of a 
flower (that’s an artichoke). Schbert’s use of ‘arthritis’ is so massively out of tune with 
the public one that he would best be characterized as meaning a completely distinct thing 
by the term (i.e. ARTICHOKE). 
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 The contrast which Wikforss strives to make is that between one – like Bert – 
who is a competent user of a word regardless of being mistaken about some important 
fact concerning its referent and one – like Schbert – whose use of a word is so 
idiosyncratic that one is best characterized as expressing a distinct concept by the wrong 
word. Her intention is arguing that Bert’s mistake, regardless of being a grave one, is 
forgivable: 
 
It may be that the belief that arthritis afflicts the joints only is central to our 
understanding of arthritis, but what gives Burge the confidence to say that 
it is so central that giving it up must imply a change in the meaning of the 
term ‘arthritis’? After all, medical terms like ‘arthritis’ play a complex role 
in medical theory, and as always with such terms, it seems possible to have 
a change in certain parts of the theory, including central parts, without any 
change meaning. (Wikforss, p. 222) 
 
 Wikforss then goes on to remark that almost none of the concepts that matter to 
us are one-criterion concepts, such as BACHELOR, whose identity conditions seem to 
be so neatly expressible by a one-criterion rule. In reality, most of our important concepts 
are much more like living organisms, constantly changing and updating themselves as 
the need comes. Similar stories abound in the medicine and clinical psychology literature. 
It seems plausible that psychologists these days have the same concept of autism than 
did their early twentieth-century predecessors, even though the latter, but not the former, 
used to define autism in psychoanalytical terms, as opposed to the behavioural-
physiological terms preferred nowadays (Majeed, forthcoming). 
 Now, everybody more or less already agrees about those points: concepts are as 
dynamic as the theories they are a part of. Indeed, many liberal philosophers (e.g. 
externalists) have used this type of considerations in order to argue that expressing a 
concept has nothing to do with the rules one is following. However, and I take it that this 
is one of the lessons that Wikforss wants to emphasize, this line of argument often fails 
to acknowledge the great degree of continuity that there is between stages of a concept 
even when it has undergone radical theoretical changes. To put the same point differently: 
liberals often emphasize how one like Bert is distinct from his doctor without noticing 
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how much they have in common. That we tend to count Bert as successfully 
communicating with his doctor but would not do the same had Schbert been in his place 
is surely evidence that Bert’s mistake is not as grave as it looks. The difference between 
Schbert and Bert is precisely that the latter is overall in agreement with his doctor about 
when and where to apply ‘arthritis’, even if he sometimes commits embarrassing 
mistakes, while Schbert, on the other hand, is just mistaken all over. 
 As I read her, Wikforss takes these considerations to support a reformulation of 
Internalism, according to which there is some flexibility on how much one can deviate 
from a concept’s rule and still successfully express it. The underlying idea is that, as long 
as one still maintains overall agreement with the proper use of a representation, one’s 
eventual mistakes get to be swept under the carpet. Importantly, this proposal would be 
a weakening, and not a rejection, of Internalism, since expressing a concept would still 
depend on having the right sort of rule in one’s head. Wikforss never goes so far in her 
paper, but this is the view I think can be extracted from her considerations: 
 
APPROXIMATION INTERNALISM: For any concept X and representation Y, a 
thinker expresses X by Y if and only if this thinker’s use of Y is guided by a rule that 
sufficiently approximates X’s rule. 
 
 How much approximation is sufficient will probably change from context to 
context, but the general idea seems clear enough to dispel Burge’s main argument: Bert 
gets to express ARTHRITIS by his use of ‘arthritis’ because the rule he follows is 
sufficiently close to the proper one. Unfortunately, Approximation Internalism fails for 
more than one reason. 
 Firstly, it does nothing to explain deferential cases where a thinker expresses a 
concept she knows close to nothing about. In these cases, the thinker is not guided by a 
rule which is approximately correct, thus, Approximation Internalism does nothing to 
explain why we still want to ascribe him the relevant concept. A case of that sort will be 
the focus of the next session. Secondly, Approximation Internalism seems to suffer from 
an even deeper problem. If the concepts one expresses are those one’s rules more closely 
approximate, then there is no reason why we should interpret Bert as expressing 
ARTHRITIS instead of THARTHRITIS, since his rule not only approximates both 
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concepts’, it is identical to the second’s. I can think of two ways by means of which one 
could try to amend Approximation Internalism, but none of them are successful. 
 The first would be claiming that the concepts we express are the socially shared 
concepts which our rules most closely approximate. Then, since THARTHRITIS is not 
shared among Bert’s community, he ends up expressing its closest public neighbor, 
ARTHRITIS (call this view Social Approximation Internalism, or SAI for short). The 
most obvious problem with SAI is that it makes it impossible for any of us to ever express 
the concept THARTHRITIS, since every attempt to associate a representation with the 
rule that constitutes it would result in us expressing ARTHRITIS. But it surely should be 
possible for us to express both concepts if we want – we are, after all, the masters of our 
meanings. Indeed, I take it that we have been doing just that in our discussion everytime 
we wrote or read ‘THARTHRITIS’. 
 A second possible refinement of Wikforss’ account could make use of the 
property of naturalness, the idea being that the concepts we express are always the ones 
with the most natural referents which our rules approximates (call it Natural 
Approximation Internalism; NAI for short). NAI is a non-starter for more than one 
reason. One reason is that it is not even plausible that tharthritis is less natural than 
arthritis, “since diseases are notoriously bad candidates for natural kinds” (Wikforss, p. 
226). A deeper reason would be similar to the one we had against SAI: if NAI is true, we 
would never be able to think and talk about non-natural stuff, i.e. in attempting to think 
of an object as being grue we would just end up thinking of it as blue.53 Both SAI and 
NAI clearly fail. 
 In summary, there is one limitation and one problem with Wikforss’ discussion. 
It does not account for deferential cases and it seems to lead us to a problematic account 
of concept expression. I take those failures to significantly weigh against the strategy of 
weakening Internalism in order to solve the dilemma which is the focus of this paper. In 
the next section, I will present a deferential case, show that it also gives rise to a conflict 
between Internalism and Publicity, and argue that we can nicely take care of it by means 
of weakening Publicity.  
  
 
53 Actually, the most natural color closer to grue could be either blue or green. Thus, NAI would not even 
succeed in determining a concept for that case. 
64 
 
5 Deferential understanding: Neptune and Schneptune 
 
 The following story will be our case study: 
 
(LE VERRIER AND BAPTISTE) The French mathematician Le Verrier, in the year of 
1846, predicted the existence of a hitherto unknown planet based on mathematical and 
astronomical findings related to perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. In order to refer to 
that planet, he named it ‘Neptune’ - a name expressing the concept NEPTUNE. It is 
plausibly the case that, at the time of the introduction of that name, the concept 
NEPTUNE was individuated by the rule that it refers to whichever astronomical body is 
causing the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. During those days, Le Verrier used to 
live with his brother Baptiste, who was very much aware of his brother’s new obsession 
with something he was often referring to as ‘Neptune’. Baptiste would often make 
remarks to his friends and family such as “all my brother talks about these days is about 
Neptune”, “Le Verrier does not even leave his lab anymore because he is so concerned 
with this Neptune” etc. As it turns out, Baptiste had no idea about what Neptune was 
apart from that it should be some astronomical thing (possibly a planet or a star), and that 
this was what his brother was constantly talking about. It is plausible that, regardless of 
being ignorant about Neptune’s nature, we should not bracket from accepting that 
Baptiste and Le Verrier could very well successfully communicate (or genuinely agree) 
by means of ‘Neptune’. 
 
 The conflict between Internalism and Publicity should be clear from the way the 
story unfolds. The rule guiding Baptiste’s use of ‘Neptune’ (let us call it R*) is no more 
substantial than the concept expressed by ‘Neptune’ refers to whichever astronomical 
body Le Verrier calls by that name. However, this is not the rule which constitutes 
NEPTUNE’s identity conditions (let us call it R), namely, the rule that the concept 
expressed by ‘Neptune’ refers to the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. 
Thus, according to Internalism, Baptiste is not expressing the same concept as his brother, 
but a distinct one constituted by R*: SCHNEPTUNE – a deferential concept dependent 
on what someone else’s representations refer to. On the other hand, we feel that Baptiste 
and Le Verrier could very well successfully communicate about Neptune. They could, 
65 
 
for example, genuinely agree that Le Verrier’s obsession with Neptune is compulsive and 
needs medical attention. But then, according to Publicity, we must count them as 
expressing the same concept by means of ‘Neptune’. And thus, the conflict reappears. 
 A promising idea would be that, in all cases where we are tempted to ascribe a 
concept to a subject who does not conform to Internalism, that subject expresses the 
relevant concept via deference to other people who in fact do conform to it. At a first 
sight, there are many things that ‘deference’ could mean in that sort of context. It could 
be, for example, a tendency to revise one’s use of a concept if one notices that it diverges 
from the use of others. A bit differently, it could be an obligation to consult an expert if 
one does not know how to classify some tricky borderline case. These types of deference 
presuppose that the thinker who is doing the deferring has some independent means of 
applying the relevant concept which does not involve just blatantly mimicking an expert. 
Bert’s case showcases that type of deference: his grasp of ARTHRITIS has some life of 
its own, so to say. 
 In contrast to that case, there are cases where one’s ability to express some 
concept is (almost) completely dependent on what the experts do or say. Think of a person 
who has heard of black holes but who only knows that they are something physicists talk 
about. It seems that this person’s concept BLACK HOLE doesn’t have much of a life of 
its own. It is, however, still useful in a certain minimal sense; imagine a librarian deciding 
whether to put a book about black holes in the physics or chemistry sections. Thus, the 
more we know about some subject matter, the less deferential our concept is and the more 
things we are be able to do with it. 
 I think it is clear that the Baptiste’s concept is of that latter kind, i.e. he does not 
have many means of applying it unless he is strictly following in Le Verrier’s footsteps. 
That does not, however, make his concept useless from a cognitive-epistemic point of 
view. Even if he does not have many means of applying it to the world, there are many 
reflective uses of concepts that he can engage in, such as wondering what Neptune could 
be or trying to discover more about what it is by asking his brother to tell him more about 




 Now, how can deference of such a kind enable us to solve the present conflict? 
As Greenberg (2014) notes, there are three ways in which deference could come in the 
help of an account of concepts: 
 
1. Deference enables one to express the same concept as the expert does because 
deferring to an expert enables one to satisfy the same criteria for concept 
expression as the expert satisfies. 
2. Deference enables one to express the same concept as the expert does because 
deferring to an expert provides a second way for expressing a concept which is 
not identical to the criteria that the expert satisfies. 
3. Deference enables one to express a concept that is distinct from the expert’s but 
is somehow intimately related to it. 
 
 It is easy to see that, if we take the original formulation of Internalism, option 1 
is an obvious non-starter. For deference to fulfill the role option 1 prescribes it would 
have to enable someone like Baptiste to, merely in virtue of deferring to Le Verrier, 
associate R with ‘Neptune’. It is clear that this is not the case. Option 2 provides an 
interesting way out of the problem. From this option, it follows that there is more than 
one way by means of which one could express a concept. Thus, even if Le Verrier 
expresses NEPTUNE in virtue of associating ‘Neptune’ with R, it could very well be that 
Baptiste expresses the same concept in virtue of satisfying some distinct criterion. That 
criterion could very well be simply deferring to someone who is able to express the 
relevant concept. On closer look, however, option 2 is unsatisfactory. Notice that it strives 
to save Internalism but ends up having to reformulate it as the following disjunctive 
thesis: one expresses a concept X by representation Y either if one associates Y with X’s 
rule OR if one defers to someone who satisfies the first condition. However, what was 
most interesting about Internalism was how neatly it accounted for expressing a concept 
in terms of the personal-level cognitive mechanisms that thinkers employed (i.e. the rules 
they followed and the explanations they could give of their uses of a representation). This 
virtue is evidently lost when one adds a proviso to Internalism allowing that, on top of 
the usual way of expressing a concept, one gets to achieve the same feat by doing 




“[…] a proviso that a thinker can have a thought involving a particular 
concept in virtue of his deferring with respect to the use of the concept or 
the concept-word is not a minor addendum to a theory committed to the 
view that to have a thought involving a particular concept is to exercise the 
concept’s canonical disposition [rule]” (Greenberg, 2014, p. 277) 
 
 In other words, option 2 does not make Internalism compatible with cases of 
deferential understanding so much as it tries to sweep the problem under the rug by 
advancing an ad hoc account without independent evidence in its favor. 
 The failure of the first two options leave us with the last contender. Option 3 
bypasses our intuition that people like Baptiste literally express the same concept as the 
people to whom they defer, however, it promises to explain our disposition to classify 
them as being able to successfully communicate by pointing to some relation between 
their concepts which is distinct from identity. Thus, this option entails that there could be 
successful communication (and genuine agreement) between people who do not express 
the exact same concepts as long as there is some special relation holding in between the 
concepts they do in fact express.  
 
6 Conceptually guaranteed sameness of extension 
Choosing to go with option 3 means conceding that people employing distinct concepts 
can nonetheless engage in a successful conversation and stand in a genuine disagreement 
with each other even when their thoughts contain distinct – but suitably related – 
concepts. The plausibility of this view of course depends on the relation it characterizes. 
At least one thing is clear: that relation must be such as to make it obvious to the relevant 
thinkers that they are not speaking past each other, i.e. to guarantee convergence on one 
and the same thing in a transparent way. 
 As we have already seen, sameness of extension is not enough to play that role 
since people employing co-referential concepts might nonetheless be speaking past each 
other. That’s precisely what we have seen when confronted with Loar’s story back in 
section 2. Let’s go over it again. What seems to explain why the subjects in Loar’s story 
are talking past each other – regardless of referring to the same person – is the fact that 
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the co-reference between their concepts is a matter of luck. Indeed, the concept Smith 
expresses by means of ‘He’ and the concept Jones takes him to be expressing are only 
accidentally co-referential, i.e. were they not unusually lucky, they would have ended up 
picking out very different things. 
 Thus, there is some prima facie plausibility to the idea that two subjects are not 
ready to successfully communicate unless their concepts non-accidentally have the same 
extension, e.g. unless their co-reference is somehow guaranteed. Going back to our 
deferential story, one could then argue that Baptiste and Le Verrier’s uses of ‘Neptune’ – 
even though they express distinct concepts – are guaranteed to co-refer in virtue of the 
concepts expressed and that this is what explains them being able to engage in the 
relevant interpersonal relations. This is good as a first pass but much more needs to be 
said. 
 What exactly does it mean for two concepts to be conceptually guaranteed to co-
refer? As a first bet, it seems that two concepts are thus related when the relevant thinkers 
can know that they co-refer (if both refer at all) exclusively on the basis of understanding 
the rules which constitute them.54 Here is one model of how that could happen: if it’s 
logically necessary that two distinct rules can only be satisfied, at the same time, by the 
same object, then anyone who understands these rules can infer that they are guaranteed 
to co-refer (if they refer at all). Here is a toy example: X is a concept whose rule is X 
refers to the one and only F whereas Y is a concept whose rule is Y refers to the one and 
only F-and-G. Now, it should be clear that one can know, just in virtue of knowing X and 
Y’s application rules, that if these concepts refer at all, then they refer to the same thing. 
Of course, it is possible that one fails to refer while the other does not, but it is not 
possible that they refer to distinct things because if the two predicates (F and F-and-G) 
are uniquely satisfied, then it follows that they are satisfied by the same thing. 
 
54 Sameness of extension that can be known on the basis of facts that are extrinsic to the concepts’ rules or 
to the representations which express them does not count as conceptually guaranteed co-reference. 
HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS can be known to co-refer on the basis of astronomical facts, but not 
exclusively on the basis of their rules (which should somehow be related to the fact that one was observable 
only in the morning, the other, in the evening). As expected, an old Babylonian who thought that Hesperus 
was the most beautiful star should not be counted as in genuine disagreement with another who thought 
the same of Phosphorus. Thus, by ‘conceptual guarantee’ I mean something closer to apriority than to 




This is the clearest case in which distinct concepts are nonetheless good enough 
for successful communication (genuine agreement). To see that, notice that we would 
count a subject who believes X IS ROUND as genuinely agreeing with a subject who 
believes Y IS ROUND even though it might be reasonable for the first to believe that X 
IS ROUND while disbelieving (or doubting) that Y IS ROUND (since one may be unsure 
about whether there’s an unique F-and-G).55 
 Let’s take stock. The mere conceivability of concepts like X and Y already entails 
that distinct concepts – such that one could rationally take contrasting attitudes towards 
thoughts differing only in the substitution of one for the other – could nonetheless be 
good enough for the interpersonal relations of communication and genuine agreement. 
Additionally, the previous considerations already show that Publicity, in its initial 
formulation, is false and needs to be weakened. Successful communication and genuine 
agreement can indeed be instantiated by people who express distinct concepts – as long 
as they have the same extension (if they pick out anything at all) as a matter of logical 
necessity. 
 This ‘rule implication’ model might very well help us account for what is going 
on in cases such as Burge’s arthritis thought-experiment. If one thinks that Bert’s concept 
THARTHRITIS is individuated by something like e.g. the rule that it refers to the one 
and only type of inflammation of the joints and limbs and that the doctor’s ARTHRITIS 
is individuated by something like the rule that it refers to the one and only type of 
inflammation of the joints, we reach a situation which is structurally analogous to that 
presented in the last couple of paragraphs. I do not think this is the only way to account 
for that case and admit doubting whether it is the best one, but it is a theoretical possibility 
nonetheless. 
 More pressing to our present concerns is the realization that the rule implication 
model does nothing to help us understand Baptiste and Le Verrier’s case – that should be 
obvious given that the rules they follow are completely independent of each other, i.e. 
grasping both rules does not warrant one to infer, or at least not without additional 
 
55 The claim that these concepts are distinct is independent from the assumption that concepts are 
individuated by rules; it can be grounded on the more general principle (sometimes referred to as ‘Frege’s 
Constraint’, see Recanati, 2016a, p. 11-12) that, if one can rationally take contrasting attitudes towards 
contents that differ solely in the substitution of one token concept for another, then these concepts are not 
the same.  
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information, that the concepts they individuate co-refer (if both refer at all). A different 
explanation must be given for their case. Fortunately, it is enough to put oneself in 
Baptiste’s shoes to realize that there is something he knows in virtue of the rule he follows 
which guarantees that he will converge on the same object as his brother. Remember that 
Baptiste’s tokens of ‘Neptune’ are designed to express a concept whose rule is that it 
refers to whatever Le Verrier is referring to by his tokens of ‘Neptune’. Thus, Baptiste 
knows something he could express by saying: “for any concept my brother might be 
expressing by ‘arthritis’, I know that I will co-refer with it by my own tokens of that 
word”. The moral of the story is that, even if Baptiste is completely ignorant of the 
concept his brother is expressing, he still manages to hook his own concept onto his 
brother’s tokens and thus conceptually guarantees that he will successfully co-refer with 
it (if it is referring to anything at all). 
 Deferential concepts, then, allow their users to guarantee co-reference with the 
thinkers they defer to regardless of there not being any relation between the deferential 
concept’s rule and that of the concept expressed by the deferred party. In other words, by 
employing a deferential concept we manage to successfully communicate (and even 
genuinely agree) with people whose concepts we can be completely ignorant about. It is 
truly an ingenious representational mechanism in that it allows people coming from very 
different epistemic standpoints to hook onto the same subject matter. 
 In summary, I have presented two different cases of thinkers who express distinct 
concepts, but which are somehow in a position to successfully communicate or genuinely 
agree. In both of these cases there was something about the concepts these thinkers 
expressed that allowed them to know, only in virtue of the rules being followed, that they 
were bound to pick out the same thing(s). In the first case – rule implication – this 
guarantee was ensured by a direct relation between the relevant concepts’ rules. In the 
other – deferential – case, however, sameness of extension is not guaranteed by the 
relevant concepts’ rules. It is based on the fact that a deferential concept is designed to 
hook onto the representations used by the deferred thinker. What is common between the 
two cases is that the thinkers in question have some non-empirical way to know that they 
are converging on the same things, and thus, not speaking past each other. This leads us 




(PUBLICITY*) Whenever two subjects (I) successfully communicate or (II) are in 
genuine agreement with each other, then that must be accounted for by them being in a 
position to know – only in virtue of the rules being followed – that their uses of the 
relevant representations necessarily have the same extension. More specifically, 
 (I) if A successfully communicates to B a thought containing the concept C¹ by 
means of an utterance U, then B must entertain a thought containing a concept C² such 
that B knows – in virtue of the rule she is following – that C² necessarily has the same 
extension as the concept expressed by a corresponding token that is part of U. 
 (II) if A genuinely (dis)agrees with B with respect to B’s utterance U that 
expresses concept C¹, A must endorse a thought containing a concept C² such that A could 
know – in virtue of the rule she is following – that C² necessarily has the same extension 
as the concept expressed by a corresponding token that is part of U. 
 
7 Deference, memory and risk 
Let me unpack Publicity* by comparing it to a recent view advanced by Recanati (2016a, 
chapter 5). This author is focuses on cases of cognitive dynamics, i.e. those in which 
thinkers need to update their concepts in order to account for changes in the context, such 
as when the concept NOW, expressible by ‘now is F’, becomes, at a later time, a memory 
concept BACK THEN, expressible by ‘back then was F’. Recanati’s view is that concepts 
can be individuated more or less finely depending on one’s theoretical ambitions. If one 
is interested in the cognitive perspective of a thinker, then concepts should be 
individuated by their rules56, thus, e.g. NOW comes up distinct from BACK THEN. 
However, if the philosopher is interested in the dynamic or interpersonal continuities 
between concepts at different times or across different thinkers, then one individuates 
concepts more coarsely and gets the desired result that e.g. thinking of a time as present 
can be the same as episodically remembering it. 
 Recanati focuses on indexical and demonstrative thoughts while I have focused 
on deferential concepts, but our resulting views bear similarities, particularly with respect 
to the idea that uses of representation guided by distinct rules can express concepts which 
are intimately related. One difference – at first sight, merely terminological – is that, 
 




while Recanati talks of fine-grained and coarse-grained concepts57, I reserve the word 
‘concept’ for the fine-grained entity, i.e. that individuated by reference-determining rules. 
Thus, what Recanati calls ‘coarse-grained concepts’ I prefer to refer to as distinct 
concepts related by conceptually guaranteed sameness of extension.  
Terminological choices are usually a matter of taste (specially with such 
complicated terms-of-art such as ‘concept’, whose meanings are constantly up for grabs). 
However, I think there is at least one point in favor of my terminological choice: I can 
avoid claiming that a deferential concept (such as Baptiste’s SCHNEPTUNE) is, even if 
only in some coarse-grained sense, identical to that expressed by the deferred thinker 
(such as Le Verrier’s NEPTUNE). As we have seen, it is always a contingent fact that a 
deferential concept co-refers with the concept expressed by the target deferred thinker. 
For example, in a nearby possible world where Le Verrier used ‘Neptune’ as a name for 
his new pussycat, SCHNEPTUNE (the concept that refers to whatever Le Verrier refers 
to by means of ‘Neptune’) would refer to the furry animal while NEPTUNE would 
naturally still refer to the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. This makes 
me think that it would be too much of a stretch of the notion of concept identity to claim 
that these are, even if only in a derivative sense, the same concept.58 
 Another difference is that Recanati argues that, in every case where thinkers 
successfully communicate with distinct concepts, we face the risk that only one of the 
thinkers is failing to refer (2016a, p. 71-94). We previously saw this possibility with the 
particular case of the concepts of the unique F and the unique F-and-G. Recanati, 
however, thinks that this possibility is live in every interpersonal and diachronic case.59 
Thus, communication with distinct concepts ends up sounding like a risky endeavor.  
 
57Actually, Recanati talks of ‘static mental files’ and ‘dynamic mental files’. 
58 Schroeter & Schroeter (2016, p. 14) make a similar criticism that would seem to affect Recanati’s view 
but not mine. They argue that deference only ensures a contingent link between the deferential and the 
deferred concepts, and that, for this very reason, one cannot claim that they are, in any sense, the same 
concept. Since I never make that claim, the criticism simply does not hit my account. However, Recanati 
might be able to evade it by claiming that he acknowledges two distinct notions of concept identity: a 
strong one in which a deferential concept is distinct from the deferred one, and a weaker one, according to 
which they are the same. He could then claim that Schroeter & Schroeter’s criticism only makes sense if 
‘the same concept’ is read in the strong sense. Whether this is a satisfactory answer is a question that I will 
leave for future work. 
59 Recanati admits of only one possible type of exception but relegates it to a footnote (2016a, p. 94, ff. 
14): “I can look at an old photograph of Paris and think: ‘Streets were crowded then’, without having the 
faintest idea when the photograph was taken.” Although Recanati does not go on to discuss these cases, 
they seem prima facie related to deferential scenarios. 
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 As risky as it might really be, it is interesting to notice that the possibility of one 
concept referring while the other does not is not live for cases where co-reference is 
guaranteed by means of a deferential concept. There just is no possibility that, e.g. 
Baptiste and Le Verrier are in a situation where only one of them is failing to pick out a 
proper referent. It is slightly ironic that deferential concepts, although being a product of 
thinkers in impoverished epistemic situations, allow no possibility of failure similar to 
that of “rule-implicated concepts”. The referential success of a deferential concept 
depends exclusively on the deferred concept’s. 
 I once believed that memory was another (the only other) type of thought that 
possessed that same property. When a perceptual concept – those we usually express by 
a demonstrative when perceiving an object – becomes, at a later time, a memory concept 
– those which we usually express by a demonstrative when recollecting –, it seems 
conceptually impossible that only one of them fails to refer. If that were right, the 
conclusion would be that memory and deference are privileged forms of thought in at 
least this one aspect, regardless of their very different functions and etiology. One could, 
at this point, even toy with the idea that memory is a form of perceptual deference, in the 
sense that a mnemonic concept would refer to whatever was referred to by the originating 
perceptual concept. However, Recanati (2016a, p. 89-94) argues convincingly that 
memories additionally locate the source of their originating perceptual experience in 
thinker’s past (i.e. and not on somebody else’s). This, summed up with the possibility of 
quasi-memories, is enough to entail that a mnemonic concept could fail to refer, while 
the perceptual experience on its causal origin did not.60 The cogency of Recanati’s 
argument – as well as the similarities between memory and deference – will have to be 
examined at some other time. For now, the lesson should be that deferential concepts 
afford thinkers a degree of confidence in referential match with their peers that possibly 




60 As Recanati (2016a, p. 93) comments, quasi-memories were introduced in the philosophical literature 
by Shoemaker (1970). These come in at least two types: (i) a memory from a subject neurosurgically 
implanted in the brain of another; (ii) an apparent memory unconsciously fabricated after listening to 




8 Objections and replies 
Thus far, my discussion has focused on singular concepts, but the general lessons reached 
should apply across the board. However, general concepts seem to bring complications 
that so far have not been examined. In this section, I examine the possibility of agreement 
with expressions that do not necessarily have the same extension, and of disagreement 
with expressions that pick out distinct things. First stop: agreement with context-sensitive 
expressions.  
One could think that Publicity* is incompatible with the fact that we often count 
people as agreeing with respect to utterances containing context-sensitive expressions 
even when, given some contextual differences, their expressions apply to distinct things. 
As Cappelen (2018, p. 107-121) puts it, “we can talk about the same topic even when we 
change extension”. Take the case of ‘tall’, for instance: there are cases in which we would 
count two speakers A and B as saying the same thing by ‘Rachmaninoff is tall’ – and thus 
as agreeing on what is said – even if, given their distinct contextual stipulations, their 
‘tall’ tokens apply to distinct people (e.g. according to A, people above 1,80m count as 
tall; according to B, people above 1,90m). The concepts A and B express by ‘tall’ do not 
necessarily have the same extension. Indeed, if Rachmaninoff’s height were 1,85m, then 
only one of the utterances would express a true content – doesn’t, then, Publicity* entail 
that they are not in genuine agreement with respect to these utterances? Yes – but that 
shouldn’t be a problem. 
 There are many types of agreement and disagreement. I have thus far reserved 
the term ‘genuine’ to those in which subjects express concepts whose rules somehow 
guarantee that they have the same extension. The case of ‘tall’ is, of course, one in which 
we have the intuition that the subjects are in agreement but where the concepts they 
express could pick out distinct things. But that just means that one has to account for our 
intuition without recourse to the literal contents that they express – it is, after all, overly 
optimistic to expect that genuine agreement with context-sensitive expressions, such as 
‘tall’, will be accounted for in exactly the same manner as with the others.61 One could 
say, for example, that our intuition is based on the contingent fact that Rachmaninoff 
 
61 Given how much has been written on the special character of indexical concepts, especially regarding 
how hard it is to characterize sameness of thought with them, this move is not at all implausible (see e.g. 




satisfies both A and B’s threshold for tallness. Alternatively, one could say that it is based 
on the fact that A and B’s uses of ‘tall’ follow the same context-insensitive rule: that it 
applies to people whose height is greater than some contextually-determined threshold.62 
Each strategy will have virtues and defects that I won’t get into, but these sketches should 
at least show that plausible accounts of our intuitions of agreement with context-sensitive 
expressions could still invoke the rules that subjects follow, and thus, be taken as 
complementary to, instead of against the spirit of, Publicity*. 
Other tricky cases involve disagreement with concepts that do not pick out the 
same things. If C says that Pluto is not a planet, because C thinks that something is a 
planet only if it clears its neighborhood of other objects, and D disagrees, shouldn’t we 
characterize C and D as being in genuinely disagreement regardless of the fact that the 
concepts they express by ‘planet’ are not only distinct but also pick out distinct things? 
The reply here, as in the previous case, is that the type of disagreement between C and D 
doesn’t need to be classified as genuine. Indeed, as Chalmers (2011b, p. 542) says, “the 
manifestly verbal dispute among astronomers about whether Pluto is a planet is best 
understood as a debate in the ethics of terminology”. In other words, we can characterize 
C and D as engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation about which concept to express with 
‘planet’ (Plunkett & Sundell, 2013), and not as in genuine disagreement with respect to 
the contents they express.63   
 Is the conclusion then that all instances of purported disagreement involving 
expressions that pick out distinct things should be characterized as metalinguistic 
negotiations? There is more than one reason for why the answer should be no. For just 
one, consider the following case.64 In a recent experiment, half of the Dutch participants 
 
62 This would be a conception of (dis)agreement that does not depend on sameness of extension, but only 
on sameness of rule. Such a conception would allow one to explain e.g. how Oscar and Twin-Oscar 
somehow agree with each other with respect to their utterances of ‘water quenches thirst’ regardless of 
referring to different stuff (Putnam, 1975). It also promises an account of the sense in which two subjects 
who think of themselves by means of the first-personal pronoun somehow think of themselves in the same 
way. One wonders whether this conception is more fundamental than the one emanating from Publicity*, 
but since their difference only manifests in relation to rules that are somehow context-dependent, I will 
avoid that complication. 
63 Plunkett & Sundell (2013) use ‘genuine disagreement’ to mean disagreements that are, in my terms, 
genuine, but also significant types of metalinguistic negotiations. I, on the other hand, reserve the term 
‘genuine’ to what they call ‘canonical disagreements’. It goes without saying that our disagreement with 
respect to these issues is merely terminological.  
64 Another reason why metalinguistic negotiations cannot be the whole story is that they might not be able 
to capture what is at stake in persistent normative and evaluative disagreements, see Marques (2017). I will 
not touch upon these issues. 
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who were asked to color the part of a drawing of a human body corresponding to the arm 
(in Dutch, ‘arm’), colored the drawing from the shoulder to the wrist, while the other half 
colored it to the fingertips (Majid, 2010). Taking the sample as representative of the 
whole population, should we then conclude that half of Dutch speakers cannot engage in 
genuine disagreement with respect to utterances containing ‘arm’ with the other half? 
This seems extreme. There is no space to work out a full response to this worry, but a 
promising way out would involve working out a notion of relevancy, such that we could 
count subjects as being in genuine disagreement if these subjects could know – in virtue 
of the rules they follow – that the extension of their concepts is the same for all relevant 
possibilities (as opposed to all metaphysically possible ones). The next step in the 
argument would then be explaining why the divergence between Dutch speakers is not 
relevant in the context of genuine disagreements expressible with ‘arm’.65 
 In any case, I agree with Plunkett & Sundell (2013) that not all instances of 
substantial disagreement require us to ascribe the same concepts to the relevant subjects. 
While these authors focus on cases where the disagreement is accounted as a 
metalinguistic negotiation, Publicity*, if true, entails that others can be accounted by the 
presence of concepts which are distinct, but nonetheless guaranteed to co-refer or to pick 
out the same things in virtue of their rules. 
 The previous objections implied that Publicity* makes it too hard for people to 
genuinely (dis)agree with each other. A final objection is that Publicity* might instead 
make it too easy. Notice how easily one can create a concept that is guaranteed to co-
refer with someone else’s use of a representation: Dolores is traveling in a foreign country 
whose native language she knows nothing about; she can, however, at every occasion in 
which she overhears some local produce a sound, create a concept intended to refer to 
whatever that sound refers to. Dolores can create that concept even if she has no idea 
whether the sound produced by the local subject corresponded to a whole sentence, a 
single word, a meaningless hum or an involuntary yawn. If, by sheer luck, it 
corresponded to a word, then, Dolores’ concept is conceptually guaranteed to have the 
same extension as the concept expressed by the local. Indeed, her situation would be 
analogous to that of Baptiste and Le Verrier. But that just means that, according to 
 




Publicity*, her concept would be such that she could be in genuine agreement with the 
local with respect to utterances containing it, or even able to successfully communicate 
by it. That’s not a desirable consequence; it seems undeniable that Dolores’ 
metalinguistic trick shouldn’t allow her to go that far.  
 This shows that we need a principled way to distinguish cases where a subject’s 
deferential concept allows her to communicate and genuinely agree with the ones to 
whom she defers (Baptiste’s), and cases in which it does not (Dolores’). The crucial 
difference seems to be that Baptiste’s implicit knowledge about Le Verrier’s context and 
communicative intentions allowed him to infer that ‘Neptune’ is a singular expression, 
or even that it was related to astronomy. Dolores has absolutely no knowledge about the 
local’s intentions apart from the sounds coming out of her mouth. That seems to be on 
the right track. How much information one needs about one’s interlocutors before one is 
able to create a successful deferential concept? That interesting question will have to be 
left for another time.  
 
9 Conclusion 
After considering a few pertinent objections and sketching possible replies, my 
conclusion is that Publicity* promises Internalist philosophers an account of successful 
communication and genuine (dis)agreement that overcomes the counterexamples often 
offered on behalf of externalist philosophers. My main thesis is then that the conjunction 
of Publicity* with Internalism yields an account of concept expression, communication 
and genuine agreement that is able to endure classical externalist attacks.  
Naturally, I have left many questions untouched, e.g. how to account for 
interpersonal relationships involving context-sensitive expressions, how to characterize 
the constraints that a thinker must satisfy in order to create a proper deferential concept 
etc. Furthermore, I have not offered more than indications of how Publicity* would help 
us with diachronic cases involving the same thinker at different times – the analogy of 
deference and memory seems like a particularly promising link to investigate. In any 
case, I rest more than content if the arguments developed in here help views like 
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Abstract 
I discuss a criterion for successful communication between a speaker and a hearer put 
forward by Buchanan (2014) according to which there is communicative success only if 
the hearer entertains, as a result of interpreting the speaker’s utterance, a thought that has 
the same truth conditions as the thought asserted by the speaker and, furthermore, does 
so in virtue of recognizing the speaker’s communicative intentions. I argue, against 
Buchanan, that the data on which it is based is compatible with a view involving Fregean 
modes of presentation. In the second part of the paper I critically discuss Unnsteinsson’s 
claim that communicative success depends on the absence of contextually salient false 
distinctness beliefs about the subject matter of the conversation. I argue that this thesis 
leads to clearly counterintuitive consequences and that no fundamental role must be 
given to the presence or absence of false distinctness beliefs in one’s account of 
successful communication. The upshot is that we should stick with Buchanan’s criterion. 
I conclude by employing Strawson and Recanati’s concepts of linking and merging to 
show how the criterion I favor is compatible with the fact that, when subjects hold no 
relevant false distinctness beliefs, communicative success does not seem to be disrupted 
by the hearer seemingly failing to recognize the speaker’s intentions. 
 
1 Introduction 
As a first pass, a communicative event is any that essentially involves the transmission 
of information from a source to a receiver by means of a perceptible signal. This broad 
conception of communication might be useful for one or another purpose, but it won’t 
lend itself to much philosophical analysis. The first restriction we shall make is to 
concern ourselves exclusively with linguistic communicative events between a speaker 
and a hearer, where a speaker asserts some thought by means of a representation (e.g. an 
utterance, an inscription etc.) which is then supposed to be interpreted – successfully or 
not – by the hearer. The philosopher of communication then wonders about what the 
conditions on the hearer’s interpretative process are for it to have been a successful one, 
that is, for that event to have been one of successful communication. Even at that 
narrower level of abstraction, one cannot help but realize that linguistic communicative 
events of that type can be evaluated according to distinct and independent standards of 
communicative success which do not always output the same results. Take, for example, 




(1)  That man [pointing to a photograph of Nietzsche] is the greatest philosopher who 
ever lived! 
 
 There are at least three different ways in which an interpretation of an utterance 
of (1) could fail. Firstly, a hearer could fail to assign the same standing meanings to the 
utterance as the speaker does. So, for example, if the confused hearer thinks ‘philosopher’ 
means musician, while the speaker knows that it just means philosopher, the first will 
have failed to understand what the second meant and, thus, their communicative event 
would not have been successful. Secondly, a hearer could fail to grasp what was said by 
the utterance even after correctly assigning its words with the right standing meanings. 
That is most obviously the case when context-sensitive expressions are present. Thus, 
the hearer could understand that ‘that man’ is a complex demonstrative expression 
usually accompanied by some demonstrative act but mistakenly believe that the speaker 
is pointing to a person standing across the room from them, and not to the photograph. 
Failure to understand the speaker’s demonstrative intentions would also compromise the 
communicative event’s success, regardless of the correct assignment of standing meaning 
(character). Finally, the hearer could get everything right at the level of standing meaning 
and what was said, but still fail to draw an important implicature intended by the speaker. 
That would be the case, for example, if the hearer were oblivious to the fact that (1) was 
meant as an ironic utterance, possibly in a context where Nietzsche is having his 
philosophical reputation harshly scrutinized. 
 Not only do we seem to have at least three different notions of communicative 
success corresponding, respectively, to correct grasp of standing meaning, what is said 
and conversational implicatures, these levels’ success conditions seem to be thoroughly 
independent of each other. Pagin (forthcoming) suggests the following communicative 
exchange as an instance of success with respect to correct grasp of conversational 
implicature, but failure with respect to standing meaning and what is said: 
 
(2) Anna: Would you like to go to the movies? 




 Anna would be able to draw the implicature that Bob is too busy to go to the 
movies regardless of whether she thinks Bob is talking about a financial institution or the 
riverside and regardless of whether she thinks he is pointing at Claire or the person 
standing right beside her. In other words, (2) would be an instance of communicative 
success with respect to the implicature that Bob is busy even in a case where Anna fails 
to grasp what is said by Bob or even the meaning of one of the words of the utterance. 
 That all being said, if we intend to investigate communicative events as regards 
the criteria of their success, the first thing to do is to restrict our focus. In this paper, we 
will only be concerned with success with regards to standing meaning and what is said.66 
Additionally, our focus will be almost exclusively on communicative events employing 
paradigmatic types of referential expressions: proper names, demonstratives and 
indexicals. Some of what I will say is supposed to apply for linguistic communication in 
general, but making sure that all of our examples contain similar types of expressions 
will help us get a clearer sense on the notion of communication that is at stake. Finally, 
we will limit ourselves to assertoric exchanges, i.e. those involving properly assertoric 
uses of sentences in the declarative mood. 
 Thus, from this point onward, ‘communication’ will be used to refer to the more 
specific type of interaction between a speaker and a hearer with respect to the meaning 
of and/or what is said by an utterance containing a referential expression produced by the 
former. Analogously, by ‘communicative success’ I will mean success with respect to 
grasping what was said by the speaker and/or assigning the relevant utterance with the 
appropriate meanings. That notion of communication (and of communicative success) 
might not perfectly map onto all ordinary-language uses of the words ‘communication’ 
and ‘understanding’, but I intend it to approximate one of their central and most important 
ones. Indeed, the main objective of this paper can be described as one of trying to shed 
light on and trimming the edges of our folk-notions of communication and understanding.  
 
2 Communicative success and identity of truth-conditions 
Criteria for communicative success should minimally spell out necessary conditions for 
a speaker to have successfully communicated a thought to a hearer by means of an 
 




utterance. It is a platitude that one of the most general aims of communication is enabling 
a reliable transmission of information between thinkers, thus, it is plausible that an 
instance of successful communication should at the very minimum guarantee that the 
belief asserted by the speaker and that subsequently entertained by the hearer necessarily 
have the same truth-value. In other words, the simplest criterion of successful 
communication is one according to which success is determined by the hearer acquiring 
a thought with the same truth-conditions as the one the speaker intends to convey; let us 
call it the identity of truth-conditions criterion (C1): 
 
(C1) There is successful communication between speaker S and hearer H iff H entertains, 
as a result of interpreting S’s utterance, a thought that has the same truth-conditions as 
the thought asserted by S’s utterance.67 
 
 C1 is as desirable as it is simple. If adequate, it would allow us to account for 
communicative success without having to resort to any theoretically loaded notions. This 
very simple view is, unfortunately, subject to devastating counter-examples. One can 
easily conceive of cases where a hearer ends up entertaining a thought with the same 
truth-conditions as that asserted by the speaker but where, intuitively, communication 
has not been successful. Let us call these cases ‘Loar-cases’, owing to their inspiration in 
Loar (1976). In Loar-cases, it seems that the failure of communication has got to do with 
the fact that the sameness of truth-conditions between speaker and hearer’s thoughts is 
not generated by the usual process of correct interpretation.  
 
2.1 Modes of presentation and communicative intentions: Buchanan against Loar 
Here is Loar’s (1976) original story: 
 
(Loar-case 1): Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed 
on television is someone they see on the train every morning and about whom, in that 
latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says, ‘That man is a stockbroker’, intending 
 
67 Let’s ignore the issue of necessary propositions for simplicity’s sake. However, if one really wants to 
take care of those, then the principle could be restated as “there is successful communication between 
speaker S, who produces an utterance ascribing property F to object a, and hearer H iff H entertains, as a 
result of interpreting S’s utterance, a thought that ascribes property F to object a”. 
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to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith to be referring to the man on the train. 
Now Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified Smith’s referent, since the man on 
television is the man on the train; but he has failed to understand Smith’s utterance. 
 
 In Loar-case 1, Jones interprets Smith’s demonstrative use of ‘he’ as if it were 
anaphoric on previous uses made in the conversation, thus leading us to the intuitive 
conclusion that they fail to successfully communicate regardless of the sameness of truth-
conditions between their thoughts. Loar notoriously took these cases to present a 
refutation of direct reference views of singular thought, according to which the thought 
asserted by an affirmative utterance of ‘a is F’ is exhausted by the singular proposition 
that a is F. Against that view, Loar argued that, on top of the singular proposition asserted 
by a speaker in a communicative event, we need to take into account the modes of 
presentation (henceforth, MOP) by means of which that speaker conceives that 
proposition. By introducing MOPs as components of what is meant by an utterance over 
and above what they refer to, Loar naturally reached the view that successful 
communication requires, not only identity of truth-conditions between speaker and 
hearer’s thoughts, but identity of MOP as well. 
 As Buchanan (2014, p. 57) remarks, Loar’s argument in favor of a MOP-based 
view of thought and communication depends on the unspoken assumption that 
understanding an utterance ‘is simply a matter of recognizing what the speaker asserted’. 
If one assumes that and agrees that Jones recognized the exact same singular proposition 
semantically associated with Smith’s utterance, then it naturally follows that Smith’s 
utterance must have semantically expressed some other content. 
 It does not take much to see that this line of argumentation does not stand on its 
own feet. Indeed, it is strikingly similar to the influential Fregean-inspired (and by now 
generally agreed to be faulty) argument in favor of Senses according to which differences 
in cognitive value (e.g. co-referential identity statements with different informative 
potential) must be accounted for by the postulation of fine-grained semantic values that 
determine the reference of a representation. The point is not that those arguments are 
invalid; the problem is the presumption that their conclusion is inevitable. Indeed, a 
significant part of the philosophy of language literature of the last century can be taken 
as going back and forth over the point that there are alternative explanations to the 
85 
 
Fregean data which stick to the view that the content of a singular utterance is exhausted 
by a singular proposition.68 The main difference between the classical Fregean argument 
and Loar’s is that the latter does not seem to depend on the informativity of identity 
statements but merely draws upon our intuitions about communicative success – still, 
they’re analogous in fixing the insufficiency of referential content by means of the 
postulation of a finer type of content.  
In the present paper, I am interested in the notion of communicative success in its 
own right, and not only in the prospects of using it to motivate a general account of 
thought. That being said, it is of utmost importance to look for the simplest and most 
neutral way of cashing out the lessons of Loar-case 1, and Buchanan’s view might very 
well be a good place to start.  
 Buchanan’s main point is that we can account for what goes wrong in Loar-case 
1 by appealing to an independently motivated account of the role of communicative 
intentions in conversations – one that is so plausible that everybody is more or less 
obligated to accept anyways – and thus completely bypass the idea that the content of 
thoughts and assertions goes beyond what they refer to. The idea, in a nutshell, is that 
“the kind of misunderstanding that Loar has called to our attention shows that there is 
some aspect of the speaker’s communicative intentions that her hearer is failing to 
recognize” (Buchanan, 2014, p. 64). In other words, Buchanan is suggesting that the 
failure of Smith and Jones’ communication can be accounted by the fact that, even though 
Jones reached a thought with the same truth-conditions as Smith’s, he did not do so by 
means of properly recognizing Smith’s communicative intention to refer to the man in 
the television. On that view, successful communication requires that the hearer token the 
same singular proposition as the speaker as a result of recognizing the proper inferential 
process intended by the speaker: 
 
(C2) If there is successful communication between speaker S and hearer H, then H 
entertains, as a result of interpreting S’s utterance, a thought that has the same truth-
 




conditions as the thought expressed by S’s utterance and, additionally, H does so in virtue 
of having recognized S’s relevant communicative intentions.69 
 
 Buchanan’s argument is as simple as it is convincing. Surely any theorist 
recognizes the role that speaker-intentions and their recognition by hearers have in the 
proper functioning of communication. Even the most die-hard Fregean philosopher (who 
believes that interpretations are a matter of assigning MOPs to symbols) has to tell a story 
about how people come up with a particular MOP during an interpretative process, and 
that story will most likely involve the recognition of the communicative intentions of the 
source to be interpreted. Thus - and this is where I am in complete agreement with 
Buchanan - a view that accounts for communicative success by means of the recognition 
of the speaker’s communicative intentions makes the postulation of MOPs redundant.  
 Now, even though I agree with Buchanan’s argument against Loar’s conclusions, 
I think its impact should not be overplayed. It is important not to forget that the target of 
Buchanan’s criticisms is a very specific type of Fregean account of communication, that 
is, an account which takes MOPs to be constitutive of what is meant by singular 
utterances. On the other hand, many recent philosophers defending views which they 
consider to be Fregean-inspired hold a much more deflationary attitude towards MOPs 
and instead assume that a MOP can be anything as long as it is able to play a set of 
interrelated semantic/epistemic roles even if, at the end of the day, they do not end up 
being the kinds of things which are expressed by our assertions nor the building-blocks 
of our thoughts.70 Thus, if one is not careful, the difference between a MOP-based view, 
deflationarily construed, and the type of view which Buchanan wants to defend could 
 
69    This is a simplified version of the principle that Buchanan (2014, p. 63-64) in fact goes on to defend. 
His principle includes the concept of an ib-feature, i.e. a feature of the speaker’s utterance which she 
intends that the hearer use as a basis for her interpretation. This detail is not relevant for the concerns of 
the present paper. It should also be noted that C2 only states necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for 
successful communication. This is in line with how Buchanan himself frames his own discussion, although 
Bach and Harnish (1979, chapter 5) can be said to have defended the same principle in its biconditional 
form. The weaker version is good enough for our present purposes: it’s the necessity of the principle, not 
the sufficiency, that will be put into question in the next section. 
70     One recent example is García-Carpintero’s (2016) Fregean-inspired presuppositional view, according 
to which MOPs are like presuppositions in that they are conveyed (presupposed), but not directly 
expressed, by means of our assertions and thoughts. In his most recent work, Recanati (2016, p. 145-146) 
also adopts a kind of presuppositional account of MOPs according to which the role that modes of 
presentation are supposed to play are executed by the vehicles of thought – which he calls ‘mental files’ - 
and presuppositional content they convey depending on the type of epistemically-rewarding relations they 
are based on. 
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boil down to a few distinct terminological choices. To evade these complications, let us 
continue to use ‘MOPs’ with its more restricted meaning, i.e. as contents of thoughts and 
assertions that outstrip what they refer to. 
That being said, Buchanan does indeed present a strong case against MOP-based 
accounts of successful communication. His argument, however, is not a direct one but 
one based on the greater simplicity of another available account. It is thus important to 
keep in mind that a MOP-based explanation of communicative success is still a coherent 
option on the table, even if it’s not the most parsimonious one around. Buchanan, 
however, also intended to oppose that weaker compatibility claim – and that is where our 
disagreement lies. 
 
2.2 Misinterpreting a drawing: against Buchanan  
On top of arguing that MOPs are not needed to account for Loar-cases, Buchanan (2014, 
p. 62) claims that the MOP-based view of successful communication cannot account for 
certain cases which are both (i) analogous to Loar-case 1 in the relevant respects and (ii) 
suitably explainable by his preferred account. If correct, this could very well constitute a 
direct argument against any criteria of successful communication based on the 
postulation of fine-grained semantic contents. I do, however, believe that Buchanan’s 
argument fails and can be adequately answered. This is the case the author comes up 
with: 
 
(Buchanan-case) In observance of a religious holiday, Smith is forbidden to read, write, 
or speak for the day. Because Smith is looking so bored, his friend, Jones, tells Smith he 
will take him to a movie, but they need to decide what to see. It is mutual knowledge 
between them that a cowboy movie entitled ‘Flat-top Mountain’ is one of the many 
movies playing at their local Cineplex. Smith grabs his notebook and draws a mountain 
(in clear view of Jones), intending to communicate thereby that he would like to go to 
see Flat-top Mountain. Jones, however, mistakes the drawing for one of a cowboy hat, 
and infers thereby that Smith would like to go to see Flat-top Mountain. 
 
 According to Buchanan, “what Smith intended to communicate, and all he 
intended to communicate, was that he wants to go to see Flat-top Mountain” (Buchanan, 
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p. 63). The author then goes on to claim that, unlike in Loar-case 1, here we seem to have 
no clear candidate for a MOP that the speaker had in mind and that the hearer failed to 
grasp, that is, “it is completely unclear what the MOP-involving proposition could be in 
this case” (ibid.) – but if that were true, then the MOP-based view would seem to have 
no resources for explaining why their communication appears to have been unsuccessful. 
The intentions-based view, on the other hand, easily explains what is going on in the 
story by invoking Smith’s intention that Jones recognizes his drawing as a drawing of a 
mountain (and not of a hat). 
 As a first attempt of a reply, one could complain that Buchanan fails to consider 
the most obvious Fregean response: Jones thinks of the movie Flat-top Mountain via the 
MOP the salient movie related to cowboy hats instead of the MOP that Smith had in 
mind, the salient movie related to a flat mountain. That response could be based on the 
fact that pictures, just as much as linguistic expressions, can be associated with multiple 
semantic values, including reference and modes of presentation.71 Thus, the response 
would continue, communication fails because Smith’s drawing refers to Flat-top 
Mountain via the mountain-MOP but is taken by Jones to refer to that movie via the 
distinct cowboy hat-MOP. Jones would have gotten the right referent by means of the 
wrong MOP. 
 To be sure, this is not the only account of Buchanan’s case available to a friend 
of MOPs. Indeed, even if, for whatever reason, one had suspicions about the idea of 
Smith’s drawing being used to singularly refer to Flat-top Mountain,72 a MOP-based 
theorist could suggest the following alternative account: Smith’s drawing is a genre 
picture, a kind of depiction whose content is general (like a picture of a horse, but of no 
particular horse), and its content is the property of being a mountain.73 It is by means of 
 
71    Hyman (2012) defends the application of the sense/reference distinction to pictures and other forms 
of depictions. 
72    One could, for example, rephrase Buchanan’s story so that the intended communicated content were 
completely general, e.g. Smith could have intended to express his adoration for Western movies by means 
of drawing a mountain (commonly associated to the landscape of movies set in the wild west) whereas 
Jones thought that he was doing so by means of a drawing of a cowboy hat (equally associated to that type 
of movies). In that variation of the story, there would seem to be no singular content for the drawing to be 
a representation of.  
73    Analogously, one could say it represents the concept of a mountain. Genre pictures are unlike other 
paradigmatic instances of depiction, such as portraits, in that they refer to kinds of objects but not to 
particular instances of them. This means that a simple account of pictorial representation according to 
which they represent what they resemble would not be immediately applicable to them. For more about 
theories of depiction and genre pictures, see Hyman (2012). 
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figuring out that his drawing is a drawing of (the property of being) a mountain, that 
Smith hopes Jones will infer which movie he wants to go see. In Fregean terms, this 
means that the MOP of Smith’s drawing is that of the property of being a mountain. One 
can, if one wants, say that this MOP either refers to the property of being a mountain or 
that it doesn’t refer at all. Not much will hinge on this, since Jones’ mistake can be 
accounted for by the fact that he fails to correctly recognize the drawing’s MOP and, 
instead, takes its MOP as being that of the property of being a cowboy hat. If one believes 
that the correct MOP either referred to a property or that it didn’t refer at all, then one 
gets the additional verdict that Jones not only failed to assign the correct MOP, but also 
the correct referent of the drawing. In any case, there seems to be no difficulty for a MOP-
based view to account for why Jones has failed to understand Smith. 
 In summary: Jones misinterprets Smith’s drawing as if it were of (the property of 
being) a cowboy hat, instead of (the property of being) a mountain. But misinterpretation 
just is, at least in a Fregean framework, the incorrect assignment of MOP to a 
representation. Thus, their communication fails because Jones fails to associate the 
correct MOP to Smith’s drawing. Furthermore, given some additional assumptions about 
the drawing’s MOP’s referent, not only does Jones assign the wrong MOP to Smith’s 
drawing, but also the wrong referent. The case can then be said to be analogous to one 
where a subject interprets an utterance of ‘the [river]bank is muddy’ as saying that some 
financial institution is dirty, and, contra Buchanan, not analogous to Loar-case 1 (where 
one at least gets the right referent).   
 That, I take, is a natural description of Buchanan-case which makes it clear that 
it is compatible with a MOP-based account of communication. Buchanan might have 
been assuming that MOPs somehow apply only to singular expressions, but that does not 
correspond to how the notion is employed in practice. Indeed, it seems that for any case 
that involves some type of misinterpretation – be it of an utterance, a drawing, or any 
other type of representational act – there will always be some easy way to account for 
them by means of a MOP-based view.74 
 
74 It seems that the same cannot be said for cases - such as those presented in Byrne & Thau (1996) in 
discussion with Heck (1995) – where there is no misinterpretation but where the correct interpretation is 
achieved by sheer luck or coincidence. It is less clear whether the MOP-based view possesses enough 
resources to deal with these cases or whether it would need to be supplemented with some additional 




2.3 Interim conclusion: successful communication requires intention recognition 
This is what we have so far: C1 fails as a criterion of successful communication because 
of cases such as Loar-case 1. In response to that, Loar suggested a MOP-based account 
of communication which, although coherent and able to account for all the relevant data, 
was shown by Buchanan to be excessively committal. Against Loar, Buchanan suggests 
C2, a principle which seems to be able to do all the work that Loar’s MOP-based view 
was supposed to do and for a much lower theoretical price. 
 This could have been the end of the story if it were not for a recent paper by 
Unnsteinsson (2018) from where one can extract the following criticism: Buchanan’s 
appeal to intention recognition is not adequately explanatory since it does nothing to 
explain why our intuitions on communicative success seem to change so drastically when 
we let go of one of the assumptions made in the previous Loar-cases – namely, that hearer 
and speaker are ignorant of some relevant identity fact. According to Unnsteinsson’s 
proposal, one’s account of successful communication must give a much more central role 
to the presence or absence of false distinctness beliefs such as those that Smith and Jones 
hold about the man on the TV and the man on the train. 
 
3 The relevance of false distinctness beliefs: against Unnsteinsson (2018) 
Notice what happens to one’s intuitions about communicative success in Loar-cases as 
soon as we assume that the relevant subjects are enlightened with respect to the salient 
identity fact in the story: 
 
(Loar-case 2): Suppose that it is mutual knowledge between Smith and Jones that the 
man being interviewed on television is someone they see on the train every morning.75 
Smith and Jones have not been engaging in any conversation when Smith abruptly says 
 
75 In an earlier version of this paper, it was merely assumed that Smith and Jones knew (and knew that 
each other knew) that the man being interviewed on television is a man they see every morning. However, 
as an anonymous referee aptly pointed out, this formulation of the story would be susceptible to familiar 
problems in case one of the subjects falsely believed that the other falsely believed that he falsely believed 
that the man on the television was distinct from the man on the train. The concept of mutual knowledge, 
taken from Schiffer (1972, p. 30), was specially devised to take care of similar types of cases. A and B 
mutually know that p if and only if (i) A and B know that p, (ii) A knows that B knows that p, (iii) B knows 
that A knows that p, (iv) A knows that B knows that A knows that p, (v) B knows that A knows that B 
knows that p, (vi) A knows that B knows that A knows that B knows that p, and so on ad infinitum.  
91 
 
‘That man is a stockbroker’, while pointing to the man on television; coincidentally, at 
that very moment Jones happened to be remembering the last encounter they had with 
that man on the train. Influenced by his own memory and failing to notice that Smith was 
pointing to the television, Jones takes Smith’s use of ‘That man’ as intending to bring 
about a memory of that man in the train. Now Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified 
Smith’s referent, since the man on television is the man on the train – but did not do so 
by means of the proper method. 
 
 Do we want to say that Loar-case 2 is a case of successful communication? 
Differently from Loar-case 1, where our intuitions weighed heavily in favor of 
communicative failure, Loar-case 2 is constructed in such a way that our intuitions, by 
themselves, do not seem to point decisively in either way. As Unnsteinsson (2018) 
suggests, a good way to begin answering this question is by reflecting on what Smith’s 
reaction would be if he noticed that Jones never realized he was pointing at the television. 
Here is one natural possibility about what would happen: nothing. Smith would be 
completely indifferent since his most general objective, e.g. letting Jones know some guy 
is a stockbroker, would be fulfilled regardless of the inferential process by means of 
which Jones reached that thought. To be fair, he could feel a bit annoyed and make it 
clear to Jones that he was actually pointing to the man on the television, but that would 
certainly be a tad pedantic, and a proper response from Jones would be ‘So what? It’s the 
same person!’. 
 Unnsteinsson takes these observations as evidence that the failure of 
communication in Loar-case 1 has got more to do with the fact that speaker and hearer 
hold a false belief about the distinctness the object referred by the speaker in the 
conversation (that the man on the train is distinct from the man on the television) than 
with the way by means of which the hearer interprets the speaker.76 The author’s 
suggestion is that “it is in the nature of the speech act of singular reference that having 
specific false beliefs about identity can make it impossible for a speaker to perform the 
act properly”, such that “lacking such false beliefs at the time of the utterance can be a 
 
76 For the sake of simplicity, I will just assume that the subjects in our thought experiments do in fact hold 
the relevant false distinctness belief, but all of what I am going to say (as well as all of what Unnsteinsson 
says) is compatible with them merely suspending belief on the issue. 
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condition on the proper functioning of the underlying mechanism of singular 
communication” (p. 5).  
One natural way to read Unnsteinsson’s proposal is that lacking distinctness false 
beliefs must be taken as a necessary condition for communicative success.77 A view of 
referential communication as a speech act with underlying normative constraints which 
preclude its proper functioning by confused speakers could have promising features. 
Nonetheless, I think it leads to clearly counterintuitive consequences.78 For starters, one 
could insist that Loar-case 2 is an instance of communication failure, regardless of 
Smith’s indifference. One could defend that view by claiming that sometimes our extra-
communicative objectives get fulfilled even when, strictly speaking, our interlocutors 
have not grasped what we said. One could reinforce that view by arguing, as Evans 
(1982) and Heck (1995) once did, that the raison d’être of communication is the 
transmission of knowledge, something which is bound to be absent in every case where 
an element of luck is involved in the hearer’s interpretation. 
 It is doubtful whether this knowledge-based view of communication would end 
up sounding convincing to everybody – as Pagin (2008, p. 30) critically says, “the claim 
that transfer of knowledge is ‘the purpose of communication’ strikes me as a piece of 
metaphysical speculation”. In any case, there are even more pressing reasons why that 
criterion fails: it predicts communication failure every time speaker and hearer have a 
false identity belief, even when that belief is playing no immediate role in the 
 
77Unnsteinsson is more closely concerned with providing necessary conditions for the success of the speech 
act of singular reference and does not discuss criteria for successful communication per se. My reading of 
that author is thus committed to a certain extension of his view under the plausible assumption that, if false 
distinctness beliefs would be disruptive of the success of the speech act of singular reference, then they 
would also be disruptive of the possibility of understanding them. 
78 Three things should be noted about my discussion of Unnsteinsson’s view. Firstly, I am merely 
concerned with criticizing one particular thesis – that lacking false distinctness beliefs is necessary for 
communication – that is congenial, but, without further argument, not necessarily essential, to what this 
author defends in a brief discussion note. As is often the case with these short notes, Unnsteinsson might 
not have had enough space to fully develop his views and, in any case, it is not clear whether his other 
points are not compatible with my criticisms. Secondly, there is much of interest in his overall project – 
that of providing a speaker-based intentionalist theory of reference - that remains untouched by my 
discussion, such as his discussion of the optimal conditions of the speech act of singular reference and of 
the viability of an intentions-based view of reference in the face of the conflicting intentions confused 
speakers have. I refer the reader to Unnsteinsson’s other works (2016, forthcoming) for more details. 
Finally, it might be that Unnsteinsson has a different methodological objective than I do. While I am 
concerned with an account of the folk notion of communication, he might be concerned with constructing 
a technical notion able to play a set of explanatory roles in his more general theory of reference. If that is 




conversation. It strikes me as obviously true that we can sometimes successfully refer 
and communicate about people about whom we hold some irrelevant false distinctness 
belief: Lois Lane successfully talked about Superman almost every day even though she 
would laugh at the idea that his true identity was that of her boyfriend, Clark Kent.  
In a couple of places, Unnsteinsson (p. 3, 5) suggests that the problem of false 
distinctness beliefs arises only when they are contextually salient or relevant. That sounds 
like a plausible enough idea because it is hard to deny that there are cases where subjects 
successfully communicate regardless of holding false distinctness beliefs that are 
contextually irrelevant, e.g. ancient Babylonians were able to successfully communicate 
about Venus in various contexts (during the day by means of ‘Phosphorus’, during the 
night by means of ‘Hesperus’) even though none of them knew that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus. In other words, that ancient Babylonians falsely believed that Hesperus and 
Phosphorus were distinct stars obviously did not interfere with the fact that they often 
had conversations about Venus.  
What about Smith and Jones’ belief that the man on the train is not the man on 
the television in Loar-case 1? One could argue that this was a contextually relevant belief 
since they were talking about the man on the train right before Smith made an utterance 
referring to the man on the television. So far, so good: Unnsteinsson’s necessary 
condition is disrespected and communication does indeed fail. However, re-run Loar-
case 1 with a slight modification: assume that Jones notices that Smith is pointing to the 
man on the television and thus that Jones doesn’t make any interpretative mistake this 
time. I find it obvious that their ensuing communication would be successful regardless 
of their false and contextually salient distinctness belief – still, Unnsteinsson’s criterion 
would output the opposite prediction. In summary, subjects can successfully 
communicate in the presence of false and contextually salient distinctness beliefs. 
Maybe I’m not being completely fair to Unnsteinsson’s notion of contextual 
relevance. Perhaps what Unnsteinsson means is that false distinctness beliefs only disrupt 
referential communication when the speaker intends to refer to one of the flanks of the 
belief and the hearer takes her to be referring to the other. In other words, perhaps 
Unnsteinsson is thinking of a case where (i) there are two ways W¹ and W² of singularly 
referring to the same individual, (ii) speaker and hearer falsely believe that W¹ and W² 
are ways of singularly referring to distinct individuals, (iii) speaker intends to refer to 
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that individual by means of W¹ and (iv) the hearer takes speaker to have referred to that 
individual by means of W². For illustration, W¹ could be demonstratively referring to an 
individual as the man on the television and W², demonstratively referring to an individual 
as the man on the train.79 Plausibly, if all four of these conditions are satisfied, speaker 
and hearer will have failed to successfully communicate. 
Even if it rings true, this idea will not be of much help to the view that lacking 
false beliefs is necessary for successful communication, since then the resulting view 
would simply boil down to the claim that false distinctness beliefs disrupt communication 
when the hearer fails to recognize the speaker’s communicative intentions. That is just 
what is happening in the situation previously described: the hearer thought that the 
speaker intended to talk about the man on the train while actually she intended to talk 
about the man on the television. But that’s already accounted for by means of C2. Why 
would we additionally need to give a central role to false distinctness beliefs in our 
criterion for successful communication if what really matters is whether the hearer gets 
the speaker’s intentions?  
In summary, Unnsteinsson’s idea was supposed to help us understand why our 
intuitions become uncertain in cases where enlightened subjects misinterpret one another, 
such as in Loar-case 2. Against this author, I have argued that it is implausible to claim 
that subjects cannot successfully communicate about x when they hold false distinctness 
beliefs about x (even when these are contextually relevant), i.e. lacking distinctness false 
beliefs is not necessary for communication success. Furthermore, I have not found any 
adequate way of fleshing out what Unnsteinsson means by ‘contextually salient’ without 
making his criterion redundant.  
Up until now, one could complain, I have only shown that lacking false 
distinctness beliefs is not necessary for communicative success. But that is compatible 
with a modification of Unnsteinsson’s view that still gives a central role to the presence 
or absence of these beliefs. According to this hypothetical view, while it is not necessary 
that speaker and hearer be enlightened for them to successfully communicate, if they are 
indeed enlightened, then it is sufficient for the success of their communication that the 
hearer entertains a thought with the same truth-conditions as the speaker. In other words, 
 




according to this view, successful communication is particularly easy for enlightened 
subjects, i.e. that C1 is true for pairs of speaker and hearer that hold no false distinctness 
belief of the matter at hand. 
I will finish this section by arguing that C1 is false even for subjects that hold no 
false distinctness beliefs. This should be seen as providing more justification for 
accepting my claim that false distinctness beliefs should not have a central place in an 
account of successful communication. A quick example is enough to suggest why that is 
the case. Imagine, again, a case where it is common knowledge between Smith and Jones 
that the man on the train is the man on the television, but where Jones interprets Smith’s 
utterance of 
 
(3) That man [pointing to the man on the television] is that man [intending to refer to 
the man they saw on the train] 
 
as if Smith had said 
 
(4) That man [pointing to the man on the television] is that man [still pointing to the 
same man on the television] 
 
 I take it for granted that this would not be a case of successful communication. 
What this shows is that, even if speaker and hearer are enlightened, successful 
communication will not come so easily: C1 fails even for that restricted set of subjects. 
In conclusion, I have argued contra Unnsteinsson that one should not hold the absence 
of distinctness false beliefs to be a necessary condition for successful communication. I 
then have made the additional point that, even if one is only concerned with subjects who 
hold no false distinctness beliefs about the subject matter of their conversation, it is not 
the case that entertaining a thought with the same truth-conditions as the speaker’s is a 
sufficient condition for communicative success. My overall aim was arguing for the 
thesis that false distinctness beliefs should not play a central role in one’s account of 
successful communication. 
Regardless of all that, we still haven’t explained one of the main intuitions behind 
Unnsteinsson’s suggestion, that is, we still need to provide some kind of explanation for 
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why is it that our intuitions change so clearly as soon as we re-describe Loar-case 1 as 
Loar-case 2, i.e. when ignorance gives way to enlightenment. If my objective of rescuing 
C2 is to be achieved, there is still some work to be done. 
 
4 Enlightenment, linking and merging 
As I have remarked, one could accept all of the previous considerations but still wonder 
why is it that, when we enlighten the hearer and speaker in a Loar-case, as we did in 
Loar-case 2, our intuitions suddenly become much more sympathetic towards the verdict 
that they have successfully communicated regardless of the hearer failing to properly 
grasp the speaker’s communicative intentions. That would mean C2 is subject to clear 
counter-examples.  
Loar-case 2 might be less than ideal as a case study because it involves an explicit 
element of luck in the way the hearer reaches his interpretation. Regardless of what one 
thinks about communication and luck, it will be useful to analyze a variation of the same 
case which does not include an accidental strike of luck.80 It will then be harder to deny 
that we can have communicative success even when a hearer seems to have failed to 
grasp the speaker’s communicative intentions: 
 
(Loar-case 3) Suppose that it is mutual knowledge between Smith and Jones that the 
man being interviewed on television is someone they see on the train every morning and 
about whom, in that latter role, they have just been talking. Indeed, they have been talking 
about that man for hours, constantly alternating between referring to him by pointing to 
his image on the television or by remembering their encounters in the train. Smith says 
‘That man is a stockbroker’, while pointing to the man on television; unaware of Smith’s 
pointing gesture, Jones takes Smith to have been invoking a memory of one their 
encounters in the train (perhaps of one day in which the man was dressed as a 
stockbroker). Now Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified Smith’s referent, since 
 
80 I have been purposefully avoiding any discussion of the role of luck in Loar-cases and its relevance for 
criteria of successful communication. As far as the recent literature on the topic goes, there just is no 
consensus on the question about whether successful communication can be lucky. One tradition that 
includes Evans (1982), Heck (1995) and Peet (2017) says it cannot. Another tradition including Byrne & 
Thau (1996), Paul (1999), and Pagin (2008) says it can. At the end of the day, I do not think it is necessary, 
for the objectives of this paper, to try to settle on an answer to this question here. 
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the man on television is the man on the train – and was not merely lucky to have done 
so. 
 
 It is hard to deny that Jones has understood what Smith said and that their 
communication was successful. Whether it matters or not, Jones was not merely lucky to 
identify the referent of Smith’s utterance. On the contrary, it is obvious that he knew who 
Smith was talking about, regardless of failing to notice his pointing at the television. 
Regardless of all that, one could argue that C2 would prima facie entail that their 
communication was not successful since the hearer seems to fail to grasp the speaker’s 
communicative intention. In the final section of this paper, I will provide a brief 
explanation of how one could account for Loar-case 3 without departing from C2. 
 There is an easy way to explain the communicative success in scenarios such as 
Loar-case 3 where the subjects are enlightened but still seem to misinterpret each other. 
In order to do so, I suggest we borrow the notions of linking and merging from Strawson 
(1974, p. 51-56) and their further developments by Recanati (2012, p. 42-53). The idea, 
in a nutshell, is that identity judgments be understood as enabling the flow of information 
between representations that the subjects previously thought referred to distinct people. 
For the purposes of our paper, linking and/or merging representations can be conceived 
as processes that have an effect on a subject’s communicative intentions with these 
representations. When a speaker acquires an identity belief about what she previously 
thought were two distinct things, the conditions of fulfillment of her communicative 
intentions about that thing will also expand so as to cohere with her new state of mind. 
Let us see how that would work in practice. 
 Assume that there is a time t previous to the interaction described in Loar-case 3 
when Smith and Jones are still unsure about whether the man on the train is the man on 
the television. At t, Smith and Jones take the world to be such that there are two distinct 
individuals satisfying those predicates and strive to isolate the information they acquire 
about each of them. At that point of the story, when Smith makes an utterance about e.g. 
the man on the train, the fulfillment of his communicative intention depends on Jones 
taking him to be remembering the man on the train (and not, for example, pointing at the 
man on the television). When these subjects learn that the man on the train is the man on 
the television, they are rationally required to update their mental states by means of the 
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mechanisms of linking and merging. In other words, this means they no longer have a 
reason for keeping the information about the man on the train insulated from information 
about the man on the television. In response to that, they should either create a bridge 
between their information repositories or merge them, so that all of the information can 
be stored in one and the same place.81 From that point onward, Smith’s communicative 
intentions become fulfillable by his interlocutors taking him to be intending to refer to 
the man on the train. Thus, his communicative intentions expand so as to encompass 
distinct ways of referring to what he now knows is one and the same person. 
 Now we can see why false distinctness beliefs matter to our intuitions of 
communicative success. When we acquire information about one and the same thing but 
are unaware of that fact, we are rationally required to keep that information in distinct 
‘compartments’ until we make sure that they come, indeed, from the same source. When 
we discover that we are receiving information from the same thing from different non-
coinciding means, we then have the option of merging the information into one and the 
same compartment or linking the information contained in distinct compartments in order 
to allow for their free flow (by expanding the fulfillment conditions of our 
communicative intentions). To be fair, Unnsteinsson could try to incorporate these 
linking and merging mechanisms to his account – but if he did, then he would owe us an 
explanation for why false distinctness beliefs are fundamentally, and not only 
derivatively, explanatory. 
 Thus, when Smith and Jones become aware of the relevant identity fact, they link 
or merge the information about the man on the train and the man on the television. Most 
relevantly, this means that, contrary to what we thought, C2 is actually compatible with 
ascribing communicative success to Loar-case 3. When Jones interprets Smith as 
intending to refer to the man on the train, one could argue that he thinks a thought with 
the same truth-conditions as Smith and that he has also recognized Smith’s 
communicative intentions, since, after undergoing the mechanisms of linking and 
merging, thinking of the relevant man as the man on the train or as the man on the 
television are equally correct ways as far as Smith’s communicative intentions are 
 
81 I do not intend that my folder, repository or compartment-talk to be taken as anything more than 
metaphors for how we organize the information we possess. 
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concerned. I expect those brief considerations to pave the way for an explanation of 
Unnsteinsson’s data without letting go of C2. 
 
5 Final remarks 
We started with the simplest criterion for successful communication (C1) and argued that 
it does not output the correct predictions for Loar-cases. I then assessed Loar’s MOP-
based account of the problem in light of Buchanan’s critical remarks. My conclusion was 
sympathetic to Buchanan’s with the exception of my point that, even if an intentions-
based account of communicative success (C2) is, as far as this limited set of datum is 
concerned, less theoretically committal, a MOP-based account is still compatible with 
everything we’ve seen so far.  
 In the following section of the paper I then went on to argue against 
Unnsteinsson’s recent suggestions to the effect that the failure of communication in Loar-
cases is to be explained by the presence of contextually relevant false distinctness beliefs 
about the object being referred to by the speaker. In order to achieve that conclusion, I 
argued that there can be communicative success even if speaker and hearer hold 
contextually relevant false distinctness beliefs. I then tried to develop Unnsteinsson’s 
suggestion in a different way but argued that it was bound to collapse into the claim that 
false distinctness beliefs only disrupt communication when the hearer fails to grasp the 
speaker’s intention – and that this would make his suggestion theoretically redundant. I 
then finished this section by motivating the claim that, even if speaker and hearer are 
enlightened, it is not sufficient for successful communication that the hearer entertains a 
thought with the same truth-conditions as the speaker.  
Finally, I turned my attention to Unnsteinsson’s remaining challenge: how would 
a view like C2 account for the fact that we are disposed to ascribe communicative success 
to cases, like Loar-case 3, where the hearer seems to fail to grasp the speaker’s 
communicative intentions? My reply, admittedly tentative, employed the notions of 
linking and merging in order to argue that, when thinkers discover that they were 
acquiring information from a single object by means of two distinct sources, they tend to 
link or merge this information, and that something like this could very well explain what 
is going on in the cases Unnsteinsson calls attention to. 
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 Naturally, there are plenty of open questions we did not have time to touch upon. 
One of these is: can successful communication be lucky? Just as a hearer might luckily 
manage to get the truth-conditions of the speaker’s thought right, she might also luckily 
manage to recognize the speaker’s communicative intentions. That would mean that C2 
is – as much as C1 – subject to cases where a hearer complies with it by means of sheer 
luck. Then, answering whether C2 is an adequate criterion of successful communication 
at all takes us back to the question of whether communicative success can go hand in 
hand with luck – a question I have not even pretended to be able to answer. 
 A distinct challenge to C2 draws upon the fact that, as is common for Gricean-
inspired views, the resulting account might end up being psychologically too demanding. 
It is a well-known fact that thinkers usually have different perspectives on the subject 
matters they think about. Likewise, it is often vague which inferential route to the referent 
is intended by particular referential speech acts (Peet, 2016). Requiring that the hearer 
thinks of the referent in the exact same way as the speaker, or that the hearer magically 
discover the exact inferential route hidden behind the speaker’s utterance might quickly 
lead one to a criterion which is rarely, if ever, satisfied in the real world. 
 Regardless of the amount of work ahead of us, I expect to have at least made a 
good case to the effect that progress on the issue of successful referential communication 
should not give fundamental importance to the presence or absence of false distinctness 
beliefs, and that it should drive off the idea that, even for some restricted cases, identity 
of referential content is enough. Communicating well, just as understanding well and 
holding the same belief, seems to be a hyper-intensional notion that requires more than 
an actual match of referents. How exactly we should develop that thought, however, 
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5 Relationism and the Problem of Publicity 
(with Victor Verdejo82) 
 
Abstract  
According to a recently developed family of relational views, whether two concepts C1 
and C2 are the same or shared is a matter of an external relation in which (tokens of) C1 
and C2 stand. In this paper, we (i) highlight the chief contributions of Relationism in the 
elucidation of concept sameness, (ii) present a set of arguments to the effect that 
relational accounts of concept sameness fail to accommodate a substantive notion of 
concept publicity, and (iii) offer a diagnosis of this result: whereas, as has been pointed 
out by relationists, non-relational approaches to concepts often fall short of concept 
shareability, Relationism puts forward a form of concept shareability that itself falls short 
of concept publicity. We conclude that the strengths of non-relational approaches will 




A number of groundbreaking works have recently advanced the view that concept 
sameness must be understood in relational terms. According to this view, whether two 
concepts C1 and C2 are the same or shared is a matter of an external relation in which 
(tokens of) C1 and C2 stand. The class of approaches offering variations of this view goes 
under the head of ‘Relationism’.83 While we do not deny the import of the proposed 
relations as fundamental aspects of cognition and communication, in this paper we target 
one of the main tenets of this momentous position. In particular, we set out to show that 
relational accounts of concept sameness fail to accommodate a substantive notion of 
concept publicity. We take this result to be revealing in ways that are challenging for the 
prospects of the relationist project as a whole but especially so in light of the fact that 
capturing concept publicity is, as we shall see, one of its principal motivations.  
 In order to fulfil this task, we first highlight the chief contributions of Relationism 
in the elucidation of concept sameness (Section 1), and go on to provide a battery of 
 
82 Víctor is a professor of philosophy at the Universitat de València, Spain.  
83 The first monograph-length defence of the view is Fine’s Semantic Relationism (2007), but its roots trace 
back at least to Taschek (1995). See Gray (2017) and below for detailed discussion. 
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arguments to the effect that Relationism fails to deliver sufficient and necessary 
conditions for concept publicity (Section 2). We will conclude that the relational account 
of concept sameness does not yield sameness for public concepts. In a more speculative 
fashion, we also propose a diagnosis of this result and its significance (Section 3). 
Whereas non-relational approaches to concepts, as standardly conceived, fall short of 
concept publicity because they fail to guarantee concept shareability, relational 
approaches also fail in achieving that objective, albeit for different reasons. More 
specifically, Relationism’s criteria for concept sameness oscillate between being too 
strict for concept publicity – disallowing unrelated thinkers from sharing the same 
thoughts – and too loose – identifying the concepts of thinkers that, for independent 
reasons, we would like to distinguish. In other words, Relationism puts forward a form 
of concept shareability that itself falls short of concept publicity. We conclude that, while 
neither type of approach can rightly be said to have fully captured concept publicity thus 
far, the strengths of non-relational approaches will also need to be considered in order to 
do so. 
 
2 Relationism and Publicity 
Concepts are the atomic constituents of thoughts. As such, they are usually expected to 
play a number of theoretical roles, some of which are philosophically contentious, some 
of which are too basic to be contested. One central example of a basic role concepts are 
supposed to play is accounting for the cognitive significance of propositional attitudes. 
This we may dub the cognitive-significance role or CS-Role for short. Because concepts 
fulfil this role, they can feature prominently in explanations of why some beliefs can be 
cognitively distinct regardless of having the same truth-conditions, e.g. the belief that 
Istanbul is Constantinople and the belief that Istanbul is identical to itself. The natural 
concept-based explanation of that cognitive difference is that the first belief is constituted 
by a thought that contains two concepts, the second, only one twice over.  
 Another basic theoretical role of concepts – one that is central to this paper – is 
that concepts are, as it were, the glue connecting the mental life of thinkers. As 
emphasized by Fodor (1998, 28), “[c]oncepts are public; they’re the sort of things that 
lots of people can, and do, share” (emphasis in original). This we may call the publicity 
105 
 
role or P-Role as an abbreviation. As hinted in Fodor’s dictum, publicity is clearly more 
than mere shareability. The publicity of concepts does not merely require that they be, in 
principle, shareable, but that they be indeed generally shared. We may cash this idea out 
in terms of a desideratum for theories of concepts: any theory according to which 
concepts are not merely, in principle, shareable, but also somehow guaranteed to be 
shared in a community of thinkers scores more points.  
 Relationists generally believe that one strong reason to accept their views is that, 
not only are they able to account for the cognitive significance of propositional attitudes 
(their CS-Role, that is), they are also better equipped to account for concept publicity and 
sharing than the others (the P-Role in our terminology).84 But to see exactly why we need 
to characterize Relationism more accurately. Various types of relational theories have 
been proposed in the last couple of decades. What they all have in common is not always 
easy to discern but can initially be summarized as the idea that whether two concepts C1 
and C2 are the same does not supervene on C1 and C2’s intrinsic properties, but rather on 
whether they, or more precisely their tokens, are externally related. A relation is external, 
in the relevant sense, iff it is not reducible to a relation between the properties intrinsically 
possessed by each concept. 
 We do not even pretend to have a fully fleshed-out view of intrinsicality, 
something most desirable when invoking the internal-external relation distinction. 
However, a clear analogy might be all we need in this context. Thus, being taller than is 
a paradigmatic example of an internal relation. It is wholly determined by the intrinsic 
properties of its relata. Indeed, one could say that the holding of this relation between 
two individuals amounts to nothing over and above each of them having a certain height. 
The relation of being south of, by contrast, is a paradigmatically external one. In order to 
assess whether two objects are thus related, it is not enough that we have access to the 
individual’s intrinsic properties – we need to check the world around them. It does not 
matter that, by exploiting logic’s expressive power, one can turn any relational property 
into a monadic property, e.g. if x is to the south of y, then x possesses the monadic 
property being south of y. Transforming relations into monadic properties in this way 
does not alter their internality or externality. If the transformed relation was external, 
 
84 A vivid illustration of this we find in the titles of Onofri’s (2018) “The Publicity of Thought” and 
Prosser’s (2019) “Shared Modes of Presentation”. 
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then the corresponding monadic property will not be based on the individual’s intrinsic 
properties.  
 We take the above example to spell out the meaning of the proposed relationist 
slogan “concept sameness is an external relation”.85 By contrast, non-relational views are 
those according to which two concepts C1 and C2 are the same whenever C1 is 
intrinsically associated with some property P1, C2, with some property P2, and P1 is 
identical to P2. For example, P1 and P2 could be the concepts’ syntactic type, associated 
definite description, way of thinking, perspective or understanding conditions. The key 
characteristic of non-relational views is that conceptual sameness boils down to the 
properties that concepts individually possess or is, to use Prosser’s apt phrase, “a 
coincidence of individual achievements” (Prosser 2019, 3). Relational views, on the other 
hand, might very well agree that a concept possesses syntactic and semantic properties, 
but will argue that whether two token concepts are the same is not determined by them. 
Thus, we regard Relationism as follows: 
 
(Relationism) Two concepts C1 and C2 are the same iff their tokens are related 
by R, where R is an external relation. 
 
Relationism concerns therefore concept sameness as predicated of concept types 
in terms of a relational condition between concept tokens. Every particular relational 
theory, however, will have something different to say about how to understand R. For 
ease of exposition, we may compress the claim that any such relational condition between 
tokens of C1 and C2 is fulfilled in the claim that C1 and C2 are ‘relationally connected’. 
Thus, according to any relational theory, two concepts are the same iff relationally 
connected.  
Now, to return to our previous question, why would one believe that Relationism 
is better positioned to capture publicity than the traditional, non-relational view? The 
basic answer is that traditional accounts of what it is to share a concept seem too 
demanding. They suggest that people would rarely, if ever, share their concepts. If, for 
 
85 It is thus no accident that Fine (2007) uses the term ‘Intrinsicalism’ to denote the family of views opposed 
to Relationism. Gray (2017) also defines Relationism as the view that sameness of representation does not 
supervene on intrinsic representational features. 
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example, the way of thinking or perspective by means of which a thinker perceives or 
regards an object is an intrinsic property constitutive of a concept C, then, on the 
traditional account, another thinker will only have the same concept C if she also exploits 
the very same way of thinking or perspective. However, ways of thinking or perspectives 
are, plausibly, highly variable from subject to subject and even continuously for the same 
subject across time. It follows that two thinkers would rarely if ever share the concepts 
constituted by ways of thinking or perspectives on the traditional view. In terms of the 
desideratum that we had earlier presented, the theory just sketched guarantees that 
concepts are, in principle, shareable but not that they are actually shared in communities 
of thinkers or across communities. 
In response to this shortcoming, Relationism offers interesting new routes to 
explaining how thinkers with very different ways of thinking or perspectives about a 
certain subject matter nonetheless share their concepts in communication and rational 
interaction. The key idea is that concepts used by different thinkers can be relationally 
connected – and hence be the same on relationist standards – regardless of any 
differences in way of thinking or perspective.  
There are a number of ways in which the relationist story about shareability can 
be fleshed out. For instance, some think that relational connectedness should be modeled 
as a primitive semantic-coordination relation that determines, beyond any intrinsic 
semantic properties, which elements of content in a sequence of representations are 
represented as the same (Fine 2007, Pinillos 2011). Others would propose that a simpler 
view could be reached by taking a formal or syntactic kind of relation as primitive 
(Cumming 2013, Heck 2012, 2014). According to Cumming’s (2013) formal approach, 
for instance, concept sameness is a matter of the holding of some conventional 
coordination relation between thinkers’ co-referential representations in a one-to-one 
fashion. Consider two subjects, a and b, and call A1 the concept a uses to refer to O, and 
B1 the one b uses for the same purpose. Is a’s concept (or concept type) the same as b’s? 
According to Cumming, this depends on which conventions a and b put into place. For 
instance, if a commits to tokening A1 in response to b’s tokens of B1 and vice-versa, then 
A1 = B1. As expected, however, the holding or not of that convention is not determined 
by any of A1 and B1’s intrinsic properties. In a different context, the chosen convention 
could be distinct. 
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Although our arguments below are supposed to apply to any version of 
Relationism, here we will often explicitly target a conception that contrasts with the 
semantic and formal kinds just surveyed and already singled out in the literature (see 
especially Gray 2017). This conception, which has been quickly gaining in popularity, 
we may dub ‘epistemic relationism’. According to it, relational connectedness is, first 
and foremost, an epistemic relation between thinkers and token concepts or 
representations, and only derivatively a semantic or formal one. One clear representative 
of this view is Onofri (2018). According to this author, two concepts are the same when 
their owners know that their tokens co-refer. This view too seems able to account for 
concept sharing without satisfying any of the presumably demanding criteria proposed 
by the traditional non-relational views. 
Many epistemic relationists in our sense take relational connectedness to consist 
of a more subtle form of epistemic relation, namely, trading on identity (Dickie and 
Rattan (2010), Schroeter (2012), Prosser (2019)). Thus, one trades on the identity of two 
concepts or thoughts when one treats them as representing something as the same without 
needing to establish it by means of an intermediary identity premise. Campbell (1987) 
convincingly argued that, unless some inferences involve trading on identity in this sense, 
we quickly fall into a very pernicious regress. The argument is simple: if the validity of 
every inference required identity premises connecting the referents of the inference 
premises with each other, then, since those identities would themselves become premises 
of the original inference, we would need additional identity premises connecting the 
referents of those identities with those of the original premises, and so on ad infinitum. 
Building on these considerations, some relationists go on to suggest that concept 
sameness is the result of trading on the identity of concepts’ reference – viz. in 
communicative exchanges and in belief retention – without requiring the identity of 
hardly shareable intrinsic properties of concepts. 
We have now seen several ways in which relational views seem to be well-
equipped to deal with the publicity of concepts. In particular, and unlike traditional non-
relational approaches, they seem to satisfactorily accommodate concept sharing in spite 
of differences in variable intrinsic properties exploited by different thinkers. However, a 
substantive notion of concept publicity is plausibly much more than concept sharing 
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beyond individual differences. There are, as we now turn to see, other aspects of publicity 
that also need to be handled but escape the resources of Relationism.  
 
3 Relationism and Publicity, Unabridged 
There are two kinds of challenges that would seem to threaten the relational project when 
it comes to a substantive notion of concept publicity. Firstly, the conditions that 
Relationism delivers for concept sharing do not actually suffice for the sharing of public 
concepts. They are conditions that, if satisfied, signal a significant connection (semantic, 
syntactic or epistemic) between concepts that, nonetheless, publicity requires to be 
distinct. Secondly, some central ordinary cases in which the sharing of public concepts 
is available are cases where a relational condition is decidedly absent. These cases 
indicate that relational conditions are not necessary for the publicity of concepts. Let us 
take each kind of challenge in turn. 
 
3.1 Relational conditions are not sufficient for publicity 
Relational conditions are, we suggest, not sufficient conditions for the publicity of 
concepts and thought. Here we would like to illustrate the point through reflection on 
three plausible requirements of a substantive notion of concept publicity: type 
classification, generalizable intentional explanation and transitivity. 
 Type classification. One seemingly uncontroversial ingredient elicited by the idea 
that concepts are public is that they can be sorted into general types. On this account, to 
say that concepts are public or publicly accessible is to say that people have the capacity 
to entertain, not merely the same concepts, but the same general types of concept. There 
are probably various ways of characterizing the relevant notion of concept type at issue. 
To a first approximation, we may take the types in question to be carved up in alignment 
with semantic types of expression.  
 For instance, at least since the work of Kripke, Kaplan and other representatives 
of the so-called ‘New Theory of Reference’, it is customary to suppose that some 
expressions – e.g. indexicals and, arguably, bare and complex demonstratives and proper 
names – are directly referential whereas others – e.g. definite descriptions and quantifier 
phrases – pick out objects only indirectly. The distinction separates out two types of 
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expression semantically. The directly referential type includes terms that stand in a close 
or immediate relation to the objects they refer to, whereas the non-directly referential or 
descriptive type comprises expressions involving reference through some sort of 
medium, such as a reference-fixing description. If correct, this divide as standardly 
formulated suggests that concepts expressed by means of terms differing in semantic type 
belong to different general conceptual types and are indeed themselves distinct. 
 It is easy to see how this picture spells trouble for relational approaches. For 
sameness of concept must surely entail sameness of general conceptual type. However, 
the kind of conceptual sameness tendered by relational accounts may hold quite 
independently of semantic types of expression. Relationism opens thus the door to cases 
in which two (co-referring) concepts expressed with different semantic types (viz. an 
indexical and a definite description) are deemed of the same conceptual type insofar as 
relationally connected. On the assumption that semantic types of expression correspond 
to general concept types, this result is problematic. 
 Consider, to illustrate, the proper name “Hesperus” and the definite description 
“the heavenly body (actually) visible in the evening”. In appropriate contexts, the 
relationist contends, these terms express the same concept. This would be the case, for 
instance, if subjects know that these terms both designate Venus (Onofri), or exhibit some 
form of trading on the identity of their reference (Dickie and Rattan, Schroeter, Prosser), 
or if the terms in the context are formally or semantically coordinated (Cumming, Fine, 
Heck). The important point here is that, according to Relationism, in the contexts in 
which “Hesperus” and “the heavenly body (actually) visible in the evening” are 
relationally connected, the terms must express the same concept. But this result is 
counterintuitive in light of mainstream approaches to meaning and thought that 
discriminate between directly referential and non-directly referential types. It strongly 
suggests that a relevant relational condition may be satisfied in regard to two concepts 
when publicity requires them to be, not merely distinct, but indeed of distinct general 
types. 
 Some relationists may counter that it is never the case that a proper name is 
relationally connected to a definite description. Take the view that relational 
connectedness consists of some form of trading on identity. Some could argue, for 
example, that the following inference scheme has no valid instances: 
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1. Hesperus is F 
2. The heavenly body (actually) visible in the evening is G 
      Conclusion. Something is both F and G   
If correct, this would indicate that there cannot be trading on identity between a proper 
name and a definite description, and that such inference schemes are never valid unless 
incremented with an identity premise (of the form “N = the actual M” for any names N 
and definite descriptions M). More generally, some could claim that there is never trading 
on identity between concepts of distinct semantic types.  
 The problem with this line of response would then be that of explaining, non-
question-beggingly, why inference schemes like the one above cannot have valid 
instances. This cannot simply be taken as a basic fact. One also cannot say that these 
inferences are not valid because the singular concepts in each premise are distinct, since 
this is precisely the fact that trading on identity should explain. Indeed, the notion of 
trading on identity is a highly technical one and its application conditions are a matter of 
philosophical dispute. Even if Campbell (1987) showed that some inferences must 
involve trading on identity, he did not put forward a clear cut criterion for identifying 
which. Therefore, unless the relationist authors who give a central role to this or other 
inference-constraining notions can explain why that inference is invariably dependent on 
a hidden identity premise, they will be exposed to the counterintuitive consequence just 
pointed out. 
An objector may also worry that the problem thus far presented concerns a 
particular classification into general types which might itself be challenged. However, 
one need not resort to any particular type distinction in order to put the point across. It 
suffices to accept that independent research in semantics, linguistics and psychology do 
make it plausible, and certainly conceivable, that concepts come in general types.86 One’s 
account of shareable concepts is thus prima facie undermined if insensitive to, or even 
 
86 Emar Maier for instance proposes to abandon the semantic distinction between reference and description 
(in philosophy) and the distinction between pronouns and R-expressions (in linguistics) in favor of the 
more encompassing distinction between definites and indefinites (Maier 2015). The argument in the main 




incompatible with, such general type distinctions. But that is precisely what seems to 
happen if Relationism is true.87  
 Intentional explanation. Type classification is hardly the only difficulty that 
relationists face in cashing out a substantive notion of publicity. Let us turn now to the 
characteristic kind of explanation in which concepts and other mental representations 
feature, namely, intentional explanation of cognition and behavior. As Dilip Ninan has 
noted, it is reasonable to expect that such explanations be generalizable: 
 
A good explanation ought to be something that generalizes, something that 
leads to by-and-large correct predictions in new cases. If we know that Sally 
went to the zoo because of her beliefs and desires, then if we learn that Sam 
has those same beliefs and desires, then it is reasonable for us to expect that 
Sam too will go to the zoo, so long as other things are equal. (Ninan 2016, 
101) 
 
We take Ninan’s point in this passage to capture a widely held understanding of the way 
intentional explanation is supposed to work. On this picture, publicity requires concepts 
to be the sort of thing that is associated with cognitive or behavioral patterns, where such 
patterns are generalizable both synchronically – across subjects – and diachronically – 
for the same subject across different contexts or times.  
 It is questionable that relational views can accommodate this aspect of publicity. 
A straightforward corollary of the above is that if C1 and C2 are the same concept, then 
they must play exactly the same explanatory role in the intentional explanations where 
they feature, i.e. if two subjects have the same beliefs and desires, then one can infer that 
they will perform the same actions caeteris paribus. Relationism is at odds with this. The 
reason is that relational connectedness does not necessarily march with sameness of 
explanatory role. This is problematic. If relational sameness does not guarantee sameness 
of explanatory role, it will lead to systematically unwarranted generalizations of 
 
87 Recent publications examine whether ‘concept’ has a univocal meaning in different disciplines, but the 
question is still highly polemical (e.g. Machery 2009, Löhr 2018). If Relationism takes a stand on it, 





explanations that invoke the same concepts. Alas, concept publicity in intentional 
explanations does not get off the ground if the same concepts do not secure sameness of 
explanatory contribution. 
 One vivid illustration of this hurdle is given by the oft-cited phenomenon of the 
essential indexical (Perry 1979). Barring sceptic drifts (e.g. Cappelen and Dever 2013), 
there is a wide consensus that concepts (or beliefs) involved in the use of indexical terms 
– such as ‘I’, ‘now’ or ‘here’ – are indispensable or explanatorily primitive in accounting 
for the way in which one may think and react to a state of affairs. For instance, in order 
to explain one’s running to a meeting starting at noon, we may invoke the thought one 
would express by ‘now is almost noon!’ but not merely the thought one would express 
by ‘11:45 am is almost noon!’ even if ‘now’ refers to 11:45 am. Thus, any complete 
explanation of an agent’s behavior must involve what Perry called ‘self-locating’ beliefs 
or concepts (cf. Perry 1979, esp. 4-5; Perry 2006). 
 It is unclear whether Relationism can live up to the existence of self-locating 
concepts or, for that matter, any class of concepts involving distinctive or irreducible 
explanatory features. Take again the self-locating concept typically expressed by ‘now’. 
The problem is plain once we realize that relationists are forced to admit that, in at least 
some cases, the concept expressed with ‘now’ to refer to t would be just the same as the 
concept expressed by any other t-referring term insofar as a semantic, formal or epistemic 
relation is satisfied. Consider for instance the view that knowledge of co-reference or 
some form of trading on identity is what constitutes concept sharing in a context. There 
will be indefinitely many cases in which we would seem to know the co-reference or 
trade on the identity of the reference of the concepts expressed with ‘now’ and other non-
indexical terms such as ‘noon’ or ‘12.00 pm’.88 But if the Perrian insights are at all 
valuable, it would seem that in such contexts too there is a persisting – indeed essential 
– difference between the concepts expressed by ‘now’, on the one hand, and ‘noon’ or 
‘12.00 pm’, on the other. No explanation of a thinker’s running-off-to-a-meeting 
 
88 The potential counter-argument that we never trade on the identity of an indexical and a non-indexical 




behavior would be complete without mentioning some belief containing the concept that 
she would express by ‘now’.89 
 At this point, a sympathizer of Relationism might complain: to claim that two 
token concepts expressed with an indexical and a distinct co-referring non-indexical term 
are explanatorily equivalent in a context is not yet to disavow the significance and 
explanatorily distinctive character of self-concepts. On a relational account, the concepts 
expressed by ‘now’ and ‘noon’ only have different behavioral import when they are not 
relationally connected, e.g. when a thinker does not know that they co-refer. This would 
explain why Perry-cases typically involve a thinker who is unaware that e.g. the current 
time is noon. On the other hand, the relationist could continue, in scenarios in which 
these concepts are relationally connected, they have just the same behavioral import and 
are intersubstitutable in an intentional explanation. 
 However, this reply overlooks the fact that a complete explanation of the behavior 
of someone for which the concepts expressed with ‘now’ and ‘noon’ are relationally 
connected would still have to include a ‘now’-concept, namely, the belief that she would 
then express by ‘now is noon’, without which it would not make sense, say, to run to the 
meeting after overhearing ‘the meeting starts at noon’. The same is not true of a ‘noon’-
concept. This shows that the concepts expressed by ‘now’ and ‘noon’ are not, after all, 
intersubstitutable in the intentional explanations. More generally, the relationist lacks the 
resources to explain why behavior explanations seem to necessarily require the 
involvement of self-locating beliefs or concepts. This is just as expected, for to fully 
acknowledge this requirement would be to acknowledge the existence of concepts – viz. 
self-concepts – whose explanatory features can be described as intrinsic features and 
hence irrespective of the relations in which they enter towards other concepts in a 
context.90 
 
89 Prosser (2015, 2019, §6) proposes an elaborated account in which differences in what he terms 
‘manifested belief’ (about the subject’s being in a certain subject-environment relation) – as opposed to 
the ‘stated belief’ (roughly, the referentially specified belief) – is what explains the difference in behavior 
associated with indexicals such as ‘here’/‘there’ or ‘now’/‘then’. The problem we are discussing reappears, 
however, with respect to the elucidation of the notion of ‘manifested belief’. If we follow Prosser’s 
suggestion, the relevant publicity presumption will be that sameness of concept or mode of presentation 
yields sameness of manifested belief. But this is precisely what is in question in the cases envisaged in the 
main text.  
90 Richard Heck seems to acquiesce to this line of objection in connection with demonstrative thought and, 




 Transitivity. Most authors – including a number of relationists (e.g. Cumming 
2013, Schroeter 2012, Onofri 2018) – are ready to accept that transitivity is a capital 
constraint for any satisfactory account of concept sameness and individuation. As 
Schroeter writes, using the label ‘de jure sameness’ for sameness of concept,  
 
ordinary reasoning seems to commit us to the transitivity of de jure sameness 
in thought and talk. For instance, when you rely on standing beliefs about 
tigers in a stretch of conscious reasoning, you’re not just committed to those 
beliefs pertaining de jure to the same topic. You’re also implicitly committed 
to those beliefs pertaining de jure to the same topic as the past judgments from 
which they derive, and to the other past attitudes on which those past 
judgments were based – even if you no longer remember those attitudes. 
(Schroeter 2012, 17, ff. 18) 
 
More than implied by our ordinary reasoning, however, the transitivity of concept 
sameness seems to open the way for a substantive vindication of concept publicity. A 
non-transitive notion of sameness would seem to jeopardize the very idea of concept 
publicity or, to put it in Fodor’s terms, the idea that all sorts of concepts “are ones that 
all sorts of people, under all sorts of circumstances, have had and continue to have” 
(Fodor 1998, 29). The reason is surely obvious: if the fact that C1 is the same as C2 and 
C2 the same as C3 does not ipso facto make it true that C1 is the same as C3, then there 
might be a situation in which, even if I might share all my concepts with someone in the 
community, they quite generally fail to be the same concepts as those of my fellows. As 
previously observed, a substantive vindication of publicity does not merely require that 
it be possible that subjects share their concepts. It requires, more precisely, that 
indefinitely large numbers of subjects do share the very same concepts. Thus, while a 
non-transitive notion of sameness is arguably enough to make sense of concept sharing, 
it does not suffice to guarantee that “thoughts are widely shared by chains of 
 
relationist contender. But note that, as presented in the main text, the scope of the objection widens to any 
class of concepts one deems to be distinctively explanatory. As far as we can tell, the objection will then 
only be a ‘small victory’ for the non-relationist on the assumption that (i) indexicals express concepts 
which we may safely ignore in our account of concept sameness and (ii) that only indexicals express 
concepts with distinctive explanatory features. Neither of these claims seem however warranted. 
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communicating agents within and across linguistic communities, as well as chains of 
time slices connected by memory relations” (Onofri 2018, 19). 
 Regardless of the aforementioned points, some relationist authors have conceded 
that relational connectedness is not transitive (e.g. Fine 2007, Pinillos 2011, Prosser 
2019, forthcoming). Prosser remarks that, just as Parfit’s (1971) lesson about personal 
identity was that survival – understood as psychological connectedness – is not identity 
but a non-transitive relation between temporal stages, the lesson here might be that the 
same goes for the ‘survival’ of a concept (Prosser 2019, §7; see also Recanati 2016, Chap. 
3). This is not the place to assess the cogency of Prosser’s suggestive analogy. Instead, 
we will retain ourselves to defending the following two-fold claim: (i) a non-transitive 
notion of concept sameness compromises a substantive notion of concept publicity and 
(ii) relational theories appear obligated to admit that concept sameness is not transitive. 
 We take (i) to have been sufficiently established in the previous paragraphs. As 
for (ii): it is not hard to see that relational connectedness allow for cases in which a 
subject S1 possesses two distinct concepts C1 and C2, the two of which are the same as a 
second subject S2’s C3. This possibility remains open even if we assume that S1 and S2 
represent (time-slices of) the same individual.  
 To illustrate, imagine the following scenario inspired by Kripke’s (1979, 265-
266) distinct – but not unrelated – discussion: Peter is exposed to two separate 
conversations about Paderewski, a famous pole pianist who has also acted as a prominent 
politician. In the first conversation, Paderewski is only referred to as being an 
accomplished pianist. In the second, as an important ex-prime minister of Poland. Given 
that Peter believes that no politician is a good musician, he infers that there must be two 
persons called ‘Paderewski’ being referred to in each conversation and thus entertains 
two distinct thoughts – one that he judges true, another that he judges false – which he 
would express by the same sentence, ‘Paderewski has musical talent’. 
 Now, let us call Saul the person that was talking about Paderewski in the two 
contexts where Peter was present. We can assume that Saul knows very well that 
Paderewski, the pianist and politician, is no more than one person. That means that the 
concept that he was expressing in the two conversations by ‘Paderewski’ was one and 
the same. Let us call Saul’s concept C1. As we have seen, Peter’s confusion led him to 
think that there were two distinct individuals named ‘Paderewski’. In conceptual terms, 
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this means that Peter has at least two distinct concepts, C2 and C3, one of a polish 
musician, another of a polish politician. But by considerations of cognitive significance, 
C2 and C3 are surely distinct concepts, i.e. Peter can rationally take contrasting attitudes 
to two thoughts that differ only in the substitution of one concept for the other. However, 
it seems hard to deny that C2 and C3 are each relationally connected to Saul’s C1. For 
instance, it seems that Peter and Saul would trade on the identity of each other’s tokens 
of ‘Paderewski’ in each of the two contexts where they were present and where a 
conversation about Paderewski took place. Similarly, it is plausible that if a forms a 
singular concept for some individual O in response to hearing b use a certain proper name 
N that refers to O, then a knows that the concept just formed co-refers with whichever 
concept b expressed by means of N. Given that principle, it is hard to deny that Peter 
knows that C2 and C3 co-refer with the concept that Saul expresses by means of 
‘Paderewski’. Indeed, provided that Peter formed C2 and C3 from listening to Saul talk 
about Paderewski, he would seem to have knowledge of co-reference between his 
concepts and whichever concept Saul expresses by ‘Paderewski’ – regardless of the fact 
that he is not in a position to infer that his two concepts, C2 and C3, also co-refer as a 
consequence of that.  
 The predicament should now be clear: C2 and C3 are (a) distinct from each other 
and (b) identical to C1.
91 Cases with an analogous structure have led Prosser and others 
to give up on the transitivity of sharing a concept. As we have seen, however, it is not 
clear how a non-transitive account of concepts such as this would be able to account for 
a substantive notion of publicity.  
 Schroeter (2012) and Onofri (2018) are well aware that the non-transitivity 
menace hovers over their relational approaches. They suggest that, if a concept is shared 
between two individuals pertaining to the same community, then it should also be the 
case that this concept is shared by most members of that community. In order to make 
sense of this idea, they appeal to indirect linking relations and argue that two concepts or 
thoughts are the same, on their account, “not only when directly linked, but also when 
indirectly linked by a chain of direct linking relations” (Onofri 2018, 19). However, we 
 
91 Taschek (1998, 347 ff.) provides a variation of the point in the main text in terms of disagreement and 
agreement towards Peter’s utterance of ‘Paderewski has musical talent’. See also Fine 2007, Chap. 4. 
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submit, indirect linking relations do nothing to help us with the fact that Peter’s two 
concepts are both linked with Saul’s but nonetheless distinct from one another. 
 Cumming’s (2013) view seems to be better geared to deal with Paderewski cases. 
According to Cumming, relational connectedness requires a one-to-one conventional 
mapping between concepts. To be sure, this is precisely what is not the case with respect 
to Peter and Saul – the former has two concepts mapping onto the latter’s only one. 
Cumming is probably right that his formalization secures transitivity (symmetry and 
reflexivity) of the sameness relation (Cumming 2013, 14). However, even if he succeeds 
in this regard, Cumming’s account is far too restrictive. It predicts failure of concept 
sharing in cases where it should not.92  
 Cumming focuses on cases where a subject takes two uses of the same name as 
being two uses of distinct homophone names. However, there are instances of cases like 
these in which it is extremely unlikely that one has ceased to share concepts with one’s 
peers. Imagine the following twist to our story where the polish pianist himself goes to a 
classical concert and overhears some people saying, ‘the pianist booked for tonight is not 
as good as Paderewski’. Given Paderewski’s humbleness, he assumes that there must be 
someone (distinct from him) that shares his name and who is a good enough pianist to 
deserve such praise. As a matter of fact, that group consisted of Paderewski’s closest 
friends and they were talking about him. However, given Paderewski’s misapprehension, 
he now has two concepts that he would express by ‘Paderewski’ – one he knows is about 
himself and another he thinks is not. Provided that these two concepts are not one-to-one 
coordinated with his peers’ only concept, they are also, on Cumming’s account, not 
relationally connected with his peers’ concept. Paderewski’s uses of ‘Paderewski’, that 
is to say, will not express the same concept as his closest friends and relatives’ uses of it. 
This is implausible. In conclusion, Cumming’s proposal would only be able to save the 
transitivity of concept sharing at the cost of giving up on a plausible, less restricted notion 




92 Onofri (2018, 18) makes a related argument. 
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3.2 Relational conditions are not necessary for publicity 
So far we have been concerned with cases in which a relational condition between two 
concepts holds or plausibly holds, yet it is not thereby guaranteed that the concepts so 
related pass muster with central aspects of concept publicity, such as type classification, 
generalizable intentional explanation and transitivity. In this section, we purport to show 
that relational connectedness is not necessary for publicity either. Two (token) concepts 
that are not relationally connected may nevertheless be public and shared. To see this, 
we may reflect on two central phenomena: disagreement and basic concepts. 
 Disagreement. The difficulties for relational accounts vis-à-vis publicity also 
reach out into a domain that, at first pass, seems most amenable to them, namely, 
disagreement. We may focus on the most basic case in which subjects are in disagreement 
because they believe directly contradictory propositions of the form p and not-p. Under 
a widely shared conception of (dis)agreement, a necessary condition for two subjects S1 
and S2 to be in (dis)agreement with each other about p is that S1 and S2 share the 
constituent concepts of p.93  
The key idea is that disagreement in this basic sense is possibly an interaction-
free notion. Relevantly for our purposes, this possibility is specifically attached to a 
conception of disagreement involving attitudinal states towards propositional contents 
(Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009, 60). Thus, MacFarlane observes that “[p]eople can be 
in disagreement even if they do not know of each other” (MacFarlane 2014, 119). 
Similarly, Teresa Marques notes that “we have the impression that there are 
disagreements between subjects who are not part of the same conversational setting, or 
do not even interact in any form” (Marques 2015, §1).  
We may recur to several examples to prove the point. For instance, it is plausible 
that the average contemporary person disagrees with John Dalton over the indivisibility 
of atoms (Burge 1986, 716; Author paper 1). Arguably too, “the ancient Greeks were in 
disagreement with the ancient Indians about whether the bodies of the dead should be 
burned or buried even before Herodotus and other travellers made this disagreement 
known to them” (MacFarlane 2014, 119). But note, by contrast, that it does not seem 
 
93 Central cases of disagreement in this sense could also involve desires or intentions (e.g. Huvenes 2012, 
MacFarlane 2014, 122-123, Marques 2015). The same point holds, mutatis mutandis, for cases in which a 
subject changes her views across time.    
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correct to claim that the candidate relations advanced by Relationism actually hold 
between concepts whenever interaction-free disagreement holds. For instance, our atom 
concept and Dalton’s do not seem to be relationally connected. In short, disagreement 
requires concept sharing but people may disagree even when no relational connection is 
present.94 
 To counter this line of argument, relationists may invoke again indirect linking 
relations between concepts. On this account, two people may disagree without being 
directly relationally connected as long as there is a possible chain of relational 
connections that eventually reaches out onto each other’s concepts. However, indirect 
linking relations are here ineffective in a straightforward way. It is possible, and indeed 
conceivable, that two subjects S1 and S2 disagree in their beliefs over p while being 
neither directly nor indirectly linked. Consider, for instance, the inhabitants of Plato’s 
mythical Atlantis and suppose that they actually existed but, limiting their whereabouts 
to the confines of their island, never really got in touch with any other community or 
civilisation. At one point, they disappear off the face of the Earth so that no trace of them 
is left. Let us suppose, finally, that Atlanteans had all sorts of controversial views over 
scientific, moral or religious issues. We may take these views to be incompatible with 
the views over the same matters of most other civilisations and communities in the rest 
of the world. It is thus conceivable that Atlanteans were in a wealth of disagreements 
with the rest of the world. However, ex-hypothesis, no relation and, a fortiori, no indirect 
linking relation yoked them to the rest of the world.95 
 A rather different strategy on behalf of Relationism would be to fall back on a 
purely truth-conditional account of disagreement. Even if ancient Greeks and Indians did 
not share their concepts, a relationist could say, they did have thoughts with the same 
truth-conditions. Our intuitions of disagreement between these two civilizations could 
then be accounted for by the fact that they often took contrasting attitudes to thoughts 
with the same truth-conditions. 
 
94 Although disagreement has attracted much more attention, the same point could be put in terms of 
agreement.  
95 The Atlantis case also blocks the suggestion that asymmetric or one-way concept relations may, as it 
were, trigger symmetric sameness concept relations (cf. Cumming’s notion of symbol coordination that is 
symmetric but itself based upon the asymmetric notion of symbol mapping (2013, 6-12, esp. n. 32)). On 
this account, for C1 to be the same as C2, C1 has to stand in R to C2 but not the other way around. Irrespective 
of this, of course, Atlanteans are neither symmetrically nor asymmetrically related to any other community. 
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The issue here is that disagreement seems to be a hyperintensional notion, and a 
purely truth-conditional surrogate of it would not seem to be able to account for certain 
special situations. Imagine, for the sake of illustration, that both the ancient Greek and 
Indian civilizations used to observe the planet Venus in the mornings and in the evenings 
without knowing that it was Venus in both occasions. We could even suppose that, by 
sheer chance, they used the same names for Venus in these two occasions, ‘Phosphorus’ 
and ‘Hesperus’. Now, suppose that the Greeks believed that Hesperus was a planet, but 
that Phosphorus was a star, whereas the Indians believed that both Hesperus and 
Phosphorus were planets. Intuitively, we would like a theory of concepts to allow us to 
say that these two civilizations agreed about Hesperus being a planet but disagreed about 
Phosphorus being so. On the other hand, since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ just refer to 
Venus, a purely truth-conditional conception of disagreement would not let us go so far: 
there is no truth-conditional (dis)agreement about Hesperus that would not immediately 
translate into a (dis)agreement about Phosphorus. 
At this point, relationists could bite the bullet and admit that concept sharing 
stemming from disagreement relations is just out of scope for the view. But this would 
definitely not be a victory for Relationism. We are in this essay concerned with the 
question of whether Relationism has the resources to fully accommodate a substantive 
notion of publicity. It is in this context self-defeating to propose that Relationism does 
fail to explain disagreement-based concept shareability, or even worse, to retreat to a 
notion of disagreement without concept sharing, and hence without the publicity of our 
concepts. 
Basic concepts. Leaving aside the issue of disagreement, it seems in general 
plausible that people can and do share concepts without (their tokens) standing in any 
form of relational connection to one another. A leaf from Fodor’s writings is helpful here: 
 
[...] it should turn out that people who live in very different cultures and/or at 
very different times (me and Aristotle, for example) both have the concept 
FOOD; and that people who are possessed of very different amounts of 
mathematical sophistication (me and Einstein, for example) both have the 
concept TRIANGLE; and that people who have had very different kinds of 
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learning experiences (me and Helen Keller, for example) both have the 
concept TREE; and that people with very different amounts of knowledge (me 
and a four-year-old, for example) both have the concept HOUSE. And so forth. 
Accordingly, if a theory or an experimental procedure distinguishes between 
my concept DOG and Aristotle’s, or between my concept TRIANGLE and 
Einstein’s, or between my concept TREE and Helen Keller’s, etc. that is a very 
strong prima facie reason to doubt that the theory has got it right about concept 
individuation or that the experimental procedure is really a measure of concept 
possession. (Fodor 1998, 29) 
 
We may put the point in terms of basic concepts. It is unlikely that each and every case 
in which it is plausible that two subjects – however spatio-temporally distant and 
culturally disparate – share one of these basic concepts is a case in which a relational 
condition is satisfied. People in different communities, speaking different languages or, 
in the extreme case, inhabiting different remote galaxies may not ever interact or possibly 
interact with one another. Still, it would be surprising if that would need to entail that 
these people never share any one concept – say, the concept of food, dog, or triangle, to 
use Fodor’s examples or, perhaps even more plausibly, the logical concept of 
conjunction, or the material conditional. But this is what seems to be required on an 
account of sameness as relational connectedness. Note that the point holds water no 
matter what particular notion of basic concept we may be ready to countenance, so long 
as one is indeed allowed. If there are any basic concepts – be these, say, genetically, 
developmentally or rationally basic – people may plausibly share them without being 
relationally connected. And while relationists may try in this context to appeal to indirect 
linking relations or more complex construals of the target relations to accommodate this 
fact, they would, it seems to us, founder for exactly the same reasons we have already 
encountered. 
 One line of reaction to this point is to claim that Relationism’s proper focus is not 
basic but non-basic concepts. While we lack a decisive argument against this manoeuvre, 
it does not however seem very advisable. First, if there is one explanatory target that our 
account of concept sameness should prioritise that is precisely basic concepts. If we 
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cannot get a grip on what concept sameness means for these concepts, we suggest, our 
account would be severely restricted. Second, to bite the bullet in regards to basic 
concepts seems, ultimately, to expose any relational account for a concept C to the 
criticism that C might actually be a basic concept. Basic concepts might plausibly include 
those for which Relationism is supposed to be giving the right sort of treatment, such as 
concepts expressible with perceptual demonstratives – such as ‘this’/‘that’ or ‘this F’/ 
‘that F’ – and indexicals – such as ‘I’, ‘here’ or ‘now’.  
 Another line of reply on behalf of relationists is perhaps to go modal: two 
concepts would be said to be the same just in case there is a possible world in which R 
holds between them. The problem with this suggestion is that the approach would border 
on idleness: arguably, for any two co-referring concepts C1 and C2 expressible with terms 
t and t’ there will always be a possible world in which R holds. The proposal would 
therefore need to constrain the relevant modality in a way that does not result in a merely 
referential individuation of concepts, nor is blatantly ad-hoc. Pessimism about the 
prospects of such an endeavour would not seem unfounded. 
 
4 Publicity and Reference-Determination 
We do not take the lines of criticism set out in the previous section to severally constitute 
a knock-down argument against relational treatments of publicity. We do however 
believe that they collectively compound to make a strong case against such treatments. 
But the significance of this predicament would not be adequately portrayed without a 
diagnosis of the kind of hurdles we have been discussing. Here is what we take to be the 
key insight in this regard: both non-relational and relational approaches to concepts 
provide suitable accounts of one of the central basic roles that concepts play, namely, the 
CS-Role. However, when it comes to the the P-Role, neither theory seems to fully capture 
the phenomenon. On the one hand, non-relationists face the threat of postulating too 
demanding and variable concepts that are not likely to be shared from individual to 
individual. By contrast, Relationism puts forward a criterion of concept sameness that 
bypasses the variability issue but cannot account for the aspects of publicity brought out 
by the arguments outlined above, and thus ends up not guaranteeing a substantive notion 
of concept publicity. 
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 An important point of this diagnosis is that non-relational theories are, perhaps 
surprisingly, largely untouched by the publicity problems we have been considering in 
the previous Section 2. To see this, we may reflect on traditional views as embodied in 
the idea of a ‘referential theory’. In order to fix ideas and to offer the most encompassing 
version of the class of theories we are evoking, we may recur to the notion of a reference-
determining condition. A reference-determining condition individuating a concept C is 
the condition – intensionally or extensionally described – that an object x has to fulfil in 
order for x to be the reference of C. When the condition for an object x to be the reference 
of C (say, Hesperus) is just that x be a particular referent a (say, Venus), then the 
reference-determining condition is ‘purely’ referential. Yet there is no need to subscribe 
to that particular interpretation. A condition for x to be the reference of C could be 
specified, intensionally, in terms of a mode of presentation or way of thinking taken as a 
primitive notion, a descriptive content (e.g. ‘the heavenly body visible in the evening’), 
a judgemental disposition (e.g. application conditions for C) or a particular epistemic 
connection or knowledge towards x (e.g. acquaintance with or knowledge of Venus). 
This characterisation thus leaves considerable leeway as to the favoured details filling in 
the notion of a reference-determining condition.96 What is relevant is that such a 
condition, however exactly glossed, is intrinsically attached to the concept in ways that 
serve, at the same time, to its individuation and to its reference-determination. 
 On this construal, referential theories capture the fact that two people share a 
particular concept in terms of these people using (token) concepts that share a reference-
determining condition. For a concept to be public is, accordingly, for many people in the 
community to share (token) concepts with the same reference-determining condition. 
This broad-stroke framework can suffice to make vivid the way in which referential 
theories are supposed to help in relation to the aspects of publicity related above. For 
shareability, when understood in the referential terms just sketched, delivers the aspects 
of publicity we have been highlighting for free.  
To begin with, a referential theory would afford the right results regarding 
scenarios that necessitate shareability but not external conceptual relations, namely, 
disagreement and basic concepts. In particular, interpersonal disagreement in different 
 
96 As the most elaborated non-relational accounts illustrate (e.g. Chalmers 2011, Evans 1982, García-
Carpintero 2000, Jackson 1998 or Peacocke 2008). 
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communities and spatio-temporal locations may involve the same concepts so long as 
their reference-determining conditions are the same. Basic concepts also fit the mould. 
A referential theory would suggest that basic concepts are concepts individuated by basic 
reference or validity conditions cutting across relationally unconnected groups of 
thinkers. 
Sufficiency problems are, if shareability is granted, clearly amenable to the 
referential framework too. Remarkably, the framework avoids any problems with 
transitivity: for two concepts to have the same reference-determining condition as a third 
concept, is for them to actually share such a condition. But a referential theory of the sort 
we are envisaging also fares better than Relationism when addressing the type 
classification and the intentional explanation worries. This theory would offer accounts 
in which relevant conceptual types correspond neatly with referentially articulated types 
and where the explanatory features engaged in intentional explanations is given by 
generalizable features of a reference-determining condition. Referential theories would 
then dodge the charge of being in principle blind to (semantic) conceptual type 
classifications or generalizable explanatory features. 
The picture we arrive at is thus one in which interrelated weaknesses and 
strengths of referential and relational theories are brought to the fore vis-à-vis CS- and 
P-roles. In sum, for the reasons aptly pointed out in the relationist literature, referential 
theories account for the CS-Role in ways that generate trouble when it comes to 
guaranteeing shareability. Nonetheless, as just noted, referential views also put forward 
frameworks in which to assume shareability is quite nearly to assume publicity in the full 
sense we have been underlining. By contrast, relational theories do a good job securing 
concept shareability while providing insightful explanations of the CS-Role. However, 
relational shareability has trouble guaranteeing a notion of publicity covering the aspects 
under focus here. It seems therefore fair to conclude that, for different reasons, neither 
type of theory has so far offered an adequate account of the P-Role.  
 One may wonder: why should we care about the aspects of publicity that a 
referentialist theory seems so apt, and a relational theory so inapt, to tackle? Admittedly, 
the concerns of this paper carry weight only on the assumption that the aspects of 
publicity we have been highlighting are at all important. What if our theory only focuses 
on cases of direct interpersonal exchanges such as, paradigmatically, face-to-face 
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communication? In reaction to this we only want to note that it seems unassailable that 
one’s theory would be better off if able to accommodate the full array of phenomena 
comprised under the idea that concepts are public. We take the ones we have tabled to be 
well-motivated on intuitive grounds. Whether or not our primary interest lies elsewhere, 
in short, it seems wise not to let those phenomena go unheeded. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this article, we have argued that in spite of the many merits of Relationism, this 
recently developed family of theories fails to provide a full account of concept publicity. 
Reflection on the intuitively plausible manifestations of publicity brings out that 
relational connectedness is neither sufficient nor necessary for concept publicity. We take 
this insight to be an important corrective upon the hopes pinned on this kind of 
approaches but also, and perhaps more importantly, an invitation to take stock and 
reconsider the explanatory assets of non-relational views of concept sameness. 
According to these views, concept sharing is (not a mere stroke of luck but) a 
consequence of the fact that concepts are entities that make it possible for subjects to 
think of a world that is, for the most part, open and accessible to all. To individuate a 
concept is thus to single out a type of thinking about something in this open world. On 
this basic picture, to focus merely on external relations – as Relationism would have thus 
far suggested – will, very likely, only give you part of the true story about concept 
publicity. The suggestion is, therefore, that concepts can hardly be public if there is no 
intrinsic individuating relation between the concept and its publically accessible referent. 
Even if many, especially from relationist ranks, will find this suggestion unattractive or 
ultimately inviable, its serious consideration seems unavoidable in a fully satisfactory 
treatment – whether relational or not – of the idea that concepts signal, in Frege’s words, 
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In this dissertation, I have investigated several philosophical puzzles associated to the 
thesis that thoughts are public, i.e. that in successful instances of communication, 
understanding, and in cases where thinkers are in genuine agreement with each other, the 
relevant thinkers accept the same thoughts. In chapter 1, I showed that this thesis seems 
difficult to uphold in the face of cases involving indexical expressions. When subjects 
successfully communicate with indexical expressions, they are nonetheless disposed to 
perform different actions, and thus we have reason to deny that they accept exactly the 
same thoughts. In chapter 2, I showed that this thesis is in conflict with the thesis that 
thoughts must track the cognitive profile of our attitudes (‘Frege’s Constraint’). In 
chapter 3, I showed that this thesis is in conflict with a minimal version of semantic 
internalism and that even the most conservative way of trying to make these two theses 
compatible involves weakening the claim that thought is public in the sense previously 
defined. In chapter 4, I investigated criteria of successful communication and argued 
against one based on match of referential content plus absence of false beliefs. In its 
place, I suggested we go back to criteria based on match of modes of presentation 
(thoughts) or successful recognition of the speaker’s referential intentions. In chapter 5, 
I argued that thought’s publicity cannot be fully accommodated by extant relationist 
theories of thoughts and concepts. One way to frame the most general conclusion of this 
dissertation is that it is futile to try to individuate an intersubjective notion of thought 
which is transitive, or which is equally useful from an intrapersonal perspective. If we 
have any reason for carving up an intersubjective notion of thought – and not even this 
is clear, as far as this dissertation is concerned – then it will most likely be orthogonal to 
the usual subjective one.  
 
 
 
 
